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Literally, ‘economics’ is a strict subset of ‘econometrics’, but their relation in practice is
far more complicated than containing. It is also a non-trivial job to associate them in an
appropriate way in a study, and I find it even more difficult to do this in a Ph.D. thesis,
at least for me. Nevertheless, I find it equally interesting if we could apply appropriate
econometric methods in finding the answer to an economic question, or develop a well-
suited econometrics method to address an economic problem. This thesis tries to do
these two things. In the first two chapters we try to develop general and hopefully
appropriate econometric tools to address problems encountered by economists. In the
next two chapters, we try to investigate the effect of some policies using appropriate
econometric methods.
1.1. Estimation and prediction under uncertainty
Chapter 2 and 3 study estimation and prediction in an uncertain environment. Re-
searchers and policy-makers are exposed to a world full of uncertainty, and thus their
studies and decisions have to be made under various sources of uncertainty. Let me bor-
row a story from my supervisor. Suppose a ruler seeks advice on a specific parameter,
say next year’s inflation. He has twelve advisors, and each advisor provides an estimate.
When all have left, the ruler has twelve estimates. In addition, he has an opinion about
each advisor based on past experience and current performance. How does the ruler
now obtain a single estimate? There are at least two possibilities. The ruler may think:
Whom do I trust most? Whose advice do I think most reliable? Then, he takes the ad-
vice of his most trusted advisor. This is the first method. Alternatively, he may consider
all advisors useful, but not to the same degree. Some are more experienced and more
clever than others, so they get a higher weight. Then, the ruler computes a weighted
average of the twelve estimates. This is the second method. While the second method
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appeals to common sense, econometric practice favors the first method. In econometric
practice one typically first selects the ‘best’ model based on diagnostic tests (such as
t-ratios, R2, and various information criteria) and then computes estimates within this
selected model. This is called ‘pretesting’. There are many problems with this proce-
dure. For example, the pretest estimator is ‘kinked’; it has a discontinuity at one. This
is not only mathematically undesirable but also intuitively: we exclude a variable if its
estimated coefficient has a t-ratio less than 1.96; we include it if the t-ratio is larger than
1.96. Most importantly, model selection and estimation are completely separated—just
like the ruler only listening to his most trusted advisor—so that uncertainty in the model
selection is ignored when reporting properties of the estimates.
In these two chapters we use model averaging techniques to incorporate the uncer-
tainty. In the first chapter, we consider estimating a regression model when there are
multiple measurements for independent variables. In particular, when one specifies the
equation to be estimated, one has to decide which concepts (say inflation) to include
in the regression. In addition, one has to decide which measurements of these concepts
to use (for example, CPI-based or PPI-based inflation). This gives rise to two levels
of uncertainty: concepts (level 1) and measurements within each concept (level 2), and
we call this the ‘measurement problem’. The measurement problem raises at least three
issues. First, different choices of measurements produce different estimates for the same
concept, leading to ambiguity in explanation and policy implications. Second, multi-
ple measurements typically cause multicollinearity if they are included in one regression
model, so that the estimates for individual measurements are imprecise, and statistical
inference on a concept based on these estimates can therefore be misleading. Third,
including multiple measurements in one model can also cause a problem of dimensional-
ity when the number of explanatory variables is close to or even exceeds the number of
observations.
Although this problem has been realized in the growth literature by Brock et al.
(2003), there are no completely satisfactory solutions. One conventional method is to
use the robustness check or extreme bounds analysis (Leamer and Leonard, 1983). The
main drawback of this method is that it produces different estimates for each concept, and
requires too strong conditions to obtain robust results. Alternatively, one would often
try many different concepts, and select the most appealing combination. This method is
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called ‘pretesting’ and it suffers from the various problems mentioned above. One may
also employ a factor-augmented regression model, but this approach is subject to the
pretest for the number of factors, and the explanation of a concept is less clear if more
than one factor is used. Extracting exactly one factor from each group can resolve the
above problems, but it only makes use of a very limited part of information contained
in the data. Since the procedure of extracting factors is independent of estimation
procedure, it is not necessary that the extracted information is relevant and complete
in explaining a specific dependent variable. On the contrary, our approach uses the full
information of the data, and estimate the model in an integrate procedure (once the
grouping is specified). Thus, we avoid the problems of factor analysis discussed above.
More advanced methods such as Durlauf et al. (2008); Chipman (1996); Doppelhofer and
Weeks (2009) are related with our approaches, but with significant difference which we
shall discuss in details in Chapter 2.
We propose a hierarchical weighted least squares (HWALS) to address the measure-
ment problem. In hierarchical model averaging, we introduce prior probabilities for the
variables in each group, and treat the regression parameters as hierarchical random vari-
ables. We are uncertain about the error term, about which groups to select, and about
which variables to select. All three levels of uncertainty are explicitly taken into ac-
count in our hierarchical model averaging estimation. Compared with existing methods,
has several advantages. It provides an estimate and standard deviation for each group,
which facilitates statistical inference and enables us to analyze the effect of each group;
it combines model selection and estimation and thus avoids the problems associated with
pretesting (see Danilov and Magnus (2004b) for a discussion and review of these prob-
lems); it allows researchers to assign various types of priors depending on the strength
of their information and beliefs; it does not suffer from multicollinearity and dimension-
ality problems because it only considers models with one variable in each group; and
its computational burden is very light, especially compared to standard Bayesian model
averaging (BMA) and Bayesian averaging of classical estimates (BACE).
In Chapter 3 we study the prediction under uncertainty. We propose a weighted
average least square (WALS) predictor, and and study its properties in simulations. The
WALS procedure avoids some of the problems encountered in standard Bayesian model
averaging (BMA). In particular, the prior is based on a coherent notion of ignorance, thus
3
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avoiding normality of the prior and unbounded risk. Also, the computational burden in-
creases linearly rather than exponentially with the number of regressors, and is therefore
trivial compared to other model averaging estimators such as standard BMA, model-
selection-based weights methods (Buckland et al., 1997; Hjort and Claeskens, 2003), ex-
ponential reweighting (Yang, 2004), or Mallows model averaging (Hansen, 2007, 2008).
Our proposed method explicitly allows for correlation in the observations, including pos-
sible correlation between the errors in the realized sample and the predictive sample.
Another main contribution of this chapter is that we propose an estimate for the
prediction variance taking model uncertainty into account, and evaluate the accuracy of
this estimate. Prediction variance is typically ignored in the existing model averaging
prediction methods. In this chapter we evaluate the proposed prediction variance through
simulation. We emphasize that the typical researcher’s instinct favoring a predictor with
a small variance over one with a large variance is not correct. We argue that what we
require is not a small but a ‘correct’ variance: in a situation with much noise a predictor
with a small variance can cause much harm, while a truthfully reported large variance
may lead to more prudent policy. In fact, one of the problems with the credibility of
econometric predictions may be that our reported prediction variances are too small,
and this is caused, at least in part, by the fact that model uncertainty is ignored. We
shall see that WALS predictions may lead to higher variances, but that these variances
are closer to the truth.
1.2. Econometrics meets political economics
Policy-makers design policies to improve the economy, social welfare, or for other pur-
poses. In reality, however, it is often that policies engender undesirable effects. Some
policy may have the outcome that largely deviates from its original intention, or even
the opposite outcome; More often, policies can have unexpected effects that harm other
aspects of economy and social welfare which is not accounted. Therefore, policy-makers
are especially interested in the effect a policy on the economy or social welfare. Chapter 4
and 5 study two influential policies in China and U.S., respectively, and investigate the
effect of the policies on economy and social welfare.
4
Introduction
Chapter 2 considers the policy ‘West China Development Drive’, introduced by the
Chinese central government in 2000 with the purpose of stimulating the economy of
the Western regions. This policy emphasizes on intensifying natural resource exploita-
tion, and several significant projects connected with natural resources in West-China
have resulted from this initiative. For example, the West-East natural gas transmission
project led to an increase of natural gas production in Sichuan and Qinghai provinces
by more than 100% and 900%, respectively, between 2000 and 2007. Also, steel produc-
tion in Yunan and Guizhou provinces increased by around 200% and 400%, respectively,
since the Drive began. The economic growth rate in Western provinces has indeed in-
creased since 2000. We focus on how this policy affects the resource effect on economic
growth. We first examine the interaction between natural resource, institutional quality,
and economic growth using cross-sectional data. We propose several new measurements
of resource abundance. These new measurements consider resource abundance either
as a stock or as a flow, thus allowing a comparison between in situ resource reserves
(a stock) and resource revenues (a flow, usually referred to as a ‘windfall gain’), and
they are regarded as less endogenous than conventional dependence measures. To allow
the possible nonlinear interaction effect of institutional quality, we employ a functional
coefficient model and find that the effect of resource abundance in China depends on in-
stitutional quality in a nonlinear fashion, which can not be fully captured using a linear
model. More importantly, we find — in contrast to Mehlum et al. (2006) — that the
effect of natural resources is more positive for provinces with poor institutional quality.
We then investigate whether resource effect is different before and after the policy
by estimating a standard and a time-varying panel data model. Immediately after the
2000 policy shock, the positive correlation between economic growth and resource rev-
enues was increasing, but this did not last long. After 2004 economic growth slowed
down while resource revenues kept increasing, leading to weak correlation. The phe-
nomena before 2004 is due to the emphasis of the West China Development Drive on
exploiting the resources in the Western provinces more intensively and efficiently. In-
come in these regions has increased, stimulating economic growth, but not equally in
all regions. The decreasing correlation between economic growth and resource revenues
after 2004 shows that increased resource exploitation did not promote the development
of other industries and sectors typically regarded as engines of economic growth. As ex-
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emplified in Figure 4.5, average R&D, industrialization, private sector employment, and
foreign investment all changed relatively little as resource revenues increased sharply.
Typical examples are Ningxia and Gansu provinces, where resource revenues increased
significantly after 2000, but most of the other sectors were still underdeveloped. The
economies of the Western provinces still relied much on primitive sectors, and the indus-
trial structure of the Western provinces failed to modernize. The emphasis on resource
exploitation brought extra income in the short run, but it did not narrow the gap be-
tween West and East China. In addition, only part of the resources produced by the
Western regions was used to improve the local economy. The larger part was transported
to the Eastern regions to meet the large demand for energy and resources there. For
example, the most important gas field in Sichuan province transmitted more than 70%
of its natural gas to Eastern provinces. This may also have resulted in enlarging the gap
between Eastern and Western provinces.
Chapter 5 considers a fiscal policy, fiscal decentralization. Fiscal decentralization
shifts some responsibilities for expenditures and/or revenues to lower levels government.
During the last three decades, this policy has been at the center stage of policy exper-
iments, not only in countries with a traditional tendency of decentralizing like United
States, but also in a large number of developing and transition economies, such as Africa,
Asia, and Latin America. Fiscal decentralization is widely believed to be an effective
tool for improving the performance of public expenditure, partly because it introduces
more competition, and also because lower levels of government have better knowledge
of a citizen’s demand. However, in this chapter we point out that fiscal decentralization
also has a dark side that is currently not recognized in the literature: it can arise dress-
up contests between local governments in which they compete for a better image, and
such contests may lead to a structure bias in the public expenditure and further a social
welfare loss.
We first setup a game between two local politicians and model dress-up contests. This
model involves a concept of visibility proposed by Rogoff (1990) and Mani and Mukand
(2007). Public goods are ‘invisible’ if their outcomes cannot well reflect the politicians’
capability, either because they are difficult to observe or because they are determined by
other factors beyond government’s control. We study how fiscal decentralization affects
the distribution of public expenditure on visible and invisible public goods, and we find
6
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that this policy distorts public expenditure by allocating more resources on the visible
public goods.
Next, we empirically test the hypothesis implied by our theoretical model using the
U.S. state level panel data. We focus on the poverty rate in U.S., a typical measure
of social welfare, and treat cash assistance as a more visible public project and vendor
payment as a less visible one. We find that fiscal decentralization causes a public expen-
diture flow from vendor payment to cash assistance, that is from a less visible project
to a more visible one. This result provides evidence of the visibility effect, and also
confirms our theoretical findings that fiscal decentralization can cause dress-up contests.
To capture how the distortion of public expenditure affects poverty, we use a functional
coefficient approach, and estimate a pooled panel and a panel with a fixed effect. This
approach allows us to capture the possible nonlinear interaction between the ratio of
cash to vendor payment, welfare expenditure, and poverty. We find that the distortion
(measured by the ratio of cash to vendor payment) can largely weaken the impact of





averaging and growth empirics1
2.1. Introduction
In applied econometrics, when estimating a regression equation, one has to decide which
concepts (say inflation) to include in the regression: the ‘specification’ problem. In
addition, one has to decide which measurements of these concepts to use (for example,
CPI-based or PPI-based inflation): the ‘measurement’ problem. The measurement prob-
lem is common in practice because most economic variables can be measured in various
ways. Climate, for example, as a potential determinant of growth, can be measured
by the fraction of tropical zone, the tropical zone area, or the absolute latitude. An-
other example is the concept of market concentration, typically thought of as a factor
that affects the financial stability of individual firms, which can be measured by the
Herfindahl-Hirschman index or by the market share of the four largest firms.
The measurement problem raises at least three issues. First, different choices of
measurements produce different estimates for the same concept, leading to ambiguity
in explanation and policy implications. Second, multiple measurements typically cause
multicollinearity if they are included in one regression model, so that the estimates for
individual measurements lack precision, and statistical inference on a concept based on
these estimates can therefore be misleading. Third, including multiple measurements in
one model can also cause a problem of dimensionality when the number of explanatory
variables is close to or even exceeds the number of observations.
The current paper addresses the measurement problem by introducing hierarchical
(two-level) model averaging, where we perform model averaging over concepts and mea-
surements. From here on we shall denote concepts as groups, and measurements as
1This chapter is coauthored with Jan R. Magnus.
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variables. We propose a method called hierarchical weighted least squares (HWALS),
a generalization of weighted average least squares (WALS) developed in Magnus et al.
(2010). In hierarchical model averaging we introduce prior probabilities for the variables
in each group, and treat the regression parameters as hierarchical random variables.
We are uncertain about the error term, about which groups to select, and about which
variables to select. All three levels of uncertainty are explicitly taken into account in
hierarchical WALS estimation.
The HWALS procedure has several advantages. It provides an estimate and stan-
dard deviation for each group, which facilitates statistical inference and enables us to
analyze the effect of each group; it combines model selection and estimation and thus
avoids the problems associated with pretesting (see Danilov and Magnus (2004b) for a
discussion and review of these problems); it allows researchers to assign various types of
priors depending on the strength of their information and beliefs; it does not suffer from
multicollinearity and dimensionality problems because it only considers models with one
variable in each group; and its computational burden is very light, especially compared to
standard Bayesian model averaging (BMA) and Bayesian averaging of classical estimates
(BACE).
In the empirical growth literature the three types of uncertainty are especially impor-
tant, because there is little consensus in this literature on which regressors to include,
and, even if there is agreement on a regressor (group), there is still disagreement on which
measurement (variable) of that regressor to use. In addition, the number of variables in
growth empirics is large and may even exceed the number of observations. For example,
Durlauf et al. (2005) listed 145 candidate regressors, while the number of countries is typ-
ically less in cross-country growth studies. Our paper employs HWALS to re-investigate
the effects of the various growth determinants.
We mainly compare our estimates with those of Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) and with
the WALS estimates of Magnus et al. (2010). Our hierarchical model averaging estimates
produce more intuitive signs and they are more robust. This is the benefit we gain from
not ignoring the measurement problem, so that correlated variables within one group
are not all included in the regression. Our empirical results also provide several new
insights. For example, we find — in contrast to the current literature — that education
and government intervention are not robust, because some of the variables in these groups
10
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have poor explanatory power in the growth regressions.
The paper is organized as follows. A literature review is provided in Section 2.2. In
Section 5.2 we present the hierarchical estimation strategy. Section 4.3 describes the
data, grouping, and scaling. We apply our estimation strategy to the data in Section 2.5
and discuss the results. Next we address the potential problem that the number of vari-
ables is too large to apply the HWALS technique directly. In that case, approximations
are required and these are discussed in Section 2.6. Section 4.6 concludes. In our supple-
mentary document (Magnus and Wang, 2013) we present extensions and more detailed
analyses.
2.2. A brief review of the literature
The measurement problem is not new — it was mentioned, inter alia, in Brock et al.
(2003) in the context of growth empirics. A popular method to deal with it is ‘extreme
bounds analysis’ (Leamer and Leonard, 1983; Leamer, 1985), but this method has the
disadvantage (in contrast to HWALS) that it produces various estimates for each concept.
Another conventional method, called ‘pretesting’, is to try many different concepts and
select the most appealing combination. There are many problems with this procedure
(Danilov and Magnus, 2004) caused by the fact that model selection and estimation
are completely separated, so that uncertainty in the model selection is ignored when
reporting properties of the estimates. In contrast to pretesting, HWALS combines model
selection and estimation in one procedure.
One may also employ a factor-augmented regression model. Here we must decide
on the number of factors (pretest problem), and when more than one factor is used the
explanation of a concept becomes more difficult. A possible solution to both problems is
to extract just one factor from each group, but then we would use only a small portion
of the information in the data.
Since Raftery et al. (1997), Bayesian model averaging has developed as a popular tool
in addressing model uncertainty, especially in the application to the empirical growth lit-
erature; see, inter alia, Fernandez et al. (2001), Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004), and Ciccone
and Jarociński (2010). Standard Bayesian model averaging addresses model uncertainty
11
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(which concepts to include) in growth regressions, while our approach addresses both
model uncertainty and measurement uncertainty simultaneously, in the same spirit as
Salimans (2012) who studied functional-form uncertainty and model uncertainty simul-
taneously.
A recent study by Durlauf et al. (2008) investigated the robustness of growth theo-
ries using Bayesian model averaging with a dilution prior. This is related to what we
do, although the growth theories and their empirical proxies studied in Durlauf et al.
(2008) differ in an essential way from our ‘concepts’ and ‘measurements’. Multiple em-
pirical proxies capture different aspects of a growth theory, and each aspect itself is a
concept. For example, Durlauf et al. (2008) considered two proxies for the geography
theory, namely the fraction of tropical/subtropical land area and the fraction of land near
navigable water. These two proxies indeed measure two effects of geography on growth:
climate and physical accessibility (two concepts), and for each concept they only have
one measurement. The two proxies of the geography theory are not alternative mea-
surements for the same concept (correlation is only around 0.14), and this is where their
paper differs from ours. In our case, standard BMA cannot be applied, primarily because
we do not allow our model space to contain models with multiple measurements within
one group. The use of a dilution prior (George, 2010) captures the dilution property
resulting from multicollinear variables, but it does not address the fact that multiple
measurements of a concept are included in one model, leading to misleading Bayesian
model averaging estimates (due to misleading likelihoods and estimates obtained from
models containing multicollinear variables in the same group). By shrinking the model
space, our HWALS procedure addresses this problem and also reduces the computational
burden. HWALS thus also differs from the hierarchical dilution prior used in Durlauf
et al. (2012) who worked with the whole model space.
Related to our approach is the jointness statistic proposed in Doppelhofer and Weeks
(2009), which measures the dependence between explanatory variables. The jointness
measure is the posterior probability that two or more variables appear in the same model.
Multiple measurements of a concept are correlated with each other and are likely, but
not certain, to have strong negative jointness. Conversely, variables that have negative
jointness do not necessarily measure the same concept. Like other Bayesian approaches,
the jointness measure computed from the posterior probability is also affected by the
12
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multicolliniearity of variables in the same group.
Our work is in the same spirit as the hierarchical structure studied by Brock et al.
(2003) and the heredity prior proposed by Chipman (1996). Brock et al. (2003) employed
a tree structure to construct prior probabilities, while Chipman (1996) considered priors
for group predictors and for competing predictors. Our hierarchical averaging method
resembles these two approaches, especially since all three methods average over a subset
of models. But our method differs from the two approaches in at least four aspects. First,
unlike Brock et al. (2003) who assigned equal and independent weights to each growth
theory in a tree structure, HWALS allows for inequality and dependence between the
various theories. Second, compared with the heredity prior, the method of restricting the
model space is much simpler in HWALS (groups and variables). Third, our procedure
allows us to assign various types of priors to measurements (imprecise priors, data-
dependent priors) depending on the strength of the researcher’s beliefs. Finally, HWALS
provides an explicit form of the first two unconditional moments.
2.3. Hierarchical weighted average least squares
2.3.1. Groups and variables
We write the linear regression model as






2 + ǫ, (2.1)
where we note two deviations from standard notation. First we write X∗ and β∗ rather
than X and β, because the regressors are considered to be ‘groups’, for example edu-
cation or inflation. These are groups (concepts) rather than precisely defined variables.
There are many measures of education and of inflation that the researcher could use.
These measurements of the same concept in one group are our ‘variables’. Second, we
distinguish between focus regressors (labeled 1) and auxiliary regressors (labeled 2). Fo-
cus regressors are in the model irrespective of any preliminary test or diagnostic. These
include the variables of specific interest and the variables that economic knowledge dic-
tates to be in the model. Auxiliary regressors, on the other hand, may or may not be in
the model, depending on prior knowledge and diagnostics.
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We write the columns of the (group) regressors as
X∗1 =
(































The distinction between groups and variables is important. The l1-th focus group x
∗
1,l1




Groups may contain only one variable. While the variables themselves are considered
deterministic, a group is random (if there are at least two variables in the group) because
the choice between the variables or the weighting scheme depends on the data (and on
priors).













= πj2,l2 , (2.4)






πj2,l2 = 1. (2.5)
Given specific variables xi1,l1 and x
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2 + ǫ, (2.8)
where we emphasize again that each model includes precisely one variable from each
group.
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2.3.2. A three-step procedure
Under the assumption that the prior distributions on separate groups are independent,













The validity of the independence assumption embodied in (2.9) depends on how the
groups are set up, and it is therefore important to investigate the sensitivity of the
results to different groupings. We consider this issue in Section 2.5.5. This is the first
step.
For given (i) and (j) we estimate (2.8) by Bayesian model averaging. In Bayesian
model averaging the estimates are computed as weighted averages of the estimates ob-
tained over all possible models, thus allowing for the fact that auxiliary regressors may
or may not be in the model, depending on priors and diagnostics. A major advantage
of Bayesian model averaging is that it treats model selection and estimation as one pro-
cedure. We shall use a method called WALS (weighted average least squares), but this
is not essential in the development. The advantages of WALS are both conceptual and
computational. The version of WALS employed here is described in Magnus et al. (2010),
and the estimates are made scale-independent using the weighting scheme proposed in











and the posterior variance matrix V (i,j). This is the second step.
These posterior moments are, of course, still conditional on the choice of variables,
that is, on (i) and (j). In the third and final step we obtain the unconditional posterior















The variance V in the posterior distribution thus fully represents the three sources of
uncertainty associated with the hierarchical procedure: uncertainty represented by the
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error term given the specification of the model; uncertainty about which auxiliary groups
to include; and uncertainty about which variables to include in each group. The estimator
b is the hierarchical WALS (HWALS) estimator, and V is taken to be its variance.
The HWALS estimator b cannot be interpreted as the usual marginal effect, since
it corresponds to a group (concept) rather than to a variable (measurement). Since all
variables are normalized to the same scale (see Section 4.3), the estimated coefficient
of the i-th variable in a group is the normalized marginal effect, taking into account
possible inclusion of other auxiliary variables. Due to the normalization, such effects are
comparable not only within concepts but also between concepts. The averaged estimator
(over the variables) of a group coefficient can thus be interpreted as the average effect of
the group.
2.3.3. Choice of π
The prior probabilities π should be specified, and the question is how. The specification
of π should depend on the strength of the researcher’s prior information and beliefs on
the ‘quality’ of the variables. We distinguish between four cases.
In the first case, the researcher has no prior information at all. In each group the
quality of one variable is ‘independent’ of the quality of another, and equally good, so








This is our default. Discrete uniform priors (over models) in a Bayesian model averaging
framework were recently criticized by George (2010), especially in the presence of highly
correlated regressors. He suggested the use of dilution priors in order to prevent the
probability of a set of ‘similar’ models increasing when more similar variables are intro-
duced. While this is a good idea, our case is different, because our prior probabilities are
assigned to variables rather than the models, and thus the probabilities are not diluted
by highly correlated variables.
In the second case, the researcher has no prior information but hopes to update the
prior using the observed data. We propose to use data-dependent priors. We write
X∗1 = (X11 : X
∗
12), where X11 contains the focus regressors for which only one variable
is available, and X∗12 contains the focus regressors for which at least two variables are
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available. For each group l in X∗12 we estimate




1,l + ǫ (i = 1, . . . , m1,l), (2.13)




. Then we update

















A larger weight is thus assigned to the variable with more explanatory power (larger
likelihood). Equation (2.13) is misspecified, because we ignore X∗12 (except one variable
xi1,l) and all auxiliary regressors in X
∗
2 . However, the effect of the misspecification on π̄
is partially ‘divided out’ and thus expected to be small.
Two subcases are of interest. In case 2(a) (one-step updating) we update the priors
for the auxiliary variables in the same way, based on the equation




2,l + ǫ (j = 1, . . . , m2,l). (2.14)
In case 2(b) (two-step updating) we update the priors for the auxiliary variables based









2,l + ǫ (j = 1, . . . , m2,l), (2.15)
where all focus groups are used, not only the groups with one variable (X11), but also
the groups with two or more variables. For the latter we select the variable with the
highest posterior probability π̄i1,l.
The third case occurs when we have unequal prior information about the variables,
and the exact values of prior probabilities are also known.
In the fourth case we can rank the prior probabilities within one group without
knowing their precise values. Here we use ‘imprecise probability’ as our prior, namely
[π−, π+]. This generalization of precise (point-valued) probability satisfies all principles
of probability theory (Walley and Fine, 1982; Weichselberger, 2000), and allows us to
model the uncertainty of subjective prior probabilities. The resulting estimates b and V
are then also interval-valued.
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2.4. Data, grouping, and scaling
We reexamine growth determinants using the proposed hierarchical method of Sec-
tion 5.2. There is a large literature on explaining cross-country growth differences, but
this literature has not led to a consensus on which regressors to include and on which
measurement of that regressor to use. These issues are well exposed in Brock et al.
(2003). Growth empirics thus provides a typical and important example of a situation
where two types of uncertainty exist: uncertainty about the relevance of a group and
uncertainty about which variable to select within the group.
Our data are taken primarily from Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004). The dependent vari-
able is the average growth rate of GDP per capita 1960–1996. The Sala-i-Martin et al.
(2004) data set contains 88 countries and 67 variables (plus the constant term). To this
list we have added seven variables from Sala-i-Martin (1997): six variables in education
and one variable in government intervention. These are indicated with an asterisk (∗) in
Table 2.1. This makes a total of 74 variables (25 groups) plus the constant term. We
use 72 (rather than 88) countries, the maximum possible number if we wish to obtain
a ‘balanced’ data set with an equal number of observations for all regressors. Since we
have more variables than observations we cannot estimate the whole set. Grouping will
therefore be especially helpful here. The issue of having more variables than observations
has recently received new attention in the literature; see Huang et al. (2010) and Jensen
and Würtz (2012) for alternative approaches.
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Table 2.1: Grouping of variables: type I groups
g Group v Variable
(1) Demographic characteristics 1 Fraction population over 65
2 Fraction population under 15
(2) Economic system 3 Capitalism
4 Socialism
(3) Education 5 Primary schooling (1960 enrollment rate)
6∗ Secondary schooling (1960 enrollment rate)
7 Higher education (1960 enrollment rate)
8 Public education spending share in GDP in 1960s
9∗ Primary school years
10∗ Secondary school years
11∗ Higher education years
12∗ Average years of schooling
13∗ Average years of schooling × log of GDP per capita
(4) Government intervention 14 Public investment share
15∗ Public consumption share (excl. education and defense)
16 Government consumption share in 1960s
17 Government share of GDP in 1960s
18 Nominal government GDP share in 1960s
(5) Health 19 Life expectancy in 1960
20 Malaria prevalence in 1960s
(6) Inflation 21 Average inflation 1960–1990
22 Square of inflation 1960–1990
(7) Initial state 23 GDP per capita in 1960 (log)
24 Size of economy (GDP in 1960)
(8)∗∗ Democracy 25 Political rights
26 Civil liberties
(9) Scale effect 27 Land area
28 Population in 1960
(10) Trade policy indices 29 Outward orientation
30 Years open
(11) Tropics effect 31 Fraction of tropical area
32 Tropical climate zone
33 Absolute latitude
(12) War 34 Fraction spent in war 1960–1990
35 War participation 1960–1990
* Variable is not in the Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) data set, but taken from Sala-i-Martin (1997).
** Group (8) is called ‘Democracy’ following Barro (1999).
Table 2.2: Grouping of variables: type II groups
g Group v Variable
(13) Ethnicity and language 36∗ Ethnolinguistic fractionalization
37 English-speaking population
38 Fraction speaking foreign language








(15) Trade statistics 47∗ Openness measure 1965–1974
48 Primary exports in 1970
(16) Terms of trade 49 Terms of trade ranking
50 Terms of trade growth in 1960s







(18) Natural resources 58 Hydrocarbon deposits in 1993
59 Fraction GDP in mining
60 Oil-producing country dummy
(19) Population 61 Population density coastal in 1960s
62 Interior density
63 Fraction population in tropics
64 Population density in 1960
65 Population growth rate 1960–1990
66 Fertility in 1960s
(20) Geography (excl. tropics effect) 67 Fraction land area near navigable water
68 Landlocked country dummy
69 Air distance to big cities
(21) Price distortion 70 Investment price
(22) Real exchange rate 71 Real exchange rate distortions
(23) Defense 72 Defense spending share
(24) Political instability 73 Revolutions and coups
(25) Independence 74 Timing of independence
* Representative variable of the group.
The regressors are listed and grouped in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. The 74 variables are or-
ganized in 25 groups. The grouping is based on Durlauf et al. (2005) with two deviations:
we split the ‘geography’ group in two (‘tropics effect’ and ‘geography excluding tropics
Data, grouping, and scaling
effect’), and we also split the ‘government’ group in two (‘government intervention’ and
‘defense’). The reason is that within the new groups ‘tropics effect’ and ‘government
intervention’ the same concept is measured, while the remaining items are of a different
nature.
We distinguish between two types of groups. A group of type I (Table 2.1) contains
variables providing alternative measurements of one concept. For example, a country’s
democracy (the concept) can be measured in several ways, and we allow two measure-
ments (political rights and civil liberties). An important growth determinant is education
(the concept), which attempts to capture human capital accumulation. Since the output
of human capital investment is difficult to measure, one typically resorts to input vari-
ables, such as the enrollment rate, school years, or the share of public education spending.
These input variables serve as different (but typically highly correlated) measurements
for the same concept. We want to use only one measurement, but we do not know which
one. Our theory of Section 5.2 applies to this type, that is, to groups (1)–(12).
In contrast, a group of type II (Table 2.2) contains variables measuring different
aspects of one concept. For example, the group ‘regional effect’ contains seven dummy
variables, each indicating whether a country belongs to some particular (colonial) region.
These variables all measure a regional effect, but a different aspect of it, and these aspects
are not highly correlated or easily aggregated. Our hierarchical theory does not apply
to groups (13)–(20), because parameter estimates associated with these variables have
different meanings, and hence a weighted sum of these estimates makes little sense. In
our hierarchical estimation procedure we can either include all variables of a type II
group or select a representative. For groups (13)–(15) we select one representative; for
groups (16)–(20) we include all variables. Groups (21)–(25) only contain one variable,
and hence there is no difference between variable and group. In summary, we have 12
type I groups (35 variables) and 13 type II groups (39 variables).
Grouping of variables can be ambiguous. While the grouping in Tables 2.1 and 2.2
based on Durlauf et al. (2005) is plausible, there is no complete agreement in the growth
literature on how to group the large number of growth proxies. For example, one may
argue that the enrollment rates and attainment levels in the education group may have
different effects on growth, because the former relate to the flow of education (Mankiw
et al., 1992) whereas the latter refer to stocks. We address such problems in Section 2.5.5.
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Before we apply the hierarchical WALS procedure, we scale all variables, that is, we
scale (and center) each variable x by replacing it with (x−mean(x)) /std(x), so that
the resulting transformed variable has zero mean and unit variance. In standard (non-
hierarchical) WALS the centering has no effect (other than on the constant term), but
























such that all its diagonal elements equal one (De Luca and Magnus, 2011). In hierarchical
WALS the preliminary scaling is important because it makes the magnitudes of the
estimated parameters within one group comparable.
In addition to scaling the variables, we may also wish to change the sign of some
variables, so that variables within one group are positively correlated. For example,
in the group ‘health’ we change the definition of malaria prevalence to malaria non-
prevalence, so that both variables in this group now measure the same thing rather than
opposite things. The five variables that have been re-signed are: fraction population
over 65, socialism dummy, malaria prevalence, civil liberties, and absolute latitude. The
within-group correlations are presented in Magnus and Wang (2013, Table 1).
2.5. Growth empirics
There is not much consensus in the empirical growth literature on which growth deter-
minants are salient and robust among a large set of growth theories. Most papers report
insignificant coefficients for most determinants. One reason is that growth theories are
open-ended Brock and Durlauf (2001), another that the same concept can be measured
by (sometimes many) different empirical proxies. In this paper we concentrate on the
second aspect. Different choices of measurement may result in very different estimates.
If we include all or many measurements of the same concept in one regression, then the
t-ratios will be misleading due to multicollinearity. Our theory allows us to treat the 74
(plus the constant) different measurements (variables) as elements of only 25 (plus the
constant) concepts (groups).
We have to choose which groups are focus and which auxiliary, and we shall discuss
two variants. In variant HWALS-F1 only the constant term is a focus group, while all
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other groups are auxiliary. This is the typical model averaging framework in which all
explanatory variables are allowed to be either included or excluded, as in Sala-i-Martin
et al. (2004). More information is used in the second variant, HWALS-F8, where eight
groups (including the constant term) are treated as focus groups. These groups are
therefore included in every model. The eight focus groups consist of four type I groups
(education, health, initial state, tropics effect), two type II groups with a representative
variable (ethnicity and language, religion), and two type II groups with only one variable
(price distortion, constant term). The distinction between focus and auxiliary is made
at the group level: if a group is considered to be focus (auxiliary), then each variable in
that group is also focus (auxiliary). Since the estimates in these two variants are highly
similar, we only report results of HWALS-F8.
In Tables 2.3 and 2.4 we present the results for HWALS-F8 using uniform priors and
data-dependent priors, and compare them with WALS-F8. The sensitivity of the results
to using other priors is studied in Magnus and Wang (2013), where we also present the
results for HWALS-F1. We find that the effects of proximate determinants on economic
growth is robust to the choice of prior probability, except for the group education. The
indirect effect (effect on other groups) of a different choice of prior probability is small,
but the direct effect (effect on the group itself) varies across groups. In general, the
choice of priors is not a serious issue for the estimation of the standard deviations in our
growth empirics.
The WALS-F8 estimates are based on the 67 variables in Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004),
hence without the seven additional variables from Sala-i-Martin (1997). They differ from
those in Magnus et al. (2010, Table 7), because of the scaling and the different number of
observations. The WALS-F8 estimates correspond to variables; the HWALS-F8 estimates
to groups.
We shall also compare our results with the BACE estimates of Sala-i-Martin et al.
(2004). Since the posterior moments given by BACE are conditional on inclusion, their
precision is misleading as pointed out in Magnus et al. (2010). Therefore, we compare
with the unconditional BACE moments according to Equations (8) and (14) in Sala-
i-Martin et al. (2004). The full set of unconditional BACE estimates is available in
Magnus and Wang (2013).
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Table 2.3: HWALS and WALS estimates: focus variables
Variable WALS-F8 HWALS-F8
Uniform prior Data-dep. prior
Education −0.0013 (0.0046) 0.0051 (0.0034)
5 Primary schooling 0.0037 (0.0188)
6 Secondary schooling
7 Higher education −0.0079 (0.0081)
8 Public edu. spending −0.0007 (0.0160)
9 Primary school yrs
10 Secondary school yrs
11 Higher education yrs
12 Ave. school yrs
13 Ave. school yrs × logGDP
Health 0.0073 (0.0058) 0.0062 (0.0059)
19 Life expectancy 0.0144 (0.0271)
20 Malaria prevalence −0.0045 (0.0094)
Initial state −0.0045 (0.0064) −0.0084 (0.0057)
23 GDP in 1960 (log) −0.0073 (0.0168)
24 Size of economy 0.0006 (0.0186)
Tropics effect −0.0030 (0.0034) −0.0041 (0.0034)
31 Frac. of tropical area 0.0015 (0.0207)
32 Tropical climate zone 0.0013 (0.0047)
33 Absolute latitude 0.0054 (0.0195)
Ethnicity and language
36 Ethnolinguistic frac. −0.0019 (0.0087) −0.0030 (0.0028) −0.0022 (0.0026)
37 English-speaking pop. 0.0014 (0.0053)
38 Frac. foreign language 0.0006 (0.0062)
Religion
39 Fraction Confucian 0.0009 (0.0058)
40 Fraction Muslim −0.0004 (0.0079)
41 Fraction Buddhist 0.0010 (0.0132)
42 Fraction Protestant −0.0122 (0.0161)
43 Fraction Hindu 0.0003 (0.0074)
44 Fraction Catholic −0.0130 (0.0226)
45 Fraction Orthodox −0.0014 (0.0029)
46 Religious intensity −0.0035 (0.0095) −0.0015 (0.0019) −0.0022 (0.0018)
Price distortion
70 Investment price −0.0047 (0.0076) −0.0041 (0.0017) −0.0046 (0.0015)
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Table 2.4: HWALS and WALS estimates: auxiliary variables
Variable WALS-F8 HWALS-F8
Uniform prior Data-dep. prior
Demographic characteristics 0.0027 (0.0048) 0.0026 (0.0044)
1 Frac. pop. over 65 −0.0011 (0.0204)
2 Frac. pop. under 15 −0.0003 (0.0324)
Economic system −0.0010 (0.0016) −0.0007 (0.0015)
3 Capitalism 0.0018 (0.0056)
4 Socialism −0.0000 (0.0067)
Government intervention −0.0003 (0.0021) 0.0005 (0.0020)
14 Public investment share 0.0016 (0.0044)
15 Public consumption share (excl. education and defense)
16 Gov. consumption share −0.0367 (0.1602)
17 Gov. share of GDP 0.0362 (0.1489)
18 Nominal gov. GDP share 0.0001 (0.0078)
Inflation 0.0005 (0.0022) 0.0004 (0.0019)
21 Average inflation 0.0042 (0.0179)
22 Square of inflation −0.0064 (0.0200)
Democracy 0.0025 (0.0027) 0.0015 (0.0024)
25 Political rights 0.0047 (0.0102)
26 Civil liberties 0.0002 (0.0075)
Scale effect 0.0028 (0.0028) 0.0018 (0.0024)
27 Land area 0.0063 (0.0157)
28 Population 0.0005 (0.0086)
Trade policy indices 0.0009 (0.0024) 0.0009 (0.0026)
29 Outward orientation −0.0008 (0.0055)
30 Years open −0.0032 (0.0104)
War 0.0001 (0.0016) −0.0003 (0.0015)
34 Frac. spent in war 0.0004 (0.0067)
35 War participation 0.0022 (0.0086)
Trade statistics
47 Openness measure −0.0004 (0.0147) 0.0006 (0.0029) −0.0003 (0.0025)
48 Primary exports −0.0026 (0.0104)
Terms of trade
49 Terms of trade ranking 0.0028 (0.0084) 0.0004 (0.0027) 0.0002 (0.0024)
50 Terms of trade growth 0.0026 (0.0058) 0.0035 (0.0024) 0.0021 (0.0022)
Regional effect
51 East Asian dummy 0.0087 (0.0108) 0.0058 (0.0028) 0.0046 (0.0025)
52 African dummy 0.0017 (0.0117) −0.0031 (0.0036) −0.0020 (0.0032)
53 European dummy 0.0198 (0.0247) 0.0015 (0.0045) 0.0009 (0.0040)
54 Latin-American dummy 0.0125 (0.0258) −0.0014 (0.0046) −0.0002 (0.0042)
55 Colony dummy −0.0023 (0.0155) −0.0038 (0.0035) −0.0040 (0.0031)
56 British colony −0.0003 (0.0071) 0.0028 (0.0027) 0.0022 (0.0026)
57 Spanish colony −0.0015 (0.0152) 0.0012 (0.0033) 0.0007 (0.0031)
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Table 2.4: Continued
Natural resources
58 Hydrocarbon deposits 0.0015 (0.0053) 0.0001 (0.0019) 0.0005 (0.0017)
59 Frac. GDP in mining −0.0016 (0.0072) −0.0013 (0.0019) −0.0012 (0.0017)
60 Oil country dummy −0.0020 (0.0052) −0.0018 (0.0023) −0.0004 (0.0021)
Population
61 Population density coastal 0.0019 (0.0172) 0.0007 (0.0030) 0.0026 (0.0025)
62 Interior density −0.0025 (0.0070) −0.0010 (0.0017) −0.0008 (0.0015)
63 Fraction pop. in tropics 0.0003 (0.0092) 0.0015 (0.0032) 0.0009 (0.0028)
64 Population density −0.0032 (0.0060) −0.0015 (0.0021) −0.0009 (0.0018)
65 Population growth rate 0.0073 (0.0232) 0.0014 (0.0054) 0.0003 (0.0047)
66 Fertility 0.0007 (0.0224) −0.0030 (0.0063) −0.0006 (0.0052)
Geography (excl. tropics effect)
67 Frac. land area near water 0.0018 (0.0118) 0.0016 (0.0032) 0.0001 (0.0030)
68 Landlocked country dummy 0.0027 (0.0040) 0.0002 (0.0018) −0.0003 (0.0016)
69 Air distance to big cities 0.0009 (0.0102) 0.0010 (0.0025) −0.0001 (0.0023)
Real exchange rate
71 Real exchange rate dist. −0.0031 (0.0107) −0.0021 (0.0020) −0.0019 (0.0019)
Defense
72 Defense spending share −0.0145 (0.0599) −0.0004 (0.0017) −0.0007 (0.0016)
Political instability
73 Revolutions and coups 0.0043 (0.0064) −0.0006 (0.0018) −0.0003 (0.0017)
Independence
74 Timing of independence −0.0001 (0.0110) 0.0008 (0.0025) 0.0010 (0.0023)
2.5.1. Sign comparisons
Let us first compare the signs of HWALS-F8 using uniform priors with those of WALS-F8
and BACE, where we recall that the latter estimates are based on variables while the
former are based on groups. We shall say that an HWALS estimate is ‘totally different’
from the BACE/WALS estimate if the sign of a type I group is opposite to all of its
variables, and ‘partially different’ if the sign of a type I group is opposite to some of its
variables. For type II groups this distinction is not necessary.
Comparing HWALS to WALS we see that in five of the type I groups the estimates are
partially different, and in three type I and nine type II groups they are totally different.
Hence, quite different estimation results are produced by HWALS as compared to WALS.
The signs produced by HWALS are generally more intuitive than those produced by
WALS, except for education. For example, HWALS suggests that regions with higher
fractions of tropical land have lower growth rates, while all variables of the tropics effect
have a positive sign in WALS. HWALS finds that being more open has a positive impact
on growth, while all variables in the trade policy indices have a negative sign in WALS;
and HWALS finds that African and Latin-American countries generally grow slower and
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British colonial countries grow faster, while WALS reports the opposite. The HWALS
estimates reflect the fact that 45% of Latin-American countries and 86% of Sub-Saharan
African countries achieve growth rates below or around the first quartile, while 52% of
British colonial countries achieve above-average growth rates.
For the group education, HWALS produces a negative (but not significant) estimate.
This seems counterintuitive. Upon closer inspection we see that the education group con-
tains many variables which are not robust and have relatively large standard deviations.
We have nine education variables, and they measure education in three ways: the enroll-
ment rate at different school levels (variables 5–7); educational attainment at different
school levels (variables 9–13); and public spending on education (variable 8). Only the
primary schooling enrollment rate in 1960 and the secondary school years have robust
positive effects, while the signs of the remaining variables vary with the model specifica-
tion. This is in line with most empirical growth literature, although some care needs to
be taken in explaining the strongly positive estimate of primary schooling in 1960 (Barro
and Lee, 1993). The variation between different measurements and the insignificance of
most measurements lead to an insignificant estimate of the group education. Therefore,
the education effect on growth does not appear to be as robust as some studies suggest.
Comparing HWALS to BACE, we find three type I groups that are partially different
(education, democracy, trade policy indices), and nine variables of type II groups that
are totally different. The signs produced by HWALS are more reliable and also more
intuitive. For example, BACE produces opposite effects of political rights and civil
liberties, while HWALS finds a negative effect (b = 0.0025, t = 0.9) of democracy
(recall that civil liberties is re-signed), supporting recent studies (Barro, 1996). The
HWALS estimate is in line with the HWALS estimates of political rights (b = 0.0028,
t = 1) and civil liberties (b = 0.0022, t = 0.9) if we include each variable separately.
However, if both variables are included simultaneously, then we obtain much smaller
estimates of both variables and large variances due to high correlation. Also in contrast
to BACE, HWALS finds positive correlation between growth and the European dummy,
and concludes that a larger fraction of GDP in mining leads to a lower growth rate, which
is supported by most cross-country studies on the ‘resource curse’. Finally, countries with
more land area near navigable water have access to more convenient transportation and
are typically more open, thus enhancing growth, as shown by HWALS but not by BACE.
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2.5.2. Precision comparisons
Next we compare the t-ratios produced by HWALS-F8, WALS, and BACE (unconditional
moments). The WALS and BACE t-ratios are largely similar. HWALS is generally more
precise than WALS and BACE, especially for those groups/variables that are typically
thought of as robust determinants.
For the focus groups, HWALS reports t = 1.26 for health, while the t-ratios of the
two health variables (life expectancy and malaria prevalence) are 0.53 and −0.48 in
WALS; and 0.45 and −0.53 in BACE. In the group ‘tropics effect’, the t-ratios of its
three variables vary greatly in both WALS and BACE. Only the fraction of tropical
area has a t-ratio slightly larger than 1 (in absolute value) in BACE, while the other
two measurements all have |t| < 0.30. WALS even reports a counterintuitive positive
effect. In contrast, HWALS combines three variables and gives a t-ratio of this group of
approximately 1. The estimate of ‘ethnolinguistic fractionalization’ produced by HWALS
has |t| = 1.07, while WALS and BACE show |t| = 0.22 and |t| = 0.30, respectively.
For the auxiliary groups, most estimates of type I groups produced by HWALS are
more significant than WALS and BACE (for example, demographic characteristics, in-
flation, and the scale effect). The estimates of most type II groups produced by HWALS
are more significant than WALS and BACE.
2.5.3. Explanatory power
Particularly relevant is the contribution of various growth theories in explaining differ-
ences in cross-country growth rates. Since all variables are converted to the same scale,
the estimates capture the explanatory power of each theory.
We find that investment price (b = −0.0041, |t| = 2.4) and the East Asian dummy
(b = 0.0058, |t| = 2.1) are the most robust variables and explain much of the cross-
country variation. Less robust but stronger in explanatory power is health (b = 0.0073,
|t| = 1.3). Even less robust but still strong in explanatory power are initial state (b =
−0.0045, |t| = 0.7) and the colony dummy (b = −0.0038, |t| = 1.1). These results
provide evidence in favor of the neoclassical growth determinants, and they are also
largely consistent with the findings in the conditional convergence literature and other
related studies (Fernandez et al., 2001; Sala-i-Martin et al., 2004; Durlauf et al., 2008).
The groups tropics effect, ethnicity and language, African dummy, and terms of trade
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have slightly less explanatory power. Here our results differ from those in Sala-i-Martin
et al. (2004) based on posterior inclusion probabilities. Unlike most studies, economic
growth is not found to be robustly related to education and government intervention.
2.5.4. Data-dependent priors
The last column in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 presents HWALS-F8 estimates using data-dependent
priors with one-step updating. (The updated priors and results of two-step updating are
presented in Magnus and Wang (2013).) By construction, the two updating methods give
the same updated prior probabilities for the focus variables, but they differ in the com-
putation of the updated prior probabilities for the auxiliary variables. The differences
are small except for demographic characteristics and the scale effect. The estimates pro-
duced by the two updating procedures generally have similar magnitudes and the same
signs (except terms of trade ranking, Latin-American dummy, and fraction of land area
near water). The exceptions all have a very weak effect on growth. The robustness of
the updated probabilities and the resulting estimates confirms that model specification
only has a marginal effect in the updating procedure.
We compare the HWALS-F8 results after updating the priors with the equal proba-
bility default. There is a big difference between focus and auxiliary groups. In the focus
groups (especially education), the effects are generally different and stronger when the
priors are updated than in the equal probability case. The reason lies in the fact that all
focus groups have a dominant variable, while most auxiliary groups have equally impor-
tant variables. For example, the large variation in updated prior probabilities (ranging
from 0.978 to 0.003) in the group education shows that some variables in this group
are much more relevant for economic growth than others. The ordering is generally in
line with findings in other studies, e.g. Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) and Magnus et al.
(2010). Similarly, in the government intervention group, the government consumption
share is by far the most relevant variable. Generally, the most relevant variables also
have the highest posterior inclusion probability (Sala-i-Martin et al., 2004), or are the
most significant (Magnus et al., 2010) compared to other variables in the same group.
In the auxiliary groups (such as democracy), the estimates and standard deviations
when updating the priors are mostly in line with those using equal probabilities. As
discussed above, this is because the variables in most auxiliary groups are almost equally
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important, so that their updated prior probabilities are close. Examples of such groups
are economic system, inflation, and war. The variables in these groups are highly cor-
related, and hence including all variables in one regression leads to very insignificant
estimates for some or all of the variables. For example, both Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004)
and Magnus et al. (2010) reported extremely weak correlation between the capital-
ism/socialism dummy and economic growth. However, when considering them as a
group, the correlation with growth is much stronger. Thinking in terms of groups rather
than in terms of variables thus provides new insights.
2.5.5. Effect of different groupings
Our empirical results are based on the grouping in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. These groupings
can of course be questioned and we briefly discuss the effect of alternative groupings.
A more complete discussion is presented in our supplementary document (Magnus and
Wang, 2013).
Initial state. In the group ‘initial state’ we separate the two variables GDP per capita in
1960 and the initial size of the economy, motivated by neoclassical growth model where
initial GDP per capita has a structural role and thus should always be included (Mankiw
et al., 1992). We thus treat GDP per capita in 1960 as a focus variable and the initial size
of the economy as auxiliary. Since the initial level of income is now always included, the
estimated coefficients should be interpreted as the effects of determinants of the height
of the steady-state growth path, rather than as the effects of long-run growth determi-
nants. The new grouping leads to a much larger estimated coefficient (b = −0.0098) of
the initial level of income and a smaller variance (V = 0.0053), making initial income an
important determinant and providing strong evidence of convergence. Results of other
focus groups and most auxiliary groups are not largely affected.
Education. Education is a difficult concept to measure and our grouping can be eas-
ily criticized. We discuss four alternative groupings:
• Separate public education spending from the education group;
• Assign public education spending to the government intervention group;
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• Distinguish between education flows and stocks by separating enrollment rates,
attainment levels, and public education spending in three groups; and
• Distinguish between lower and higher education level by separating primary and
secondary education, higher education, and public education spending in three
groups.
The results confirm the large variation of education variables as well as their distinct
effects on growth. Various aspects of education (flows versus stocks, lower versus higher
level) are weakly related to growth, with the exception of primary schooling.
Tropics effect. Separating latitude from tropic effect group hardly affects the results.
2.6. Approximations for large k
To compute the HWALS estimates we need many runs of the WALS algorithm. Each run
of the WALS algorithm requires model averaging over k2 = 41 (HWALS-F1) or k2 = 34
(HWALS-F8) auxiliary variables. In the case of BMA this would take much computing
time (of the order 2k2), but in WALS much less (of the order k2). This is one (but not
the only one) advantage of WALS over BMA. Even so, in our application of the HWALS
procedure, we have to repeat this algorithm 29 × 3 × 5 × 9 = 69120 times. This would
be impossible with BMA or BACE, but it is still feasible in WALS, and the estimates
reported in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 are based on exact computations.
If the number of groups and variables increases further, then estimating all combina-
tions becomes computationally too time-consuming, especially if we also want to perform
simulations and sensitivity analyses. In such cases we have to resort to approximations.
In this section we propose and compare several approximating algorithms. There are two
aspects to the approximation: selecting the subset of WALS regressions to be performed
and obtaining the corresponding WALS estimates; and assigning estimates to the non-
sampled regressions based on the estimates of the sampled regressions. We shall discuss
each aspect in turn.
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2.6.1. Subset selection
Two types of subset selection are considered: non-probability sampling and probability
sampling. The non-probability method chooses the combinations deterministically. We
sample those combinations whose prior probabilities (weights) are larger than a prede-
termined critical value π∗, because these are the combinations composed of relatively
‘important’ variables in each group. We obtain WALS estimates for these combinations.





representing the sum of the prior probabilities of the exact estimates used in the approx-
imated HWALS computation. We use two stopping rules. First, we reduce π∗ until the
precision α satisfies a required level α∗. Second, to bound computation time, we restrict
the number of samples S by an upper bound S∗. Hence, we require α > α∗ and S < S∗.
In contrast, the probability method uses the prior probabilities as weights and draws
randomly (without replacement) based on these weights. Each combination can now be
selected, but combinations with a high weight will have a higher selection probability
than combinations with a low weight. The only requirement is S < S∗.
2.6.2. Approximating the non-sampled estimates
We consider two methods to approximate the non-sampled estimates from the sampled
ones, first using neighboring estimates, then using a normalization of the probability.
The first method is based on ‘neighboring’ estimates. For a given combination C, its
‘neighbors’ consist of those combinations containing at least one group represented by a
variable that is also present in C. The approximation averages the neighboring estimates.
Neighboring estimates are good approximates because changing the measurement of a
group has a much smaller impact on estimates of other groups (indirect effect) than it
does on the group itself (direct effect).
In the second method we normalize the probability of the sampled combinations, so





, (i, j) ∈ C, (2.16)
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where C is the set of sampled combinations. From Equation (2.16) we see that estimates
of more important samples contribute more to the approximates. The second method
thus uses not only closely related information (neighboring estimates), but also less
related information (non-neighboring estimates). It is not a priori clear whether this is
good or bad, and we shall investigate the issue below.
2.6.3. Comparison of the methods
We now have four methods for the approximation procedure, as follows:
Approximating method
Sampling method Ave. neighbor Norm. probability
Non-probability Method 1 Method 2
Probability Method 3 Method 4
We compare the four methods from two aspects: approximation accuracy and compu-
tation time. For approximation accuracy our criterion is the average absolute deviation
from the estimates obtained from the whole sample.
Figure 2.1: Approximation accuracy: 4 methods
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Figure 2.1 presents the convergence of the approximation accuracy for each of the
four methods. Average absolute deviations decrease smoothly for non-probability meth-
ods, but less smoothly for probability methods because of the randomness. Comparing
different approximating techniques, we find that Method 2 has higher approximation ac-
curacy and needs less computation time than Method 1; and similarly that Method 4 has
higher approximation accuracy and less computation time than Method 3. Apparently
the normalization method strictly dominates the method using neighboring estimates,
and this domination is especially strong when the number of samples is small. Next,
when we compare different sampling techniques, we see that no method strictly domi-
nates another. When the number of samples is small, Method 4 is more accurate than
Method 2, but it is less accurate when the number of samples is large, thus reflecting the
trade-off between using the more important estimates and a wider range of estimates.
The computation time is roughly proportional to the number of samples, so that
computation time can be accurately predicted for each method. In fact, the ratio
Computation time (in seconds)
number of samples/100
is approximately 1.5 (Method 3), 1.2 (Method 4), 1.0 (Method 1), and 0.7 (Method 2).
The computation time is higher for probability sampling than for non-probability sam-
pling, because randomness is time-consuming. In summary, Methods 2 and 4 dominate
Methods 1 and 3. When the number of samples is relatively small, Method 4 is preferred,
but when the number of samples is relatively large, then Method 2 is preferred.
2.7. Conclusions
Applied researchers frequently encounter the situation where there is more than one
measurement (variable) for a concept (group). To include all variables of the group into
the regression is not satisfactory, because of multicollinearity. To choose between vari-
ables based on diagnostics leads to pretesting problems. A satisfactory solution can be
obtained through two-level (hierarchical) Bayesian model averaging, where we question
which groups should be in the model (level 1) and also which variables should be in
each group (level 2). Our proposed method (HWALS) is an attempt to obtain estimates
and standard deviations that fully reflect three sources of uncertainty: uncertainty rep-
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resented by the error term, given the specification of the model; uncertainty about which
(auxiliary) groups to include; and uncertainty about which variables to include in each
group. Our method combines model selection and estimation and thus avoids the prob-
lem of pretesting. It is transparent, easy to implement, and computationally efficient
compared to standard methods such as BMA and BACE. The method provides one es-
timate and standard deviation for each group (concept) rather than several estimates
corresponding to each variable (measurement), and this facilitates statistical inference
and interpretation of the effect of the concept. The hierarchical structure also allows us
to assign various types of priors, depending on the strength of the researchers’ beliefs.
Unlike factor analysis, HWALS allows clear economic explanations, because the data are
not transformed (except for simple scaling).
We apply the HWALS theory to growth empirics, and study the effects of different
growth theories in explaining cross-country growth. This application is particularly suit-
able, because the open-ended growth theories and the many possible proxies for the same
concept expose growth regressions to a high degree of model uncertainty. The HWALS
estimates appear to possess more intuitive signs and are generally more significant com-
pared to other methods. For example, HWALS finds a moderately negative effect of
democracy and fraction GDP in mining, which is theoretically justified and empirically
supported by the literature, whereas BACE finds the opposite result. Our findings re-
garding the robust and important determinants are mostly in line with the literature. A
notable difference from the literature is that the education and government intervention
effects are not robust, reflecting the large variation between variables in these two groups.
Extensive sensitivity analysis is provided with respect to the prior probabilities and
grouping, from which we conclude that the main results, especially the estimates of
robust and important determinants, are not sensitive. Also provided are methods of ap-
proximation when the number of groups or variables is large. The experimental results
show that computation time can be much reduced while still obtaining estimates satis-
fying a given level of accuracy. Generalizations in various directions are possible. For
example, non-linear models can be incorporated by adjusting the estimation method in
the first-level averaging. The idea of hierarchical averaging can also be applied to other





Weighted average least square
prediction2
3.1. Introduction
In econometric practice one typically first selects the ‘best’ model based on diagnostic
tests (such as t-ratios, R2, and various information criteria) and then computes esti-
mates within this selected model. This is called ‘pretesting’ (Leeb and Pötscher, 2003,
2006, 2008). There are many problems with this procedure (Magnus, 1999; Danilov and
Magnus, 2004b,a), but the most important is that model selection and estimation are
completely separated so that uncertainty in the model selection is ignored when report-
ing properties of the estimates. Alternatively, one can consider averaging the results
obtained from all candidate models, and this is called ‘model averaging’. Model aver-
aging not only appeals to common sense, but also has two major advantages. First, it
avoids arbitrary thresholds (like 1.96), thus forcing continuity on a previously discontin-
uous estimator; second, it allows us to combine model selection and estimation into one
procedure, thus moving from conditional to unconditional estimator characteristics.
Much of the model averaging literature has concentrated on estimation rather than
on prediction. In this paper we concentrate on prediction (forecasting), which may in
fact be a more appropriate application of model averaging, because the interpretation
of coefficients changes with different models but the predictor always has the same in-
terpretation. A substantial literature on the averaging of forecasts exists, going back to
Bates and Granger (1969); see Granger (2003), Yang (2004), Elliott and Timmermann
(2004), and Aiolfi and Timmermann (2006) for some recent contributions, and Hendry
and Clements (2004) and Timmermann (2006) for recent reviews. Simulation and em-
pirical studies indicate that predictors based on a set of models generally perform better
than predictors obtained from a single model (Stock and Watson, 2004; Jackson and
2This chapter is coauthored with Jan R. Magnus and Xinyu Zhang.
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Karlsson, 2004; Bjørnland et al., 2012).
Our paper has two main contributions. First, we introduce the prediction counterpart
to the weighted average least squares (WALS) estimator proposed in Magnus et al.
(2010) and study its properties in simulations. The WALS procedure avoids some of
the problems encountered in standard Bayesian model averaging (BMA). In particular,
the prior is based on a coherent notion of ignorance, thus avoiding normality of the
prior and unbounded risk. Also, the computational burden increases linearly rather
than exponentially with the number of regressors, and is therefore trivial compared to
other model averaging estimators such as standard BMA, model-selection-based weights
methods (Buckland et al., 1997; Hjort and Claeskens, 2003), exponential reweighting
(Yang, 2004), or Mallows model averaging (Hansen, 2007, 2008). Our proposed method
explicitly allows for correlation in the observations, including possible correlation between
the errors in the realized sample and the predictive sample.
The second contribution of the paper is that we propose an estimate for the predic-
tion variance taking model uncertainty into account, and evaluate the accuracy of this
estimate. The typical researcher’s instinct is to favor a predictor with a small variance
over one with a large variance. We argue that what we require is not a small but a
‘correct’ variance: in a situation with much noise a predictor with a small variance can
cause much harm, while a truthfully reported large variance may lead to more prudent
policy. In fact, one of the problems with the credibility of econometric predictions may
be that our reported prediction variances are too small, and this is caused, at least in
part, by the fact that model uncertainty is ignored. We shall see that WALS predictions
may lead to higher variances, but that these variances are closer to the truth.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 3.2–3.7 develop the theory. In Section 3.2
we set up the model and present the traditional predictor. The commonly employed
conditional predictor is presented in Section 3.3, and the WALS predictor in Section 3.4.
In Section 3.5 we discuss the computation of the WALS predictor based on the Laplace
prior. An estimator for the variance of the WALS predictor is proposed in Section 3.6.
Finally, in Section 3.7, we discuss the estimation of unknown parameters in the vari-
ance matrix of the random disturbances. Then, in Sections 3.8–3.11, we compare the
WALS predictor with its most important competitors: unrestricted maximum likelihood,
pretesting, ridge regression, and Mallows model averaging. Our comparison is conducted
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through a large number of Monte Carlo simulation experiments, controlling for sample
size, parameter values, and variance specifications. The simulation results show that
the WALS predictor typically has the lowest mean squared prediction error among the
predictors considered, and that the more uncertainty exists in the model, the better is
the relative performance of WALS. Section 3.12 concludes.
3.2. The traditional predictor
Our framework is the linear regression model
y = Xβ + u, (3.1)
where y is a vector of N observations on the dependent variable, X (N × k) is a matrix
of regressors, u is a random vector of N unobservable disturbances, and β is a vector
of k unknown parameters. We assume throughout that 1 ≤ k ≤ N − 1 and that X
has full column-rank k. We are interested in some specific (possibly future) values of
the regressors Xf (Nf × k), and we wish to predict the value yf (Nf × 1) likely to be
associated with Xf . We assume that yf is generated by
yf = Xfβ + uf , (3.2)
and our task is to find a predictor ŷf of yf .






















where the variance of (u, uf) is a positive definite (N +Nf )× (N +Nf) matrix, whose
component blocks Ω, Cf , and Ωf are functions of an m-dimensional unknown parameter
vector θ = (θ1, . . . , θm)
′. Our theory applies to both fixed and random regressors under
strictly exogeneity (hence not to lagged dependent variables). To simplify notation the
following derivation treats the regressors as fixed (at least for the moment); the results
for random regressors can be obtained similarly if we condition appropriately.
The joint distribution of u and uf in (3.3) implies that
E(uf |u) = CfΩ−1u, var(uf |u) = Ωf − CfΩ−1C ′f , (3.4)
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so that
E(yf |y) = Xfβ + CfΩ−1(y −Xβ). (3.5)
This leads to the traditional least squares predictor in the presence of a non-scalar
variance matrix:
ŷf = Xf β̂ + CfΩ
−1(y −Xβ̂), (3.6)
where β̂ = (X ′Ω−1X)−1X ′Ω−1y denotes the generalized least squares (GLS) estimator of
β, and it is assumed (for the moment) that θ is known; see Whittle (1963, p. 53, Eq. (10))
for the general formula, and Johnston and DiNardo (1997, Sec. 6.8) and Ruud (2000,
Sec. 19.7) for the special case where Nf = 1 and the errors follow an AR(1) process. The
predictor (3.6) is normally distributed with mean E(ŷf) = Xfβ and variance
var(ŷf) = Xf(X
′Ω−1X)−1X ′f + Cf (Ω
−1 − Ω−1X(X ′Ω−1X)−1X ′Ω−1)C ′f (3.7)
from which we see inter alia that the presence of the covariance Cf increases the variance
of the predictor, and therefore that ignoring correlation leads to misleadingly precise
predictions.
The prediction error PE := ŷf − yf can be conveniently written as the sum of two
independent random variables:
PE = (Xf − CfΩ−1X)(β̂ − β)− (uf − CfΩ−1u), (3.8)
and the traditional predictor ŷf is a good predictor in the sense that it is unbiased and
that the prediction error has minimum variance
var(PE) = (Xf − CfΩ−1X)(X ′Ω−1X)−1(Xf − CfΩ−1X)′
+ Ωf − CfΩ−1C ′f (3.9)
in the class of linear unbiased estimators.
3.3. The conditional predictor
The previous section assumes that the data-generation process (DGP) and the model
coincide, which one might call the ‘traditional’ approach. In practice, the model is likely
to be (much) smaller than the DGP. In this section we shall assume that the model is
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a special case of the DGP obtained by setting some of the β-parameters equal to zero.
We do not know in advance which β-parameters should be set to zero and we use model
selection diagnostics (such as t- and F -statistics) to arrive at a model that we like. Once
we have obtained this model we derive the properties of the predictor conditional on the
selected model and hence we ignore the noise generated by the model selection process.
We call this the ‘conditional’ approach. This is not quite right of course, and we shall
present a method which combines model selection and prediction in the next section.
We distinguish between focus regressorsX1 (those we want in the model on theoretical
or other grounds) and auxiliary regressors X2 (those we are less certain of), and write
model (3.1) accordingly as
y = X1β1 +X2β2 + u, (3.10)





′. Let k1 ≥ 0 be the dimension of β1 and k2 ≥ 0
the dimension of β2, so that k = k1 + k2. Model selection takes place over the auxiliary
regressors only. Since each of the k2 auxiliary regressors can either be included or not,
we have 2k2 models to consider.
In addition to the regressors that are always in the model (X1) and those that are
sometimes in the model (X2), there are also regressors that are never in the model (say
X3), even though they are in the DGP. This is because the modeler is ignorant about
these regressors or has no access to the necessary data. We disregard this situation for
the moment, but return to it in Section 3.8.
We assume (at first) that θ and hence Ω is known. It is convenient to semi-orthogonalize
the regression model as follows. Let
M∗1 := Ω
−1 − Ω−1X1(X ′1Ω−1X1)−1X ′1Ω−1, (3.11)
where we notice that the matrix Ω1/2M∗1Ω
1/2 is idempotent. Let P be an orthogonal ma-
trix and Λ a diagonal matrix with positive diagonal elements such that P ′X ′2M
∗
1X2P = Λ.
Next define the transformed auxiliary regressors and the transformed auxiliary parame-
ters as
X∗2 := X2PΛ




2 = X2β2, so that we can write (3.10) equivalently as




2 + u. (3.13)
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The result of this transformation is that the new design matrix (X1 : X
∗
2 ) is ‘semi-
orthogonal’ in the sense that X∗2
′M∗1X
∗
2 = Ik2 and this has important advantages that
will become clear shortly.
3.3.1. Estimation in model Mi
Our strategy will be to estimate (β1, β
∗
2) rather than (β1, β2). Each of the k2 components
of β∗2 can either be included or not included in the model and this gives rise to 2
k2
models. A specific model is identified through a k2 × (k2 − k2i) selection matrix Si of
full column-rank, where 0 ≤ k2i ≤ k2, so that S ′i = (Ik2−k2i : 0) or a column-permutation
thereof. Our first interest is in the GLS estimator of (β1, β
∗
2) in the i-th model, that is,
in the GLS estimator of (β1, β
∗





Let Mi represent model (3.13) under the restriction S ′iβ∗2 = 0, and let β̂1(i) and
β̂∗2(i) denote the GLS estimators of β1 and β
∗
2 under Mi. Extending Danilov and Magnus
(2004a, Lemmas A1 and A2), the GLS estimators of β1 and β
∗
2 under Mi may be written












∗ := (X ′1Ω
−1X1)
−1X ′1Ω
−1X∗2 , Wi := Ik2 − SiS ′i. (3.15)
Note that b∗2 is simply the GLS estimator of β
∗
2 in the unrestricted model, and that Wi
is a diagonal k2 × k2 matrix with k2i ones and (k2 − k2i) zeros on the diagonal. The j-th
diagonal element of Wi equals zero if β
∗
2j (the j-th component of β
∗
2) is restricted to zero,
and equals one otherwise. If k2i = k2 then Wi = Ik2. The diagonality of Wi is a direct
consequence of the semi-orthogonal transformation.


















β̂∗2(i) ∼ Nk2 (Wiβ∗2 , Wi) , (3.17)
and cov(β̂1(i), β̂
∗
2(i)) = −Q∗Wi. The residual vector ei := y − X1β̂1(i) − X∗2 β̂∗2(i) is given
by ei = ΩD
∗




1 − M∗1X∗2WiX∗2 ′M∗1 and Ω1/2D∗iΩ1/2 is a symmetric
idempotent matrix of rank n− k1 − k2i. It follows that:
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• all models that include the j-th column ofX∗2 as a regressor have the same estimator
of β∗2j , namely b
∗
2j , irrespective of which other columns of X
∗
2 are included;
• the estimators b∗21, b
∗




• the residuals of the i-th model Mi depend on y only through M∗1 y.
3.3.2. Prediction in model Mi
Next we wish to predict Nf (possibly future) values yf , based on values of the regressors

























where the errors (u, uf) are distributed as in (3.3). From (3.5) we obtain
E(yf |y) = X1fβ1 +X∗2fβ∗2 + CfΩ−1(y −X1β1 −X∗2β∗2), (3.19)
leading to the predictor in model Mi, using (3.14),
ŷ
(i)



















2f −X1fQ∗)− CfΩ−1(X∗2 −X1Q∗). (3.21)
The prediction error PE(i) := ŷ
(i)








2 − β∗2)− vf , (3.22)
where
Z1f := X1f − CfΩ−1X1, vf := uf − CfΩ−1u. (3.23)
Since vf and u are uncorrelated, and X
′
1Ω
−1u and b∗2 are also uncorrelated, we find that
PE(i) is the sum of three independent random variables.
Theorem 1: The prediction error PE(i) follows a normal distribution with
E(PE(i)) = −Zf(I −Wi)β∗2
43






−1Z ′1f + ZfWiZ
′
f + Ωf − CfΩ−1C ′f ,
and hence the mean squared prediction error MSPE(i) := MSE(PE(i)) is




−1Z ′1f + Zf∆iZ
′
f + Ωf − CfΩ−1C ′f ,
where
∆i := Wi + (I −Wi)β∗2β∗2 ′(I −Wi).
Proof: The results follow directly from (3.22). ‖
The best model is therefore the one where the matrix ∆i is as ‘small’ as possible.
Since Wi is a diagonal matrix with only zeros and ones on the diagonal, ∆i is ‘small’ if
the selected model Mi includes precisely those regressors x∗2j of X∗2 whose corresponding
parameter β∗2j is larger than one in absolute value. Since the β
∗
2j are ‘theoretical’ t-ratios,
this result corresponds exactly to econometric intuition.
This econometric intuition is based on the following fact. Consider the partitioned
regression model (3.10) with var(u) = σ2In. Let er denote the residual vector when y
is regressed on X1 only, and let eu denote the residual vector when y is regressed on





is distributed as F (k2, N − k). This is a standard result (Johnston and DiNardo, 1997,
p. 97). Now define the least squares estimator for σ2 in the full model as s2u = e
′
ueu/(N−
k), and the adjusted R2 as R̄2u = 1− s2u/σ2y , where σ2y :=
∑N
n=1(yn − ȳ)2/(N − 1). In the

















r ⇐⇒ R̄2u > R̄2r ⇐⇒ F > 1. (3.26)
As a special case (k2 = 1), we find that adding one regressor will decrease s
2 and
increase R̄2 if and only if the t-statistic of the corresponding parameter is larger than
one in absolute value.
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3.4. The WALS predictor
The problem, of course, is that we don’t know which model to choose. Given estimates




2 , we could include the regressor x
∗
2j if |β̂∗2j| > 1, and
exclude it otherwise. This would lead to a pretest estimator with well-established poor
properties. These poor properties stem primarily from the fact that the pretest estimator
is ‘kinked’; it has a discontinuity at one. This is not only mathematically undesirable
but also intuitively: If β̂∗2j = 0.99 we exclude x
∗
2j ; if β̂
∗
2j = 1.01 we include it. It would
seem better to include x∗2j ‘continuously’ in such a way that the higher is |β̂∗2j |, the more
of x∗2j is included in our model. This is precisely the idea behind model averaging. The
additional benefit of model averaging is that we develop the theory taking into account
both model uncertainty and parameter uncertainty. In other words, we think of model
selection and parameter estimation as one combined procedure, so that the reported
standard errors reflect both types of uncertainty.







where the sum is taken over all 2k2 different models obtained by setting a subset of the





λi = 1, λi = λi(M
∗
1 y). (3.28)
The assumption that the weights λi depend only onM
∗
1 y is justified by the fact that these
weights are typically chosen according to the diagnostic power of the auxiliary regressors.




u), similar to the choice of weights in Liang
et al. (2011). Since β̂∗2(i) and s
2
u are both functions of M
∗
1 y, it follows that the λi depend
only on M∗1 y. This condition significantly alleviates the computational burden. The
definition (3.27) then specializes as follows.
Definition 1 (WALS predictor): The WALS predictor of yf is given by







1 y + Zf β̂
∗
2 ,
where β̂∗2 := Wb
∗
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Note that, while theWi’s are non-random diagonal matrices, the matrix W is random
(but still diagonal) because it depends on the random λi’s. The prediction error PE :=








2 − β∗2)− vf , (3.29)
and we present its moments in the following ‘equivalence’ theorem.
Theorem 2 (Equivalence theorem): If the weights λi satisfy condition (3.28), then
the WALS prediction error PE has the following expectation, variance and mean squared
error:
E(PE) = Zf E(β̂
∗
2 − β∗2),








f + Ωf − CfΩ−1C ′f ,
and hence








f + Ωf − CfΩ−1C ′f .
Proof: The key ingredient is that cov(M∗1u,X
′
1Ω
−1u) and cov(u, vf) are both zero. In
addition, the λi (and hence W ) depend only on M
∗




2 also depends only
on M∗1 y. Hence, the three random variables X
′
1Ω
−1u, β̂∗2 , and vf are all independent of
each other. The results follow. ‖
The equivalence theorem tells us that theWALS predictor ŷf will be a ‘good’ predictor
of yf in the mean squared error sense if and only if β̂
∗
2 is a ‘good’ estimator of β
∗
2 . That
is, if we can find λi’s such that β̂
∗
2 is an ‘optimal’ estimator of β
∗
2 , then the same λi’s will
provide an ‘optimal’ predictor of yf .
Next we obtain expressions for the bias and variance of the predictor itself, under the
assumption that the diagonal elements of W depend only on b∗2 = X
∗
2
′M∗1 y rather than
only on M∗1 y.
Theorem 3: If the diagonal elements wj of W depend only on b
∗
2, then the WALS
predictor ŷf has the following bias and variance:





































Under the stronger assumption that wj depends only on b
∗
2j , the k2×k2 matrices var(β̂∗2)
and cov(b∗2, β̂
∗
2) are both diagonal.
Proof: The bias follows directly from Theorem 2. Noting that
cov(X ′1Ω




1 = 0, cov(X
′
1Ω
−1y, β̂∗2) = 0,
Definition 1 implies that



























1/2 is idempotent, we can write
Ω1/2M∗1Ω
1/2 = AA′, A′A = In−k1 .
Define y∗ := A′Ω−1/2y and B1 := A
′Ω−1/2X∗2 , so that y
∗ ∼ N(B1β∗2 , In−k1). Since
B′1B1 = Ik2 there exists an (n − k1) × (n − k) matrix B2, such that B := (B1 : B2)
is orthogonal. This allows us to write












































∗ are independent, and the diagonal elements wj of W depend only
on X∗2













2j) = 0 (i 6= j),
because b∗2i and b
∗









diagonal. This completes the proof. ‖
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3.5. Computation of the WALS predictor based on prior ignorance
The WALS predictor proposed in Definition 1 can not be computed unless we know
W =
∑
i λiWi. Because of the semi-orthogonal transformation, we do know that W is
diagonal, say W = diag(w1, . . . , wk2). There are 2
k2 λi’s, but there are only k2 wj’s.
These are functions of the λi’s, but we can not identify the λi’s from the wj’s. This does
not matter because we are not interested in the λi’s as we are not interested in selecting
the ‘best’ model. We are only interested in the ‘best’ predictor.




2 are independent with var(b
∗
2j) = 1. Therefore, if we
choose wj to be a function of b
∗






2 will also be
independent, and our k2-dimensional problem reduces to k2 one-dimensional problems.
The one-dimensional problem is simply how to estimate β∗2j using only the information
that b∗2j ∼ N(β∗2j , 1).
This seemingly trivial question was addressed in Magnus (2002), who proposed the
‘Laplace’ estimator. This estimator is obtained by combining the normal likelihood with
the Laplace prior,
b∗2j | β∗2j ∼ N(β∗2j , 1), π(β∗2j) = (c/2) exp(−c|β∗2j |), (3.30)
where c is a positive constant. The Laplace estimator is now defined as the resulting
posterior expectation β̂∗2j := E(β
∗
2j |b∗2j). It is admissible, has bounded risk, has good
properties around |β∗2j | = 1, and is near-optimal in terms of minimax regret. It is also
easily computable. The mean and variance of β∗2j|b∗2j are given in Theorem 1 of Magnus
et al. (2010). The mean is
β̂∗2j = E(β
∗
2j | b∗2j) = b∗2j − c · h(b∗2j) (3.31)
with
h(x) :=
e−cxΦ(x− c)− ecxΦ(−x− c)
e−cxΦ(x− c) + ecxΦ(−x − c) , (3.32)












where φ and Φ denote the density function and the cumulative distribution function of
the standard-normal distribution, respectively.
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Each wj satisfies w(−b∗2j) = w(b∗2j) and increases monotonically between w(0) and
w(∞) = 1. Hence, β̂∗2j is a shrinkage estimator, and we have
w(0)|b∗2j| < |β̂∗2j | < |b∗2j |. (3.35)
In particular, when c = log 2, we find that w(0) = 0.5896 which defines the maximum
allowable shrinkage.
The hyperparameter c is chosen as c = log 2, because this implies
Pr(β∗2j > 0) = Pr(β
∗
2j < 0), Pr(|β∗2j | > 1) = Pr(|β∗2j| < 1). (3.36)
What this means is that we assume a priori ignorance about whether β∗2j is positive
or negative, and also about whether |β∗2j | is larger or smaller than one. These seem
natural properties for a prior in our context, because we don’t know a priori whether
the β∗2 coefficients are positive or negative, and we don’t know either whether adding a
specific column of X∗2 to the model will increase or decrease the mean squared error of
the predictors. Such a prior thus captures prior ignorance in a natural way. Given the
choice of the weights wj and hence of the estimator β̂
∗
2 , the WALS predictor ŷf can be
computed.
3.6. Moments of the WALS predictor
The moments of the WALS predictor are given in Theorem 3, but the expressions pro-
vided there depend on unknown quantities. Under the assumption that the weights wj
are specified as in (3.34), and hence depend on b∗2j only, we estimate these unknown
quantities as follows.
Theorem 4: If the diagonal elements wj of W depend only on b
∗
2j as specified in (3.34),
then the expected bias of the WALS predictor ŷf , based on prior densities π(β
∗
2j), is zero:
E (E(ŷf −X1fβ1 −X2fβ2)|β∗2) = 0.
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Proof: According to Theorem 3, the prediction bias, conditional on β∗2 , is
E(ŷf −X1fβ1 −X∗2fβ∗2 |β∗2) = Zf E(β̂∗2 − β∗2 |β∗2).
Further,
E(β̂∗2j − β∗2j) = E
(




E(b∗2j − β∗2j |β∗2j)
)





because E(h(b∗2j)|β∗2j) is antisymmetric in β∗2j and π(β∗2j) is symmetric in β∗2j . Hence the
expected bias of ŷf vanishes. ‖
The variance of ŷf is given in Theorem 3. Under the assumption that the weights
wj depend only on b
∗






2) are both diagonal. Hence




2j). The variance in the
posterior distribution of β∗2j |b∗2j is given by vj in (3.33), and hence provides the obvious

















Since var(b∗2j) = 1, this would be a perfect estimate if wj were a constant. Now, wj
depends on b∗2j and is therefore not a constant. Still, its variation is very small compared














since we estimate var(β̂∗2j) by vj = v(b
∗
2j). The estimated correlation is therefore always
positive (in fact, larger than 0.7452) and smaller than one, such that when b∗2j approaches
±∞ the correlation approaches one.
We conclude that a suitable estimator for the variance of the WALS predictor is given
by























where V and W are diagonal k2×k2 matrices whose j-th diagonal elements vj and wj are
given in (3.33) and (3.34), respectively. Having thus obtained estimators for all unknown
quantities, the prediction variance can be computed.
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3.7. Unknown variance matrix
We have thus far assumed that Ω and Cf are known, whereas in practice they are of
course unknown. If the structure of the variance matrix is known, we can estimate Ω
and Cf once we have an estimate of unknown parameter θ. The parameter θ can be
estimated based on the unrestricted model by minimizing
ϕ(θ) := log |Ω|+ y′(Ω−1 − Ω−1X(X ′Ω−1X)−1X ′Ω−1)y (3.40)
with respect to θ.
This leads to the maximum likelihood estimator θ̂ of θ, and hence to the estimators
Ω̂ = Ω(θ̂) and Ĉf = Cf(θ̂). Note that the gradient of ϕ is the m × 1 vector whose i-th













M∗ = M∗1 (Ω−X∗2X∗2 ′)M∗1 . (3.42)
Therefore, θ̂ depends on y only through M∗1 y and the same holds for Ω̂ and Ĉf . Re-
placing the unknown parameters with their estimates can have an effect on the property
of the WALS predictor. However, Danilov (2005) showed that such an effect is small, at
least in terms of the risk.
3.8. Simulation setup
Sections 3.2–3.7 contain the theoretical framework. Our next task is to evaluate the
performance of the WALS predictor in a number of common situations and in compar-
ison with other often-used predictors. In the current section we describe the setup of
our simulation experiment. The simulation results are presented in Section 3.9. Many
extensions of the benchmark setup were considered and some of these are summarized
in Sections 3.10 and 3.11.
3.8.1. Five methods
In the simulations we compare the performance of the WALS predictor to four commonly-
used methods: unrestricted maximum likelihood (ML), pretesting (PT), ridge regression
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(Ridge), and Mallows model averaging (MMA). We briefly describe each method below.
Unrestricted maximum likelihood simply estimates the unrestricted model (with all
auxiliary regressors). There is no model selection here, and hence no noise associated
with the model selection procedure. On the other hand, the noise associated with the
estimation procedure will be large because of the large number of parameters.
Pretest estimation is a long-standing practice in applied econometrics, perhaps be-
cause pretest estimators are ‘logical outcomes of the increased diagnostic testing of as-
sumptions advocated in many econometric circles’ (Poirier, 1995, p. 522). Pretest es-
timators and predictors do not follow textbook OLS or GLS properties, because the
reported predictor is biased and its variance is only correct conditional on the selected
model. One would expect the unconditional (‘true’) variance to be larger, because of
the model selection noise. Giles and Giles (1993) provide a comprehensive review of the
pretest literature. In pretest prediction one first selects the model based on diagnostic
testing, and then predicts under the selected model. The choice of critical values of the
pretest has received much attention (Toyoda and Wallace, 1976; Ohtani and Toyoda,
1980; Wan and Zou, 2003). Here we use the stepwisefit routine in Matlab, one of the
most popular pretest methods. This routine begins with a forward selection procedure
based on an initial model, then employs backward selection to remove variables. The
steps are repeated until no additions or deletions of variables are indicated. We treat
the model that includes only the focus regressors as the initial model and let the rou-
tine select the auxiliary regressors according to statistical significance. We choose the
significance level for adding a variable to be 0.05 and for removing a variable to be 0.10.
Ridge regression (Hoerl and Kennard, 1970) is a common shrinkage technique, origi-
nally designed to address multicollinearity. Since the focus parameters are always in the
model, we only penalize the auxiliary parameters. The ridge estimator is then obtained
by minimizing













the solution can be written as




where κ is the tuning parameter. Alternatively we obtain the ridge estimator in a
Bayesian framework as the mean in the posterior distribution of β|(X ′X)−1X ′y by com-
bining the data density (X ′X)−1X ′y|β ∼ N(β, σ2(X ′X)−1) with the partially informative
prior β/σ ∼ N(0, (1/ǫ)E1+(1/κ)E2) and letting ǫ → 0. Following Golub et al. (1979), we
choose the tuning parameter κ by minimizing the generalized cross validation criterion
GCV(κ) =
(y − Ξ(κ)y)′(y − Ξ(κ)y)




Finally, Mallows model averaging, proposed by Hansen (2007), averages over estima-
tors using weights obtained by minimizing the Mallows criterion
C(λ) = (y − P (λ)y)′(y − P (λ)y) + 2σ2 trP (λ), (3.47)







, and X(i) is the regressor
matrix in model Mi. Note that we do not assume an explicit ordering of the regressors,
as Hansen does. An explicit ordering has the computational advantage that it reduces
the number of weights from 2k2 to k2, but it is typically not practical in applications.
When the submodels are strictly nested, Hansen (2007) proved that the MMA estimator
is asymptotically optimal in a given class of model averaging estimators. Wan et al.
(2010) extended the optimality to non-nested models.
All predictors explicitly account for possible correlation in the random disturbances.
In particular, the WALS predictor is obtained using Definition 1, and the predictors of
the other four predictors are all computed from
ŷf = Xf β̂ + CfΩ
−1(y −Xβ̂), (3.48)
where β̂ depends on the chosen method. For ML (unrestricted model, no model selec-
tion), the predictor is linear in y and the associated variance is easily computed. For
PT and Ridge, the predictor is not linear in y, but the reported variance is calculated as
if the predictor were linear in y, following common practice. The variance for WALS is
estimated from (3.39) while the variance for MMA can not be computed.
3.8.2. Data-generation process
We generate the data in three steps. First, we design the regressor matrix X = (X1 :
X2 : X3), where X1 and X2 contain the focus and auxiliary variables, while X3 contains
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the regressors that are omitted by the researcher (from every model) either because of
ignorance or because of data limitations. The DGP and the largest (unrestricted) model
are therefore not necessarily the same in the simulations. This is important because it
brings us one step closer to econometric practice. In the benchmark DGP we consider
six regressors with k1 = 2, k2 = 3, and k3 = 1, such that
X1 = (x1, x2), X2 = (x3, x4, x5) X3 = (x6), (3.49)
where x1 is the intercept. Since k2 = 3 we have 2
3 = 8 possible models. In the bench-
mark, all regressors, except the intercept, are generated by independent standard-normal
distributions, and they are treated as fixed, so that each replication uses the same realiza-
tion of the regressors once they have been generated. We also consider the cases where
regressors are correlated (multivariate normal distribution with non-zero a covariance
matrix) as a robustness check, and we find the results largely similar except that WALS
always outperform other methods when there are omitted variables. In Section 3.11 we
shall consider extensions where we have a large number of regressors and the regressors
are autocorrelated or non-normally distributed.
Next, we simulate the parameters βj (j = 1, . . . , 6) corresponding to regressors
x1, . . . , x6. For the auxiliary and omitted regressors x3, . . . , x6 we set these parame-
ters indirectly by controlling the ‘theoretical’ t-ratios, as follows. If we estimate the
focus variables and just one auxiliary variable xj , we obtain an estimated coefficient















1xj (j = 3, . . . , 6). (3.50)
The values of the tj are important (especially whether |tj | > 1 or |tj | < 1), because they
determine whether adding an auxiliary regressor to the model will increase or decrease
the root mean squared prediction error (the square root of the mean squared prediction




T t3 t4 t5 t6
T1 1.2 0.9 1.1 0.0
T2 1.2 1.7 0.7 0.9
T3 1.2 0.9 1.0 2.5
T4 2.0 2.5 2.7 0.0
T5 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.0
Given xj and tj, we then obtain the parameters βj (j = 3, . . . , 6). Three of the five cases
(T1, T4, T5) have no omitted variables. In T1 the t-ratios of the auxiliary variables are
close to 1, in T4 the t-ratios are large, and in T5 they are small. The other two cases (T2,
T3) have an omitted variable. The value of t6 is either close to one (T2) or large (T3).




j for three values of ν:
1, 2, and 3. Since the prediction performance is hardly affected by this choice, we shall
report for ν = 2 only.
Finally, we generate the error terms, based on (3.3), from a normal distribution with
mean zero and variance Ωall. We consider three specifications of Ωall: homoskedasticity,
heteroskedasticity, and autocorrelation. More precisely,
• homoskedasticity: Ωall = σ
2In+nf with σ
2 ∈ {0.25, 1.00};
• heteroskedasticity: Ωall = diag [exp(τx2)] with τ ∈ {0.2, 0.7};
• autocorrelation: AR(1) with σ2 = 1.0 and ρ ∈ {0.3, 0.8}.
3.8.3. Comparison of prediction methods
We evaluate the five methods by comparing the predictors and the estimated variances
of the predictors. To compare the predictors produced by the five methods, we consider
the deviation between the predictor ŷf and the true value yf . A direct comparison is,
however, misleading because there is a component common to all procedures. Hence we

























f are the predictor and the true value in the r-th replication. We follow
Hansen (2008) and subtract uf−CfΩ−1u from the prediction error, because it is common
across prediction methods and independent of u, hence independent of β̂ − β.









which would tell us whether one method reports more precise predictions than another.
This is of interest, but more important than whether the reported prediction variance
is small is whether the prediction variance is correct. It is easy to find predictors with
small variances, but this does not make them good predictors.
Thus we wish to determine how close the estimated variance is to the ‘true’ variance,











where VT denotes the ‘true’ variance, that is, the actual variance of the predictor. Since
different methods give different predictors, the ‘true’ variance of the predictor varies
across methods. We estimate VT by obtaining Rv = 100 predictors from the replications,



















We consider training samples of size N = 100 and N = 300, and a prediction sample
of size Nf = 10. The simulation results are obtained by computing averages across
R = 3000 draws.
3.9. Simulation results: The benchmark
We compare the predictors by considering two sample sizes (N = 100, N = 300), five sets
of parameter values (T1, . . . T5), six specifications of Ωall, and five methods. Each method
is presented relative to ML, that is, we present the RMSE of each method divided by the
RMSE of ML. An entry greater than one thus indicates an inferior performance relative
to the ML method.
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Table 3.1: RMSE of predictor relative to ML, benchmark model
N T WALS PT Ridge MMA WALS PT Ridge MMA
Homoskedasticity
σ2 = 0.25 σ2 = 1.00
T1 0.8644 1.0570 0.9109 0.9416 0.8981 1.1589 1.0641 1.0172
T2 0.8819 1.0311 0.8979 0.9406 0.9287 1.1373 1.0350 1.0178
100 T3 0.9525 1.2025 1.0866 1.0769 0.9366 1.1001 0.9576 1.0031
T4 1.0024 1.2756 1.0296 1.1579 0.9569 1.2758 1.0521 1.1267
T5 0.8190 0.8600 0.7556 0.8019 0.7939 0.8280 0.6906 0.7680
T1 0.8990 1.1152 0.9899 0.9940 0.9295 1.0421 0.9398 0.9727
T2 0.9598 1.0819 1.0237 1.0156 0.9271 1.0758 0.9648 0.9934
300 T3 0.9523 1.0341 0.9612 0.9841 0.9642 1.0480 0.9929 0.9977
T4 0.9516 1.1490 0.9977 1.0853 1.0513 1.2362 1.0481 1.1492
T5 0.8004 0.8571 0.7195 0.7878 0.8404 0.8777 0.7823 0.8238
Heteroskedasticity
τ = 0.2 τ = 0.7
T1 0.9038 1.0766 0.9401 0.9708 0.8926 1.0964 0.9786 0.9815
T2 0.8846 1.1140 0.9936 0.9847 0.8743 1.0639 0.8699 0.9418
100 T3 0.9736 1.0682 1.0071 1.0169 0.8752 0.9326 0.8681 0.8849
T4 0.9628 1.2428 0.9650 1.1144 0.9558 1.2430 0.9679 1.1158
T5 0.8160 0.8633 0.7494 0.7976 0.8148 0.8633 0.7486 0.7948
T1 0.8928 1.1104 0.9847 0.9917 0.8834 1.0718 0.8988 0.9581
T2 0.9012 1.0801 0.9810 0.9744 0.8675 1.0014 0.8694 0.9134
300 T3 0.8884 0.9702 0.8807 0.9069 0.9421 1.0325 0.9530 0.9754
T4 1.0596 1.2178 1.0485 1.1456 0.9011 1.2004 0.9741 1.1056
T5 0.8043 0.8431 0.7209 0.7806 0.9132 0.9360 0.8847 0.9058
Autocorrelation
ρ = 0.3 ρ = 0.8
T1 0.8875 1.0543 0.9384 0.9586 0.9809 1.0182 0.9903 0.9958
T2 0.8980 1.0885 0.9001 0.9643 0.9659 1.0058 0.9608 0.9774
100 T3 0.8823 0.9723 0.8398 0.9110 0.9990 1.0232 1.0126 1.0111
T4 1.0089 1.1629 1.0127 1.0917 0.9979 1.0511 1.0109 1.0278
T5 0.8634 0.8971 0.8077 0.8510 0.9632 0.9715 0.9525 0.9600
T1 0.9188 1.0868 0.9904 0.9934 0.9760 1.0241 0.9891 0.9947
T2 0.9399 1.0771 0.9975 0.9926 0.9574 0.9988 0.9603 0.9717
300 T3 0.9031 0.9819 0.8991 0.9243 0.9856 1.0164 0.9920 0.9975
T4 1.0460 1.1804 1.0423 1.1207 0.9988 1.0623 1.0060 1.0373
T5 0.8453 0.8735 0.7829 0.8265 0.9788 0.9828 0.9711 0.9764
The RMSEs of the predictors are presented in Table 3.1. WALS comes out best
in 39 out of 60 cases (65%), followed by Ridge (27%) and ML (8%). The pretest and
MMA predictors never dominate. The dominance of WALS occurs for each of the spec-
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ifications of Ωall, though slightly less in the autocorrelation case than in the homo- and
heteroskedastic cases. One reason why WALS is superior over MMA is that WALS makes
use of the information in the error structure, while MMA does not.
In T1 WALS dominates in all 12 cases, and in T2 in 11/12 cases. This shows that
WALS performs well when the t-ratios of the auxiliary variables are close to one, even
when the model possibly omits one variable with a t-ratio close to one. If the omitted
variable has a stronger impact on the dependent variable, as in T3, WALS still works
best in 9/12 cases followed by Ridge (3/12). This suggests that omitting important
regressors may affect the prediction ability of WALS, which is a point worthy of further
investigation; see Section 3.11.
When the t-ratios of the auxiliary variables are much larger than one, as in T4, then
WALS is still the best, but this is the only case where ML also performs well. This makes
sense, because model uncertainty plays a smaller role here. We note that increasing the
parameter values in Ωall (σ
2, τ , and ρ, respectively) improves the relative performance
of WALS over ML in T4. Larger parameter values in Ωall imply more noise in the model,
and the superiority of WALS seems stronger then. The possibility that the degree of
model uncertainty affects the relative performance of different methods also warrants
further investigation; see Section 3.10.
In the opposite case where the t-ratios of the auxiliary variables are much smaller
than one, as in T5, WALS is not the best. Here the Ridge predictor always dominates,
and ML is always the worst. Again, there is little model uncertainty. The unrestricted
model (ML) is not appropriate, but shrinkage towards the restricted estimator (with
only the focus regressors) makes sense, and this is what Ridge does. We also experiment
the cases with negative t-ratios, and find that the results are not substantially different.
WALS comes out best in most cases (28%), followed by ridge (15%).
Next we compare the performance of the prediction variance. We first consider the
magnitude of the estimated variance itself, then we ask how close the estimated variance
is to the ‘true’ variance. The MMA method is not included in this comparison because
there is no procedure known to us to compute this variance. In the boxplots of Figure 3.1,
the central mark is the median, the edges of each box indicate the 25-th and 75-th
percentiles, the whiskers extend to the most extreme data points not considered outliers,
and outliers are plotted individually.
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Figure 3.1: Estimated variance in the benchmark model (N = 100)
Homoskedasticity (σ2 = 1.0)
T = T1 T = T4
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Autocorrelation (ρ = 0.3)
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We consider six representative cases. Judging by the median of the estimated vari-
ance, ML has the largest variance, followed by WALS, while the variance of the Ridge
and PT predictors are both smaller than WALS. This is in accordance with intuition,
because ML includes all regressors, while pretesting and ridge are based on the selected
model or the selected parameter, while ignoring variation caused by the selection proce-
dure. The WALS predictor has a relatively large variance (but still smaller than ML),
because it does take the uncertainty in the selection procedure into account.
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We note that the estimated variances for WALS and ML are more concentrated on
their median values than those of Ridge and PT, and that the distributions of the latter
two methods are also characterized by a strong asymmetry. The difference between the
four variance estimates is relatively small when there is little model uncertainty (T4),
and more pronounced when model uncertainty is large (T1).
As discussed above, a variance estimate is a good estimate, not when it is small,
but when it provides the correct information about the precision of the predictor. If
this precision happens to be low, then we need to provide a high value for the variance
estimate. Table 3.2 gives the RMSE of the estimated prediction variance, as given
in (3.53), again relative to ML. On the left-side of the table (where the parameters σ2,
τ , and ρ are relatively small), the RMSE ratios (relative to ML) are, on average, 1.10
for WALS, 2.43 for Ridge, and 10.98 for PT. On the right-side (where the parameter
values are larger, hence more uncertainty), the RMSE ratios are 1.05 for WALS, 2.19 for
Ridge, and 9.44 for PT. The main conclusion from the table is therefore that ML and
WALS provide the best estimates of the prediction variance, while Ridge and especially
PT generally report a variance which is misleadingly small. While WALS provides a
much better estimate of the forecast than ML, the variance of the forecast is slightly
more accurately estimated in ML than in WALS.
ML performs particularly well when N is large (because of the asymptotic behavior
of ML estimates and predictions) and when the variance parameters are small. The rel-
ative performance of WALS prediction variance estimates is improved by increasing the
variance of the error terms. This suggests that more model uncertainty makes WALS
prediction more attractive. In the benchmark setup, where we have assumed determinis-
tic regressors and coefficients, there is not much model uncertainty. If we raise the model
uncertainty, for example by introducing random regressors or random coefficients or by
increasing the variance of the errors, then one would expect the WALS estimates, which
incorporate the model uncertainty, to be more accurate than ML. We shall analyze this
idea further in the next section.
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Table 3.2: RMSE of prediction variance relative to ML, benchmark model
N T WALS PT Ridge WALS PT Ridge
Homoskedasticity
σ2 = 0.25 σ2 = 1.00
T1 0.8155 10.417 2.1262 0.8050 9.7509 2.1211
T2 0.9011 12.307 2.8462 0.8606 11.722 2.7199
100 T3 1.0760 8.5721 1.9561 1.0421 9.7699 2.0451
T4 0.7755 16.040 2.1837 0.7972 16.747 2.2023
T5 0.7765 3.0180 0.6894 0.7916 3.0839 0.7061
T1 1.2139 16.351 3.3701 1.2947 15.494 3.0947
T2 1.1475 16.967 3.7704 1.3978 18.440 4.0967
300 T3 1.3510 15.950 3.3156 1.4509 15.176 3.3333
T4 1.0001 21.714 2.5714 0.8938 20.070 2.5663
T5 1.4811 5.3371 1.0851 1.2495 4.9051 1.0459
Heteroskedasticity
τ = 0.2 τ = 0.7
T1 1.1174 17.938 4.6738 0.8849 12.547 3.3035
T2 1.0030 23.113 5.3124 0.9509 18.382 4.2944
100 T3 1.1227 25.641 5.3652 0.9648 18.941 4.8476
T4 1.0083 17.748 3.3204 0.9628 15.244 2.8077
T5 1.2374 5.1309 1.6143 0.9888 4.5029 1.5134
T1 1.3897 18.963 3.8448 1.1613 16.107 3.3285
T2 1.3279 20.426 4.4850 1.2645 17.335 4.3203
300 T3 1.4954 19.552 3.9925 1.3081 16.980 3.2964
T4 1.2030 27.566 3.4499 1.0624 22.479 2.7482
T5 1.1378 5.2663 1.1331 1.2631 5.2922 1.2149
Autocorrelation
ρ = 0.3 ρ = 0.8
T1 1.0605 2.5141 1.2681 1.0000 1.0156 1.0064
T2 1.0347 2.9666 1.3984 1.0011 1.0141 1.0072
100 T3 1.0381 2.8648 1.3693 0.9984 1.0213 1.0093
T4 1.0190 3.6270 1.2758 1.0007 1.0162 1.0047
T5 1.0633 1.4584 1.0620 1.0000 1.0088 1.0049
T1 1.0060 1.6103 1.0716 0.9983 1.0050 1.0003
T2 1.0191 1.6745 1.1390 0.9997 1.0065 1.0016
300 T3 1.0080 1.6066 1.0980 0.9991 1.0087 1.0016
T4 1.0068 1.7774 1.0753 1.0006 1.0031 1.0009
T5 1.0258 1.1822 1.0238 1.0000 1.0035 1.0019
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3.10. Simulation results: More uncertainty
In this section we extend the benchmark setup by introducing additional randomness in
the model. This is achieved by allowing for random regressors or random coefficients or
by increasing the variance of errors.
3.10.1. Random regressors
We first consider the model with random but exogenous regressors. This is a common
extension in simulation designs, and particularly useful in applications where one wishes
to model dynamic economic behavior. The only difference with the benchmark is that
we generate a new set of X ’s from N(0, σ2x) in every replication, so that each realization
of the y-series involves a new realization of the X-series. (The introduction of σ2x is
unimportant, because the RMSE is invariant to its value.) The generation of X is
independent of the errors.
Allowing the regressors to be random increases the RMSE of the forecast in each
method. The relative performance of the five predictors is similar to the benchmark
case. In particular, the WALS predictor has the lowest RMSE in T1, T2, and T3, about
5% lower than the RMSE of the ML predictor. In case T5, the ridge predictor has
the lowest RMSE under all error structures, around 10% lower than the ML predictor.
In contrast to the benchmark results, allowing random regressors improves the relative
performance of WALS over ML in T4, because more randomness decreases the importance
of the auxiliary variables.
The main difference between the random regressor model and the benchmark model
is in the prediction variance, and we report its RMSE in Table 3.3. WALS now produces
the most accurate prediction variance in all cases, including T4 and T5. This remarkable
performance of WALS is due to the fact that randomness in the regressors raises model
uncertainty, which in turn increases the variation of the predictor, that is, the true vari-
ance. The prediction variance of WALS explicitly incorporates such model uncertainty,
in contrast to pretesting, ridge regression, and ML.
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Table 3.3: RMSE of prediction variance relative to ML, random regressor model
N T WALS PT Ridge WALS PT Ridge
Homoskedasticity
σ2 = 0.25 σ2 = 1.00
T1 0.7499 1.0219 0.8056 0.7467 1.0119 0.8007
T2 0.7958 1.0096 0.8365 0.7952 1.0110 0.8362
100 T3 0.8866 1.0101 0.9149 0.8899 1.0161 0.9220
T4 0.8487 0.9951 0.8990 0.8497 0.9929 0.8987
T5 0.5091 0.9267 0.5336 0.5064 0.9021 0.5229
T1 0.7486 1.0219 0.8064 0.7435 1.0165 0.8011
T2 0.7978 1.0107 0.8407 0.7990 1.0101 0.8399
300 T3 0.8930 1.0170 0.9222 0.8889 1.0115 0.9179
T4 0.8473 0.9953 0.8989 0.8474 0.9938 0.8988
T5 0.5123 0.9513 0.5505 0.5147 0.9417 0.5481
Heteroskedasticity
τ = 0.2 τ = 0.7
T1 0.7448 1.0296 0.8095 0.7421 1.0342 0.8128
T2 0.7914 1.0123 0.8381 0.7950 1.0129 0.8448
100 T3 0.8862 1.0080 0.9149 0.8835 1.0067 0.9137
T4 0.8461 0.9954 0.9010 0.8495 0.9925 0.9044
T5 0.5125 0.9515 0.5525 0.5621 0.9278 0.5855
T1 0.7444 1.0192 0.8054 0.7444 1.0192 0.8054
T2 0.7987 1.0162 0.8450 0.7987 1.0162 0.8450
300 T3 0.8906 1.0139 0.9191 0.8906 1.0139 0.9191
T4 0.8490 0.9942 0.9014 0.8490 0.9942 0.9014
T5 0.5146 0.9614 0.5548 0.5146 0.9614 0.5548
Autocorrelation
ρ = 0.3 ρ = 0.8
T1 0.7469 1.0318 0.8150 0.9809 1.0059 0.9890
T2 0.7997 1.0241 0.8494 0.9683 1.0049 0.9785
100 T3 0.8866 1.0175 0.9177 0.9646 1.0065 0.9775
T4 0.8479 0.9986 0.9022 0.9099 1.0004 0.9433
T5 0.6863 0.9902 0.7205 0.9975 1.0082 1.0033
T1 0.7629 1.0151 0.8199 0.9924 1.0003 0.9950
T2 0.8054 1.0122 0.8483 0.9894 1.0058 0.9940
300 T3 0.8913 1.0082 0.9201 0.9848 0.9996 0.9898
T4 0.8478 0.9934 0.9005 0.9465 1.0023 0.9666
T5 0.8013 0.9948 0.8239 0.9985 0.9990 0.9977
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3.10.2. Random coefficients
Next we consider the situation where the coefficients of the explanatory variables are




xtj(βj + vtj) + ut (t = 1, 2, . . . , N), (3.55)
where the vtj ’s are independent unobserved random disturbances, distributed as N(0, σ
2
v).
Such models date back to Rubin (1950), Hildreth and Houck (1968), Swamy (1970),
Froehlich (1973), and others, who discussed parameter estimation and provided empirical
applications. Prediction in random coefficient models is studied, inter alia, in Bondeson




xtjβj + ζt, ζt =
6∑
j=1
xtjvtj + ut (3.56)











shows that introducing variation in the coefficients increases the variance of the errors.
We assume that the researcher is ignorant of the random coefficients and misspecifies
them as fixed. Hence the model is the benchmark model, but the DGP has changed.
How do the predictors respond to this situation?
Regarding the accuracy of the predictors, we find similar results as in the random
regressor model. The WALS predictor has the lowest RMSE in cases T1–T4, while the
ridge predictor is the best under T5. This demonstrates good performance of the WALS
predictor when the t-ratios of the auxiliary variables are close to one, even when the
coefficients are misspecified.
The accuracy of the estimated prediction variance is shown in Figure 3.2 as a function
of σ2v . Increasing σ
2
v raises the model uncertainty as well as the degree of misspecification,
thus lowering the accuracy of all predictions. The variance estimates obtained from
pretesting have a much larger RMSE than those from other methods, and they are also
more volatile. Ridge regression generally produces somewhat better variance estimates.
Most accurate are ML and WALS, and their variance accuracy is close when σ2v is small.
When σ2v = 0 (the benchmark), ML is more accurate than WALS, but as σ
2
v increases,
the RMSE of WALS increases slower than the RMSE of ML, and when σ2v > 0.03 the
accuracy of WALS variance estimates is higher than ML. These results confirm that
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Figure 3.2: RMSE of prediction variance in random coefficient model (N = 100)
Homoskedasticity (σ2 = 1.0)
T = T1 T = T4











































Heteroskedasticity (τ = 0.7)
T = T1 T = T4











































Autocorrelation (ρ = 0.3)
T = T1 T = T4













































WALS behaves well in the presence of a large degree of model uncertainty. Viewed
differently, WALS is more robust than pretesting, ridge, and ML.
3.10.3. Increase in the variance of errors
Finally, we consider an increase in the variance of the errors by changing a parame-
ter in Ωall. We only consider the homoskedastic and the heteroskedastic cases. Under
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homoskedasticity we can increase the error variance by increasing σ2; under heteroskedas-
ticity case by increasing τ .
Figure 3.3: RMSE of prediction variance: homoskedastic versus heteroskedastic (N =
100, T = T1)
Homoskedasticity Heteroskedasticity










































Figure 3.3 shows how the RMSE of the prediction variance changes as the parameters
σ2 and τ increase. In both cases, WALS and ML outperform Ridge and, in particular,
PT. When the error variance is small, the prediction variances produced by WALS and
ML show similar accuracy. But as the error variance increases, the WALS prediction
variance is more accurate than ML.
Note that increasing the error variance affects the RMSE of the prediction variance in
different ways: it increases the RMSE in the homoskedastic case but reduces the RMSE
in the heteroskedastic case. This is because in the design of the heteroskedastic variance,
Ωall = exp(τx2) is a function of x2. Increasing τ leads to a smaller estimated coefficient
β̂2 since the estimation process cannot distinguish between increasing the error variance
from increasing the variation in x2.
In summary, more model uncertainty leads to a better performance of WALS relative
to the other methods.
3.11. Simulation results: More regressors
In Sections 3.9 and 3.10 we assumed two focus regressors, three auxiliary regressors, and
one omitted regressor. In practical applications the number of regressors is likely to be
larger. In this section we extend the benchmark framework by assuming k2 = 12 auxiliary
regressors and k3 = 3 omitted regressors, while keeping the same number k1 = 2 of focus
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regressors. The large number of auxiliary regressors will increase the model uncertainty,
because we now have 212 = 4096 different models to consider compared to 23 = 8 in
the benchmark. When introducing new variables we have to specify the ‘theoretical’




TL1 1.2, 0.9, 1.0, 1.3, 1.2, 1.5, 1.6, 1.2, 1.1, 0.8, 1.5, 1.4 0.0, 0.0, 0.0
TL2 1.2, 0.9, 1.0, 1.3, 1.2, 1.5, 1.6, 1.2, 1.1, 0.8, 1.5, 1.4 2.4, 2.8, 2.0
TL3 1.2, 0.9, 1.0, 2.3, 2.2, 2.5, 2.6, 2.1, 2.0, 0.5, 2.5, 1.4 0.0, 0.0, 0.0
TL4 1.2, 0.9, 1.0, 0.7, 1.2, 0.5, 0.6, 2.2, 0.3, 0.8, 0.5, 1.2 0.0, 0.0, 0.0
In TL1 all auxiliary variables have t-ratios close to one and there are no omitted variables.
In TL2 we have the same t-ratios for the auxiliary variables but now there are also omitted
variables. In TL3 many of the auxiliary variables have ‘large’ t-ratios, while in TL4 many
of the t-ratios are ‘small’. Only TL2 has omitted variables and they are all important.
We combine this larger data set with the benchmark setup, random regressor DGP, and
random coefficient DGP, again under each of the three error structures. We compare
WALS, Ridge, and PT with ML. We do not compute MMA because the computational
burden is too high when k2 is large.
We briefly consider two other extensions, both analyzed in the context of the small
data set: dependence among the regressors and non-normality. Dependence is introduced
through a multivariate normal distribution with correlation 0.5, while the non-normal
regressors are obtained from a Student distribution with five degrees of freedom. We also
considered correlated regressors, e.g. AR(1) regressors. These results are essentially the
same and therefore not reported. We experiment (separately) with these two extensions
in the benchmark model and also in models with more uncertainty. The simulation results
are largely similar to the case with normal and uncorrelated regressors. In particular,
the WALS predictor is the most accurate when t-ratios are close to one, and the WALS
prediction variance is particularly reliable when there is additional uncertainty.
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Table 3.4: RMSE relative to ML, many auxiliary regressors (N = 100)
Homoskedasticity Heteroskedasticity Autocorrelation
(σ2 = 1.0) (τ = 0.7) (ρ = 0.3)
T WALS PT Ridge WALS PT Ridge WALS PT Ridge
Benchmark model: fixed X, fixed β
Predictor
TL1 0.8611 1.2088 0.8982 0.8570 1.1664 0.9411 0.9284 1.0807 0.9561
TL2 0.9289 1.0789 0.9234 0.8755 1.0167 0.8328 0.9398 1.0637 0.9229
TL3 0.9625 1.3057 0.9883 0.9047 1.2300 0.9294 0.9052 1.1423 0.9077
TL4 0.8285 1.0579 0.7997 0.8035 0.9935 0.7745 0.8993 1.0058 0.8760
Prediction variance
TL1 0.3440 14.835 0.8088 0.7854 22.311 1.6711 1.3175 13.641 1.4356
TL2 1.1154 17.104 0.9023 1.1196 25.152 1.4803 1.2224 15.158 1.5576
TL3 0.4239 20.146 0.9557 0.6404 27.417 1.2445 1.1870 16.359 1.2598
TL4 0.3452 8.6851 0.6884 0.6729 12.559 1.0391 1.2984 7.9238 1.3222
Random regressor model: random X, fixed β
Predictor
TL1 0.9787 1.0249 0.9791 0.9828 1.0136 0.9823 0.9810 1.0188 0.9821
TL2 0.9769 1.0182 0.9761 0.9811 1.0106 0.9801 0.9778 1.0132 0.9753
TL3 0.9854 1.0365 0.9874 0.9891 1.0249 0.9908 0.9868 1.0327 0.9876
TL4 0.9745 1.0023 0.9715 0.9821 1.0000 0.9800 0.9770 1.0022 0.9754
Prediction variance
TL1 0.7713 1.0240 0.7595 0.7634 1.0329 0.7830 0.7650 1.0538 0.7779
TL2 0.8569 1.0177 0.8489 0.8491 1.0024 0.8433 0.8523 1.0167 0.8438
TL3 0.8324 1.0074 0.8443 0.8277 1.0003 0.8568 0.8253 1.0184 0.8498
TL4 0.7365 1.0358 0.7195 0.7299 1.0636 0.7516 0.7303 1.0899 0.7540
Random coefficient model: fixed X, random β
Predictor
TL1 0.9896 1.0216 0.9960 0.9913 1.0050 0.9907 0.9844 1.0179 0.9876
TL2 0.9926 1.0400 1.0166 0.9747 0.9978 0.9836 0.9683 1.0027 0.9616
TL3 0.9748 1.0309 0.9775 0.9941 1.0203 0.9966 0.9966 1.0333 0.9988
TL4 0.9763 1.0157 0.9893 0.9846 1.0067 0.9866 0.9839 1.0055 0.9833
Prediction variance
TL1 0.1869 6.9005 0.5812 0.1577 7.6836 0.7459 0.4234 8.3586 0.9135
TL2 0.3387 11.519 0.8175 0.1607 9.1310 0.8254 0.3520 8.2753 0.8903
TL3 0.2718 8.3617 0.7382 0.2199 9.3498 0.8352 0.4600 10.759 0.9792
TL4 0.1638 4.2507 0.4721 0.1532 5.1157 0.6335 0.4300 5.7437 0.8624
3.12. Conclusion
This paper has introduced a new method of prediction averaging using weighted average
least squares (WALS). We have argued that pretesting—the currently dominant predic-
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tion method—is dangerous, because it ignores the noise associated with model selection.
Indeed, our simulation results demonstrate that pretesting performs very badly. Model
averaging is an attractive method in that it allows us to combine model selection and
prediction into one procedure. Within the model averaging methods we proposed the
WALS predictor and also an estimate for its variance. Our predictor explicitly allows for
correlation in the errors.
We have compared the WALS predictor with four competing predictors (unrestricted
ML, pretesting, ridge regression, Mallows model averaging) in a wide range of simulation
experiments, where we considered not only the accuracy of the predictor (measured
by the root mean squared prediction error), but also the accuracy of the prediction
variance. The WALS predictor generally produces the lowest mean squared error. The
estimated variance of the WALS predictor, while typically larger than the variance of the
pretesting and ridge predictors, is more accurate, and when model uncertainty increases
the dominance of WALS becomes more pronounced. These results, together with the
fact that the WALS predictor is easy to compute, suggest that the WALS predictor is a





quality, and economic growth in
China3
4.1. Introduction
Since reformists within the Chinese Communist Party initiated a program of economic
reforms in December 1978, China has been the world’s fastest-growing major economy
with consistent growth rates of around 10% over the past thirty years. China is also the
largest exporter and second largest importer of goods in the world. At the same time the
production of natural resources has increased sharply. These natural resources are not
evenly distributed over China: the coal mines are primarily located in eight provinces,
all in the North-East and North, while most natural gas reserves can be found in the
Mid-West, especially in Sichuan province which accounts for almost 30% of the nation’s
production of natural gas. Regions with a high production of natural resources have
generally developed slower than low-producing regions, a phenomenon which resembles
the situation where resource-rich countries perform worse than resource-scarce countries,
the so-called ‘curse of resources’.
The ‘curse of resources’ hypothesis has been analyzed in many cross-country stud-
ies, both from empirical and theoretical viewpoints, but there have not been many
within-country studies examining the relationship between natural resources and eco-
nomic growth. A notable exception is the study by Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004), who
employed data from 49 states in the USA, and concluded that resource-scarce states
outperform resource-rich states. Like the USA, China is endowed with several unique
characteristics which make it suitable for testing the resource curse hypothesis. First,
China has homogeneous constitution, law, and governance structures (but different in-
stitutions) across provinces. Second, there are significant differences between provincial
3This chapter is coauthored with Jan R. Magnus and Kan Ji.
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economies, and substantial variation in resource endowments and development. Third,
market reforms have lifted restrictions on the flows of products, labor, and capital Zhang
et al. (2008). In addition, the price reforms in China’s natural resource sector between
the late 1970s and the mid-1990s ensure that the resource prices largely reflect market
supply and demand.
Recently, a number of studies have appeared on the relationship between resources
and economic growth in China. Xu and Wang (2006) were the first to use panel-data
methods, and they found evidence supporting the curse of resources at the provincial
level. Shao and Qi (2009) confirmed these results and compared the resource effects be-
fore and after the ‘West China Development Drive’ in 2000, by estimating two samples
(before and after the policy change) separately. Their results suggest that the 2000 pol-
icy change induced a resource curse. Zhang et al. (2008) employed a panel-data set at
the provincial level and associated a slower growth rate of per capita consumption with
rich resources, especially in rural regions. Fan et al. (2012) used city-level data to an-
alyze the transmission mechanism of resource curse and diffusion processes of resources
among cities. They found no evidence of a resource curse in China, and they showed
that resources have a positive diffusion effect among neighboring cities within the same
province.
Some caution is required in interpreting these results. First, no distinction is made
between resource abundance and resource dependence. For example, Xu and Wang
(2006) measured resource abundance by the proportion of mining workers or by the ratio
of investment in the mining industry to total fixed asset investment. These measurements
capture resource dependence rather than resource abundance, and the effect of these two
concepts on economic growth is not necessarily the same (Brunnschweiler and Bulte,
2008). In addition, the measurement of resource dependence suffers from endogeneity
(Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008; Norman, 2009; van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2010).
The current paper measures resource abundance rather than resource dependence, thus
avoiding these problems. Second, the analysis of the critical role of institutions in the
association between resource abundance and economic growth is not satisfactory. Not
only is the measurement of institutional quality poor, but also important nonlinearities
are ignored (Ross, 2001). Finally, while panel-data methods capture short-run dynamics,
they are typically not powerful in explaining the long-run effect of natural resources.
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Conventional panel-data models estimate constant slope coefficients, implicitly assuming
that the resource effect does not change over time. This may, however, not be the case
in China, especially for regions with significant structural breaks such as the West China
Development Drive.
In this paper, we study the interplay between resource abundance, institutional qual-
ity, and economic growth in China. We also investigate whether the resource effect on
economic growth varies over time. Our paper makes four main contributions in the
context of provincial China. First, we propose several new measurements of resource
abundance. These new measurements consider resource abundance either as a stock or
as a flow, thus allowing a comparison between in situ resource reserves (a stock) and
resource revenues (a flow, usually referred to as a ‘windfall gain’). Second, we re-examine
the role of institutional quality in the relationship between resource abundance and eco-
nomic growth. Institutional quality is proxied by confidence in the courts, using data
from the World Bank. We investigate whether and how the effect of resource abundance
on economic growth depends on institutional quality, employing a functional-coefficient
model. Our results show that the effect of resource abundance in China depends on in-
stitutional quality in a nonlinear fashion, which can not be fully captured using a linear
model. More importantly, we find — in contrast to Mehlum et al. (2006) — that the
effect of natural resources is more positive for provinces with poor institutional quality.
Third, we consider the West China Development Drive as a significant policy shock that
may influence the effect of resource abundance on economic growth. We employ both a
standard panel-data model and a time-varying coefficient model to study whether and
how the resource effect changes after the policy shock. Finally, our paper uses both cross-
section and panel data to explore the effect of natural resource abundance on economic
growth. The advantage of cross-section data is that they better capture the long-run
effect, and reduce the possible bias caused by economic fluctuations. The advantage of
panel data is that they contain more information on the dynamics.
We employ provincial data over the period 1990–2008. Our results are not in gen-
eral agreement with most of the current literature. First, the cross-section benchmark
model shows no evidence of a resource curse. Second, the difference-in-difference ap-
proach shows that the interaction effect of resource abundance and institutional quality
is positive but not significant, suggesting that the interaction effect may not be linear.
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Third, extending the benchmark model, the functional-coefficient estimates indicate that
resource abundance is strongly related to economic growth in regions where institutional
quality is weak, and weakly related in regions where institutional quality is moderate.
Fourth, both the standard panel-data approach and the time-variant model show that the
West China Development Drive has had an important impact on the role of resources in
the economy. By intensifying resource exploitation of the Western provinces, the Drive
has led to an income rise in the West. This increased income helped the local econ-
omy for a short period, but not for long, possibly because an overemphasis on resource
exploitation in some Western provinces crowded out other sectors to some extent.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we briefly review the theories relating
resources and institutional quality, and formulate the questions raised in this paper.
In Section 4.3 we describe the data, and present some characteristics and preliminary
analysis. In Section 4.4 we present the cross-section analysis, and in Section 4.5 the
panel-data analysis. Some conclusions are offered in Section 4.6.
4.2. Resources and institutional quality
Ever since the 1950s, economists have observed that resource-rich countries may grow
slower than resource-scarce countries. Why do abundant resources tend to impede eco-
nomic growth? Several theories have been developed, mainly Dutch disease models
(Sachs and Warner, 1995) and institutional explanations. Traditional Dutch disease ex-
planations cannot be directly applied in the Chinese context, because most of China’s
exports are not expensive for other countries to buy because labor is inexpensive in
China. While it is possible to study the ‘Dutch disease’ among provinces, an adapted
definition and appropriate data would be required. Due to the data limitations, we focus
here on institutional quality explanations.
Many papers have stressed the importance of institutions through which abundant re-
sources may curse economic growth. From a qualitative point of view, resource revenues
appear to be easily appropriable, thus leading to rent-seeking behavior and corruption.
Also, more labor is attracted to seek revenues from other productive activities (Isham
et al., 2005; Leite and Weidmann, 1999; Norman, 2009). Auty (2001) argued that re-
source wealth promotes the ascendance of the ‘predatory state’ over the ‘development
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state’, either by encouraging the former through corruption or by undermining the latter
when revenues associated with resource extraction reduce the efficiency of policy and
administration. The relationship between resources and institutions also depends on the
type of resources. Many studies show that ‘point’ (concentrated) resources result in poor
institutions, while ‘diffuse’ resources do not. This is because point resources (such as
oil, minerals, and plantations) are extracted from a narrow geographic or economic base,
and can be protected and controlled at a relatively modest cost. In contrast, diffuse nat-
ural resources (such as agricultural products) are spread in space and utilized by agents
characterized by horizontal relationships (Bulte et al., 2005). The latter are therefore
less correlated with institutional quality.
From a quantitative point of view, Leite and Weidmann (1999) were perhaps the
first to demonstrate the effect of resource abundance on institutional quality. Mehlum
et al. (2006) interacted natural resource abundance with institutional quality and found
that the negative effect of natural resources on economic growth only occurs in countries
with poor institutional quality. Ross (2001) argued that institutions themselves may also
be endogenous and not invariant with respect to resource endowments. Some empirical
studies claim that institutional quality alone can explain a great deal of cross-country dif-
ferences in economic development, thus further questioning the role of natural resources
in economic development (Acemoglu et al., 2001).
The economy of China is in transition, hence it is a mixture of a market economy and
a planned economy. This mixture is also reflected in the resource market. Before 1990 the
Chinese central government controlled the price of most natural resources. During the
1990s the pricing of resources was reformed, and the prices were adjusted to international
levels. This is still the case today. In particular, the domestic oil price is adjusted based
on the oil markets in Singapore, Rotterdam, and New York, and fluctuates with market
demand. The domestic natural gas price is lower than the international price, but it is
still determined by the market.
The quality of institutions in China varies significantly over provinces. Chinese pro-
vinces possess homogeneous constitutional and legal systems, but their institutional qual-
ity differs widely for historical, regional, political, and other reasons. For example, coastal
provinces typically have better institutions than inland provinces, partly because they
are more open, and partly because some coastal provinces enjoy preferential treatment
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since the ‘reform and open policy’ initiated in 1978. These special features help us to
study the interplay of resource abundance, institutional quality, and economic growth.
We try to answer two questions. The first question is whether and how the effect of
resource abundance on economic growth depends on institutional quality. It is, of course,
possible that the resource effect on economic growth may also be dependent on some other
variables besides institutional quality, such as manufacturing, R&D, education, and so
on (see Fan et al., 2012). We shall focus on the interaction effect of institutional quality,
and try to provide explanations how and why institutional quality influences the resource
effect on economic growth. The second question is whether the association between
resources and economic growth varies over time. Since the West China Development
Drive had an emphasis on natural resources, the resources in the Western provinces
were exploited more intensively. The economic growth rate in the Western provinces has
indeed increased after the Drive was initiated. It is therefore possible that the association
between resources and growth is different before and after the policy change, a hypothesis
that will be formally tested.
4.3. Data and descriptive statistics
We consider 28 mainland ‘provinces’ in China, namely 22 provinces, 4 municipalities
directly under the central government, and 2 autonomous regions. Three autonomous
regions (Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Tibet) are excluded because of lack of data.
Each province is labeled either ‘West’ or ‘East’ depending on its geographic location; see
Figure 4.1.
In studying natural resource abundance and its effect on growth, we distinguish
between a stock measure (RAs, resource reserves) and a flow measure (RAf , resource
revenues). Resource reserves are a measure of in situ resource wealth, while resource
revenues measure the flow of income from extracting resource stocks at some point in
time. Although the two measurements are likely to be highly correlated, the distinction
is useful because some provinces may be rich in resource reserves, while their income does
not depend primarily on resource exploitation. Also, it is not clear whether resources
in the ground have the same effect on economic growth as flows of resource revenues
do (Norman, 2009). Both measures differ from resource dependence, the typically used
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Figure 4.1: Map of China
Note: The provinces left of the black solid line are defined as Western regions, most of which are affected
by the West China Development Drive policy. More precisely, the West China Development Drive
policy covers Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunan, Tibet, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang,
Inner Mongolia, and Guangxi. Source: Chinasource website, http://www.chsource.org/site/index.php.
Although Shanxi province is usually treated as a central region, it is grouped here as a Western region
since its economic structure is more like the Western provinces and it is covered by the West China
Development Drive policy. Guangxi province is defined here as a Western province for the same reason.
77
Chapter 4: Natural resource, institutional quality, and economic growth in China
(though not very good) proxy for resource abundance.
The question whether resource abundance is exogenous or endogenous has been em-
phasized by Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008). Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2010)
pointed out that abundance may not be as exogenous as it seems, and suggested that
the historic resource stocks used by Norman (2009) are less endogenous than other mea-
sures. We agree with this suggestion and follow Norman (2009) in measuring resource
reserves as the recent (2003) observed level of reserves plus total production during the
preceding years, including both energy and mineral resources. The energy resources in-
clude petroleum, natural gas, and coal mining. The mineral resources cover all major
mineral resources in China and include iron ore, manganese ore, chrome ore, vanadium
ore, native ilmenite, copper ore, lead ore, zinc ore, bauxite, magnesite, pyrite, phosphate
ore, and kaolin. All resource data at the regional level are taken from the China Sta-
tistical Yearbook. Because of lack of data in the early years, we can only construct the
stock values in 1999 using 1999 prices of resources. Stock values rather than physical
quantities are used to enhance comparability across resources, as suggested by Norman
(2009). Although stock values may vary a little depending on the price, exploitation
technology, and other factors, values in the early years are preferred because they are
likely to influence government behavior in later years (Norman, 2009; Van der Ploeg
and Poelhekke, 2010). Measuring resource reserves in this way should mitigate (but not
eliminate) the endogeneity.
Resource revenues are measured by sales income of resources (after adjusting for
inflation), and also include energy and mineral resources. Besides the resources covered
in the measure of resource reserves, resource revenues include additional resources such
as subterranean heat (energy), nickel ore, tungsten ore, and tin ore (mineral). These
additional resources account for less than 20% of sales income on average. (The sales
income documented in the Yearbook is the sum of all types of resources, and there are
no statistics that allow us to compute sales income covering exactly the same types
of energy and mineral resources as the reserves measure.) Since reserves and revenues
include almost the same types of resources, we largely rule out the possibility that their
difference lies in the different types of resources that they measure.
Compared to other measures used in the literature, our resource abundance measures
are less affected by other economic activities, and thus serve as better proxies of resource
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abundance. We are, however, aware of some weaknesses of our measures. For example,
even resource reserves tend to be measured as economically recoverable reserves and
are thus subject to changes in prices and technology. Besides, we cannot recover the
resource stocks in some of the early years, e.g. 1990, due to lack of data. If these data
were available, this would reduce the endogeneity of the resource reserves measure. As
for resource revenues, one worry is whether our results will be affected by considering
production cost. We check this by experimenting with different measures of revenues,
in particular net profit of resources and gross industrial output of resources. Estimation
results based on different measures are highly consistent. These measures are also highly
correlated (correlation > 0.94), suggesting that production costs differ only marginally
across provinces. Therefore we will present our results using sales income of resources,
because it is the most complete measure without missing values. The resource revenues
measure may be less exogenous than reserves due to market conditions, but the two
measures are closely related since resource stocks can be converted into flows of money
(Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008). The time-varying feature of the revenues measure
allows us to examine the short-run (dynamic) relation between resources and growth,
while the reserves measure is time-invariant.
The economy-related variables include economic growth, institutional quality, R&D,
industrial development, private sector employment, foreign investment, and initial eco-
nomic level. All of these, except institutional quality and initial economic level, contain
observations over several years for each province. The time span varies across variables.
We emphasize the role and measurement of institutional quality. This is a difficult
concept to measure. In cross-country studies one typically uses systematic indicators such
as the rule of law or government competitiveness (Knack and Keefer, 1995). But within
China the constitution and law in one province is the same as in another province. In
Chinese studies, institutional quality is therefore often ignored or measured using dubious
proxies, such as the ratio of total trade over GDP (Xu and Wang, 2006; Shao and Qi,
2009). We propose to use the confidence in courts surveyed in 1995 by the World Bank as
a measure of institutional quality. This is a subjective measure, reflecting perceptions of
people from 114 cities. Chinese courts are divided into four levels. The highest level is the
supreme court in Beijing, and the other three levels are the so-called people’s courts: high
courts, intermediate courts, and basic courts. Appointments at the different levels of the
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people’s courts are made by corresponding strata of the people’s congresses. Therefore,
unlike most of western countries where courts and government have independent power,
local courts in China are often influenced by local power cliques. The confidence in courts
therefore reflects not only the perceived justice of the courts but also the behavior of the
government, and thus captures the essence of institutional quality. The subjectivity of the
proposed measure is a potential weakness in that it sometimes differs from an objective
measure and could be biased, as suggested by Olken (2009) in a different context. Such a
difference or bias (if present) would however be largely averaged out, since we work with
aggregated provincial data. An advantage of the subjective measure is that it is based on
the perception of several aspects of government behavior, and thus reflects many aspects
of institution. It is therefore more general than a specific objective measure, which
typically captures only one aspect of government behavior, e.g. corruption, efficiency, or
intervention in the economy. Our measure is also likely to be more stable, because it is
formed over a period of time, and thus reflects underlying features of local institutions
that are not easily changed in the short run. This is especially relevant in rural China,
where people are not well-informed about the latest changes of government behavior,
and therefore do not rapidly adjust their perceptions, once formed.
The measurement of all variables and their time span is briefly described below.
G Growth of real GDP per capita. In the cross-section analysis, growth is averaged





where T = 2008 and T0 = 1990. In the panel-data analysis, it is defined as the
annual growth rate of real GDP per capita:
Gt = log(GDPt/GDPt−1) (t = 1991, . . . , 2008).
RAs Log of resource reserves in Chinese Yuan per capita. The variable is constructed by
first summing the per capita stock values of all types of resources, and then taking
the logarithm. The stock value of a resource is the product of its reserves and its
average market price in the corresponding year. The reserve values are constructed
using an estimate of the reserves in 1999, obtained by adding extraction flows from
1999 to 2003 to the 2003 ‘reserve base’. The resource reserves cover energy resources
and mineral resources (types of energy and mineral resources are given above).
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RAf Log of resource revenues in Chinese Yuan per capita. The resource revenues are
measured by sales income of resources after adjusting for inflation, covering both
energy and mineral resources, from 1999 to 2008.
INS Institutional quality, measured by confidence in the courts, which is a weighted
average of city level data. The weights are given by the proportion of the city’s
GDP in the province. (We also used the proportion of a city’s population as weights
as a robustness check.) Only cross-section data in 1995 are available.
R&D Research and development, the ratio of government expenditure in R&D to total
government expenditure, from 1995 to 2006.
IND Industrial development, ratio of value-added of industry to GDP, from 1992 to 2008.
PSE Private sector employment, also referred to as private economic activity, measured
by the number of people in not-state-owned companies divided by the provincial
population, from 1992 to 2008.
FI Foreign investment proportion, the ratio of the actual inflow of foreign investment
over gross investment in fixed assets, from 1989 to 2003. This captures the impor-
tance of foreign investment in the local economy.
INIT Initial economic level in Chinese Yuan per capita, defined as the logarithm of real
GDP per capita in 1989.
WEST Geographic dummy: WEST = 1 if the province lies in the Western region of
China (as defined in Figure 4.1) and WEST = 0 otherwise.
The resource reserves data are taken from the China Statistical Yearbook (National Bu-
reau of Statistics, 2003–2004) and the China Economic Information Network (CEINET).
Resource revenues data are taken from the China Land and Resources Statistical Year-
book (Ministry of Land and Resources, 2000–2009). The economy-related variables are
either from CEINET or from the World Bank.
Table 4.1 provides descriptive statistics of the economy-related and resource variables.
By comparing the statistics of the East sample to the West sample, we see that the
average growth rate in Eastern provinces is generally higher than in Western provinces.
On the other hand, Western provinces have slightly higher resource reserves and revenues
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of economy-related variables
Entire sample East sample West sample
(28 prov) (18 prov) (10 prov)
Variable Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std
Growth 0.0394 0.0054 0.0411 0.0054 0.0364 0.0039
RAs 4.4511 1.0375 4.3193 1.2015 4.8292 0.6398
RAf 2.0758 0.3855 2.0238 0.4224 2.2522 0.3584
INS 58.146 13.321 62.009 11.758 51.199 12.963
R&D 0.0097 0.0046 0.0111 0.0053 0.0073 0.0013
IND 0.2875 0.0665 0.2973 0.0752 0.2698 0.0452
PSE 0.0655 0.0278 0.0763 0.0283 0.0461 0.0126
FI 0.0963 0.0928 0.1305 0.0991 0.0347 0.0266
INIT 3.1876 0.2068 3.2626 0.2118 3.0527 0.1100
than Eastern provinces. The institutional quality is generally better in the Eastern
provinces than in the Western provinces. Also, R&D, industrialization, private sector
employment, and foreign investment in the East are all higher on average than in the
West.
4.4. Cross-section analysis
We analyze the data first as a cross section, and then, in Section 4.5, as a panel. We
begin by reconsidering the classical growth regression
G = β0 + β1RA+ β2INS +
6∑
k=1
θkxk + ǫ1, (4.1)
where G denotes economic growth, RA is resource abundance, INS represents institu-
tional quality, and
(






contain auxiliary control variables: research and development (R&D), industrial develop-
ment (IND), private sector employment (PSE), foreign investment (FI), initial economy
level (INIT), and the Western dummy (WEST). The auxiliary variables affect the econ-
omy and are associated with resource abundance. Their inclusion will therefore reduce
the omitted variable bias. For resource abundance, we always consider two variants: one
where RA is measured as a stock (RAs, resource reserves) and one where it is measured
as a flow (RAf , resource revenues).
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Table 4.2: Economic growth: classical growth model
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
RAs −0.0001 0.0002 −0.0037
(−0.22) (0.26) (−0.76)
RAf 0.0001 0.0006 −0.0099
(0.08) (0.26) (−1.36)
INS 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 −0.0002 −0.0003
(2.76) (2.76) (1.85) (2.02) (−0.52) (−0.96)
R&D 0.3074 0.3011 0.3921 0.4391
(1.87) (2.03) (1.74) (1.96)
IND 0.0217 0.0210 0.0172 0.0194
(1.96) (1.92) (1.32) (1.76)
PSE 0.1359 0.1320 0.1583 0.1417
(2.04) (2.43) (2.23) (2.62)
FI 0.0258 0.0269 0.0284 0.0279
(2.76) (2.56) (2.94) (2.65)
INIT −0.0053 −0.0051 −0.0304 −0.0296 −0.0345 −0.0328
(−1.06) (−0.99) (−4.07) (−4.68) (−3.87) (−5.39)
WEST −0.0035 −0.0036 −0.0016 −0.0016 −0.0014 −0.0012
(−1.29) (−1.29) (−0.62) (−0.58) (−0.52) (−0.45)
RA× INS 0.0001 0.0002
(0.82) (1.39)
Constant 0.0465 0.0448 0.1089 0.1066 0.1392 0.1392
(2.38) (2.12) (6.18) (5.47) (3.28) (4.79)
R2 0.4579 0.4574 0.6829 0.6832 0.6913 0.6996
p-value of F -test 0.0022 0.0022 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Note: t-values are in parentheses. The number of observations in each column is 28.
The least-squares estimation results are presented in Table 4.2. Columns (a) and (b)
show that the impact of resource abundance is very weak, both when measured as a
stock (resource reserves) and when measured as a flow (resource revenues). The effect
of institutional quality is strong and positive. If other explanatory variables are added
(columns (c) and (d)), then the significance of institutional quality slightly decreases but
it remains strong, while the resource effect remains insignificant. Equation (4.1) seems to
imply that resource abundance has no effect on economic growth, but such a conclusion
would be premature and incorrect. Classical growth regressions cannot fully capture
the resource effect in China, because the resource effect is likely to vary with institu-
tional quality. It is possible that natural resources are important in provinces with poor
institutional quality, but less important in provinces with strong institutional quality.
Classical growth regressions ignore such provincial heterogeneity by assuming constant
coefficients for each explanatory variable. The estimated coefficient in the presented
classical growth regression is the ‘overall’ effect of resource abundance, and its insignif-
icance does not imply that heterogenous effects are also insignificant for various levels
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of institutional quality. In fact, we shall see that provincial heterogeneity is essential in
explaining the role of resource abundance.
Thus motivated, we extend the classical models by including an interaction term
RA×INS, as suggested by Mehlum et al. (2006). We estimate the regression model
G = β0 + β1RA+ β2INS + β3RA×INS +
6∑
k=1
θkxk + ǫ2. (4.2)
The estimation results are given in columns (e) and (f) of Table 4.2. We see that the
interaction term is positive, but not significant. This result weakly supports the argument
by Mehlum et al. (2006) that resource abundance promotes the economy if institutions
are producer-friendly. The insignificance of the interaction term suggests that the linear
model may not fully capture the interaction effect of resources and institutional quality in
China. Note that Equation (4.2) only provides a positive or negative (linear) interaction
effect, and that this effect is the same for all institutional quality levels. However, if
resource effects on growth depend nonlinearly on institutional quality, then (4.2) does
not capture this.
In order to capture a possibly nonlinear relationship between resource abundance and
economic growth, we consider the functional coefficient model
G = δ0 + δ1RA+
6∑
k=1
γkxk + ǫ3. (4.3)
The same variables RA and x1, . . . , x6 appear in Equation (4.3) as in Equation (4.1),
except that institutional quality INS enters through the coefficients δ0, δ1, and γk (k =
1, 2, . . . , 6). Since there is no a priori reason why some of the coefficients would and
others would not depend on institutional quality, we allow all coefficients to be functions
of institutional quality. The advantage of a functional-coefficient model is that it provides
information on how the interaction varies (possibly nonlinearly) across different levels of
institutional quality. A second advantage is that it solves the potential reverse causality
between institutional quality and growth, at least to some extent, because institutional
quality enters the model as a smoothing variable instead of a control variable.
The parameters in this model are estimated by local linear estimation (Fan and
Gijbels, 1996; see also Cai et al., 2000). Thus, we specify
δj = δCj + δSj(INS− u0) (j = 0, 1),
γk = γCk + γSk(INS− u0) (k = 1, 2, . . . , 6),
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where min(INS) ≤ u0 ≤ max(INS). The parameters (δCk, δSk) and (γCk, γSk) are esti-
mated nonparametrically. Various data-driven methods can be employed for selecting
the bandwidth. We chose the bandwidth by minimizing the average mean squared error
(Cai et al., 2000).
Figure 4.2: Marginal effect of RAs and RAf on economic growth as a function of insti-
tutional quality





































































In Figure 4.2 we show how the δ1-parameter changes as a function of institutional
quality. The solid line plots the estimate of δ1, and the dashed lines are 5% confidence
intervals based on jackknife standard errors. We see that resource reserves and resource
revenues largely measure the same concept of abundance (when applied to growth re-
gressions in China). The typical ‘U-shape’ in both subfigures shows strong and positive
correlation between resource abundance and economic growth in provinces with weak
institutional quality. As institutional quality improves, this correlation decreases and
becomes statistically insignificant. These results provide an explanation of the insignif-
icance of the resource effect in Equation (4.1). The reason for the insignificant ‘overall’
effect (columns (a)–(d) in Table 4.2) is that the resource effect varies with institutional
quality and that this effect is weak in provinces with good institutional quality. The
nonlinear behavior in both subfigures also explains the statistical insignificance of the
interaction term (columns (e) and (f) in Table 4.2).
In general, resource abundance in China thus has a positive effect on economic growth.
This evidence obviously challenges the existence of a resource curse. In fact it supports
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Brunnschweiler and Bulte’s (2008) argument that resource abundance promotes economic
growth, which they explain by the ‘windfall’ flow of income from resource extraction.
This flow, they argue, has a direct effect on the economy as well as an indirect effect
through improving institutional quality.
The positive effect of resource abundance is particularly strong in regions with weak
institutional quality, and the effect decreases as institutional quality improves. This find-
ing differs from the cross-country evidence reported by Mehlum et al. (2006), who find
that worse institutions make the effect of natural resources more negative. A possible
explanation is that regions with weak institutional quality are likely to rely more on their
primary industries than regions with strong institutional quality, because the prosperity
of many non-resource sectors is largely built on good institutional quality. For example,
good institutions lead to more willingness of savers to invest in firms and to a higher
effectiveness of corporate governance, thus associating good institutions with a healthy
financial sector (Beck and Levine, 2005). Nunn (2007) pointed out that better con-
tract enforcement makes countries more specialized in the industries in which so-called
relationship-specific investments play a dominant role.
Improvement of institutional quality helps the development of many non-resource
sectors more than it helps the development of resource sectors, so that better institu-
tions make resources become less important. The correlation between the economy and
non-resource sectors is thus stronger than correlation between the economy and resource
abundance, and indeed we observe a decreasing and insignificant effect of resource abun-
dance when institutional quality increases.
To further strengthen this argument, we present the functional effects of some other
control variables, namely industrialization, foreign investment, private sector employ-
ment, and R&D. Figure 4.3 shows the effects of industrialization, private sector employ-
ment, and foreign investment on economic growth all tend to be stronger and more
positive in regions with better institutional quality. Typical examples are Qinghai,
Guizhou, and Ningxia. These provinces all suffer from weak institutional quality, and
their economies therefore rely largely on resource abundance, while the non-resource
sectors are poorly developed. In contrast, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Tianjing
provinces are among the top ten provinces in terms of institutional quality, and their
non-resource sectors, such as R&D, industrialization, and private sectors are among the
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Figure 4.3: Marginal effect of other control variables on economic growth as a function
of institutional quality







































































































































Chapter 4: Natural resource, institutional quality, and economic growth in China
best. Resources in these provinces play only a small role in promoting economic growth.
When institutional quality exceeds the median level (62 on the left, 68 on the right
in Figure 4.2), the positive impact of resource abundance on economic growth increases
(but remains insignificant) as institutional quality improves. Apparently, provinces with
strong institutional quality and abundant natural resources are likely to make good use
of these resources and revenues. Property rights on natural resources in China are owned
by the government, and local residents therefore typically do not benefit much from rev-
enues derived from resource extraction. Most income associated with resources goes to
the government and to state-owned enterprizes. Hence, for provinces with weak insti-
tutional quality, rising revenues from the booming resource sectors are not used by the
government to stimulate the economy, but often harm economic development, because
they lead to increased prices for nontradable goods, thus lowering the competitiveness of
local economies (Zhang et al., 2008). If institutional quality is strong, however, then rev-
enues from resources may be used to boost economic development. This is because better
property rights tend to improve asset allocation, leading to higher growth (Claessens and
Laeven, 2003). Examples include Shandong, Jilin, Liaoning, Tianjin, and Henan pro-
vinces, most of which are traditional industrial provinces in North-East China. These
provinces are rich in natural resources (especially mineral resources), the institutional
quality is high, and the exploitation and use of the resources is efficient. Booms in re-
source sectors thus do not impede the development of non-resource sectors, but instead
stimulate industries that are indirectly related to resources such as the automobile, ship-
building, and equipment manufacturing industries.
Our results are very robust to different measures of resource revenues and to different
weights for institutional quality. Even when we take into account the possible influence
of the 2000 policy shock and estimate the model with separate samples (before and after
the shock), the results remain essentially unchanged. (Further details on the shock and
its effects will be discussed in the next section.) We conclude that the effect of resources
on the economy is highly and nonlinearly dependent on institutional quality, and that
the correlation between resource abundance and economic growth is high and positive in
provinces with weak institutional quality, but weakly negative in provinces with medium
institutional quality.
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4.5. A panel-data approach with time-varying resource effects
Cross-section models are useful in capturing long-run effects, but they do not identify
resource effect fluctuations over time. In particular, they cannot identify the effects
of a policy shock such as the West China Development Drive. This significant policy
package was introduced by the Chinese central government in 2000 with the purpose of
stimulating the economy of the Western regions. While the policy also involves non-
resource projects (such as promoting infrastructure construction, protecting the ecology
environment, and re-adjusting industrial structure), the emphasis is on intensifying nat-
ural resource exploitation. Several significant projects connected with natural resources
in West-China have resulted from this initiative. For example, the West-East natural gas
transmission project led to an increase of natural gas production in Sichuan and Qinghai
provinces by more than 100% and 900%, respectively, between 2000 and 2007. Also,
steel production in Yunan and Guizhou provinces increased by around 200% and 400%,
respectively, since the Drive began. The economic growth rate in Western provinces has
indeed increased since 2000. It is therefore to be expected that the relationship between
resources and growth is different before and after the policy, and we shall test this hy-
pothesis using both a standard and a time-varying coefficient panel-data approach. The
availability of panel data is important because, by allowing not only variation over pro-
vinces but also over time, we are able to capture the short-run dynamic behavior of the
resource effect as well as other impacts on economic growth. In addition, the use of panel
data enlarges the sample size and hence improves the accuracy of the estimates. Since
the stock measure of resource abundance is a historical variable that does not vary over
time, we can only use the flow measure (resource reserves) in the panel-data analysis.
4.5.1. Standard panel-data approach
We first consider the standard panel-data model. To incorporate the policy shock in
2000, we introduce a policy shock dummy PD taking the value 0 before 2000 and 1 from
2000 onwards. Thus we have




where i = 1, . . . , N and t = 1, . . . , T , and we allow for the possibility of an interaction
term RAf × PD. Here Git denotes the growth rate of real GDP per capita in province i
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at year t, ci is a province-specific effect, and PD and RAf ×PD capture the policy effect.
The auxiliary control variables in this case are
(







idiosyncratic error ǫit is assumed to be independent of xit. Since province-specific effects
are correlated with the regressors, we employ a fixed-effect estimation method. The time-
invariant variables INS, INI, and WEST are excluded as explanatory variables, because
they cannot be identified in a fixed-effect method. Since our measure of institutional
quality varies only slightly in our observed time period (see Section 4.3), the exclusion
of INS will only have a slight effect on the results. We only use resource revenues (the
flow) as a measure of resource abundance, because our measure of resource reserves (the
stock) does not vary over time.
Table 4.3: Economic growth: standard panel-data model
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
RAf 0.0187 0.0132 0.0072 0.0128 0.0107
(5.51) (4.16) (2.16) (4.38) (4.94)
R&D −0.9825 −0.9486 −0.8366 −0.8938 −0.9166
(−3.80) (−4.83) (−3.42) (−3.72) (−3.91)
IND 0.0854 0.0734 0.0635 0.1039 0.1063
(5.66) (5.00) (3.86) (8.14) (8.18)
PSE 0.0283 0.0170 0.0305 0.0179 0.0293
(0.57) (0.33) (0.81) (0.35) (0.67)
FI −0.0510 −0.0216 −0.0214 −0.0282 −0.0276









Constant −0.0050 −0.0004 0.0108 −0.0034 −0.0064
(−0.66) (−0.07) (1.40) (−0.54) (−0.11)
overall R2 0.1534 0.2163 0.2279 0.2468 0.2547
p-value of F -test 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
ρ 0.2772 0.2026 0.1948 0.2349 0.2432
Note: t-values are in parentheses. ρ is the fraction of variance due to the individual-specific effect.
The number of observations in each column is 308.
Table 4.3 presents the standard fixed-effect estimation results. Column (a) is the
benchmark, including only resource revenues and auxiliary control variables. The as-
sociation between resource revenues and growth is positive and strong in the short-run
dynamics, contrasting sharply with the insignificant long-run relationship. This discrep-
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ancy between short-run and long-run effect is in line with Collier and Goderis (2008)
who find similar differences in a cross-country framework. One explanation of this pos-
itive association is the income effect that the ‘windfall gain’ from resources stimulates
consumption and further prompts economic growth. As expected, R&D and foreign in-
vestment have different short-run and long-run effects; these are long-run investments
having little effect in the short run. To study whether the 2000 policy shock affects eco-
nomic growth, column (b) includes the policy shock dummy PD. Its coefficient is strongly
significant, showing, as expected, that the new policy has led to higher growth. If we
include both PD and the interaction term RAf×PD, then we obtain column (c). The
interaction term is positive and weakly significant (p-value is 9.5%), suggesting the pos-
sibility that the resource effect is different before and after the policy shock. The result
is not conclusive however, because a standard panel-data model can only measure the
linear difference between before and after the shock, thus capturing the average change.
If the resource effect contains nonlinear dynamics, then these are not captured by the
standard panel-data model. This leads us to the time-varying coefficient model, where
possibly nonlinear resource effects can be investigated. This model and the resulting
columns (d) and (e) are discussed in the next subsection.
4.5.2. Time-varying coefficient approach
The standard fixed-effect approach reveals different resource effects before and after the
policy shock. This approach can not, however, describe how the resource effect changes
after the policy shock. We expect that the effects of other variables are also influenced
by the policy. This could lead to a strengthening of the effects, because the policy
also involves non-resource projects and these non-resource industries may grow faster
after 2000. But it could also lead to a weakening, because the emphasis on resource
exploitation strengthens the association between resources and economic growth, and
also because an over-emphasis on resources crowds out the non-resource sectors, leading
to a weaker correlation between non-resource sectors and growth.
We extend the standard panel-data model by allowing the coefficients to be time-
varying, and consider the time-varying coefficient model
Git = c(t) + x
′
itτ(t) + ǫit (i = 1, . . . , N, t = 1, . . . , T ),
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where xit are the explanatory variables: RAf , R&D, IND, PSE, and FI, all in province
i at year t. The dummy PD is excluded because the policy effect can now be captured
by the model parameters which are smooth functions of t. The parameter vector τ(t) =
{τ1(t), τ2(t), . . . , τk(t)}′ contains the coefficients for the k = 5 control variables. This is
a typical time-varying coefficient model for panel data (Hoover et al., 1998). Unlike the
standard panel-data model, no within-transformation or first-difference transformation
is needed when estimating the model, because no incidental parameter problem occurs
in this case.
To estimate c(t) and τ(t), we employ a method proposed by Hoover et al. (1998,
Section 2.3), in particular the local constant fit based on a kernel function K(·) with
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is a diagonal T × T weight matrix. The bandwidth is selected following Hoover et al.
(1998, Section 2.4) by minimizing the average predictive squared error with ‘leave-one-
out’ cross-validation.
The kernel estimator (ĉ(t), τ̂(t)) thus takes the form of a generalized least-squares
estimator with weight matrix K∗(t). Rather than running a cross section for every time
period, the kernel estimator employs not only the information at time t but also the
neighboring information, and its smoothness depends on the choice of bandwidth. By
selecting an optimal bandwidth, we minimize the average predictive squared error, and
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obtain estimators with appropriate smoothness. The kernel estimator has also attractive
asymptotic properties (Hoover et al., 1998), but whether these properties apply here is
somewhat dubious because of the small number of provinces.
Figure 4.4 shows the results using the entire sample (all provinces). All coefficients
vary over time. The coefficient of resource revenues is positive and increasing from
2000–2004, and decreasing from 2005–2007. The R&D effect is increasing from 1997–
2000, fluctuating a little during 2001–2005, and decreasing after 2005. The coefficients
of industrialization, private sector employment, and foreign investment are generally de-
creasing from 1997–2004. The estimated time-varying estimates are generally in line with
the standard panel-data results (except R&D). In particular, the nonlinearly dynamic
resource effect explains the positive but weakly significant coefficient of the interaction
term RAf×PD (column (c) in Table 3). Since the resource effect first increases and then
decreases after the shock, the before-and-after difference is partially offset and thus not
strongly significant on average. But, in general, the resource effect did change after the
policy shock, and became considerably stronger immediately after 2000, implying that
the correlation between resource revenue and economic growth is stronger after than be-
fore 2000. This is not surprising because the emphasis of the West China Development
Drive was on exploiting the resources in the Western provinces more intensively and
efficiently. Income in these regions has increased, stimulating economic growth, but not
equally in all regions. The decreasing coefficients of the other variables suggest that the
negative impact of the policy on non-resource effects dominates the positive impact.
In the period 2003–2004 the impact of resource revenues was particularly strong, be
it with relatively large standard errors. To confirm this result in the standard fixed-
effect model we included a time dummy D0304 for 2003–2004, and an interaction term
RAf×D0304. Columns (d) and (e) in Table 4.3 show that D0304 is significantly positive,
confirming that the economic growth rate was particularly high in 2003–2004. The
interaction term RAf×D0304 is positive, though not very precise, suggesting that the
resource effect increased during the period. In contrast, industrialization, private sector
employment, and foreign investment effects experienced a drop in these two years.
Apparently the economic situation in China was different in 2003 and 2004 than in
other years, and growth determinants had different effects during this period. This is
indeed the case. The economic growth rate was particularly high in 2003 and 2004,
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Figure 4.4: Time-varying coefficients: entire sample
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Note: The solid curve is the estimated coefficient of each regressor, and the two dashed curves represent
±1.96 jackknife standard error bands. The jackknife standard errors are computed by leaving out one
individual at a time from the sample.
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mainly due to a high demand for investment. The annual growth rates of fixed asset
investment in 2003 and 2004 were 27.7% and 26.6%, respectively. One reason for such
high investments was an increasing demand for housing and automobiles. This demand
directly stimulated the investment in the realty business and the automotive industry,
and also indirectly in related industries (e.g. steel, building materials, power sector). In
addition, several great projects in the Western provinces were initiated in this period:
the West-East natural gas transmission project, the West-East electricity transmission
project, and the Western coal mining project. These projects led to a large increase in
resource production with an associated increase in income. These two reasons explain
the strong correlation between resource revenues and economic growth in the period
2003–2004, while the effects of other explanatory variables are relatively weak.
To avoid overcapacity in the future, the government proposed policies to restrain
investment. As a result, fixed asset investment largely decreased in 2005 and 2006, and
economic growth slowed down. However, resource exploitation did not slow down, and
resource revenues kept on increasing, especially in the Western provinces. This is why
we observe a decreasing correlation between resource revenues and economic growth rate
after 2004.
To understand this from another viewpoint, we plot annual economic growth and
its determinants in Figure 4.5. All variables are averaged over Eastern and Western
provinces, respectively, and scaled to facilitate comparison. We observe a positive jump
in the growth rate in 2004, especially in the Western provinces, and a return to a lower
level in 2005. We also observe a jump in resource revenues in both Eastern and Western
provinces in 2004. The co-movement of economic growth and resource revenues provides
further evidence of the strong correlation between resource revenues and economic growth
in 2003–2004. When the economic growth rate returned to a lower level after 2004,
resource revenues in the Western provinces were still increasing at a high speed from 2006
to 2008. This explains the decreasing correlation between economic growth and resource
revenues after 2004.
The decreasing correlation between economic growth and resource revenues after 2004
shows that increased resource exploitation did not promote the development of other in-
dustries and sectors typically regarded as engines of economic growth. As exemplified
in Figure 4.5, average R&D, industrialization, private sector employment, and foreign
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Figure 4.5: Time series plot of growth and its determinants
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investment all changed relatively little as resource revenues increased sharply. Typical
examples are Ningxia and Gansu provinces, where resource revenues increased signifi-
cantly after 2000, but most of the other sectors were still underdeveloped. The economies
of the Western provinces still relied much on primitive sectors, and the industrial struc-
ture of the Western provinces failed to modernize. The emphasis on resource exploitation
brought extra income in the short run, but it did not narrow the gap between West and
East China. In addition, only part of the resources produced by the Western regions
was used to improve the local economy. The larger part was transported to the Eastern
regions to meet the large demand for energy and resources there. For example, the most
important gas field in Sichuan province transmitted more than 70% of its natural gas to
Eastern provinces. This may also have resulted in enlarging the gap between Eastern
and Western provinces. In summary, the intensification of resource exploitation in the
Western provinces helped the local economy to some extent, but the positive effect was
short-run and not long-run.
4.6. Conclusions
In this paper we have re-examined the effect of natural resource abundance on economic
growth at the provincial level in China. We emphasize four features of our analysis. First,
we employ new data on natural resource abundance and institutional quality to study
the association between resource abundance, institutional quality, and economic growth.
We compare two types of resource abundance measures: a stock measure and a flow
measure. The new measures of resource abundance are considered to be more exogenous
than the conventional resource dependence measure. Institutional quality is measured
by a subjective measure of confidence in courts, and it is shown to be theoretically and
empirically related to resource abundance and economic growth.
Second, we model a nonlinear resource effect on economic growth. Classical growth
regressions cannot fully capture the resource effect on economic growth in China because
the resource effect is (nonlinearly) dependent on institutional quality. Thus we employ
a functional-coefficient model and we find that the effect of resources on the economy is
a nonlinear function of institutional quality, and that the correlation between resource
abundance and economic growth is strong and positive in provinces with weak institu-
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tional quality, but relatively weak in provinces with strong institutional quality. This
finding partially supports the argument in Mehlum et al. (2006) that the resource ef-
fect depends on institutional quality, but it suggests that such dependence may not be
captured satisfactorily by the linear model considered by them. More importantly, the
conclusion that worse institutions make the effect of natural resources more positive
(rather than more negative) in China also contrasts with the cross-country evidence in
Mehlum et al. (2006).
Third, we study the different roles of resources on economic growth before and after
the 2000 policy shock, and find that the association between resources and economic
growth is not constant over time if we consider short-run dynamics. Immediately after
the 2000 policy shock, the positive correlation between economic growth and resource
revenues was increasing, but this did not last long. After 2004 economic growth slowed
down while resource revenues kept increasing, leading to weak correlation.
Finally, we analyze the resource effect using both cross-section and panel data. The
cross-section model typically captures the long-run effect, and the panel-data model the
short-run effect. Abundant resource revenues are positively correlated with economic
growth in the short-run, and their long-run correlation is positive in provinces with weak
institutional quality.
Although our paper is a cross-province study in China, some ideas can be applied to
more general cross-country studies. Our paper suggests that the classical growth model is
not always satisfactory in studying resource effects, because it fails to capture a possibly
nonlinear influence of institutional quality. It is likely that institutional quality is also
relevant in other countries. This is also the case with our finding that the resource effects
in China change over time. This is likely to be true in other countries. For example,
evidence before World War II tends to support a positive effect of resources on growth
(Habakkuk, 1962), while most empirical studies using data after World War II report a
negative effect.
Further research is still needed in at least three directions. First, economic growth
just measures one aspect of economic development. Economic development also includes
inter alia a decrease in poverty and infant mortality, and better nutrition (Bulte et al.,
2005). In many countries with high growth rates there is poverty and basic nutritional
needs are not met. Therefore, the effect of natural resources on economic growth is not
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necessarily the same as the effect of natural resources on economic development (Zhang
et al., 2008). Second, the exogeneity of resource abundance deserves more investigation,
and the quality of resource abundance measures may be further improved by using stock
values of earlier years. Third, while a more general institutional indicator has been used
in cross-country studies, there are no systematic indicators on institutional quality in
China. Since institutional quality appears a key variable, more accurate measures would




Dress-up contests: A dark side of
fiscal decentralisation4
5.1. Introduction
During the last three decades, fiscal decentralisation (FD) and local-government reform
have been at the centre-stage of policy experiments. This has occurred not only in coun-
tries with a traditional tendency to decentralise, such as the United States, but also in
a large number of developing and transition economies, such as Africa, Asia, and Latin
America (The World Bank, 1999). FD, which moves the responsibility for decision-
making in public expenditure from central to local governments, is widely believed to
be an effective tool for improving the efficiency of public expenditure. One of the ma-
jor transmission channels, well documented in the literature, is yardstick competition,
through which FD regulates the behaviour of Leviathan government (Besley and Case,
1995; Belleflamme and Hindriks, 2005; Besley and Smart, 2007; Bordignon et al., 2004);
see Lockwood (2005) for a recent review.
The literature focuses on the benefits of FD; in contrast we explore a negative aspect.
We argue that under asymmetric information, the yardstick competition of capability
between local governments (due to FD) turns into a competition for a better image, i.e.
a ‘dress-up contest’. This is because voters with limited information cannot observe the
politicians’ capability; they instead infer this capability from the public service provided.
This motivates politicians to allocate more resources to the public goods that can best
demonstrate their capability. The dress-up contest can lead to a structural bias in public
expenditure, which may result in a distortion of social welfare.
This paper has two main contributions. First, we propose and model dress-up con-
tests that occur between local governments and are caused by FD. From Rogoff (1990)
and Mani and Mukand (2007) we borrow the visibility concept in a two-politician model.
4This chapter is coauthored with Ruixin Wang.
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Public goods are ‘invisible’ if they do not provide a good indication of politicians’ ca-
pability, either because they are difficult to observe or because they are determined by
factors beyond the government’s control. Mani and Mukand (2007) showed that a gov-
ernment tends to spend more on visible projects than invisible projects, since voters
infer its capability from visible projects. This is referred to as the visibility effect. We
extend their model by introducing yardstick competition between two politicians. Using
a one-shot game, we show that yardstick competition motivates the politicians to start
a dress-up contest. To win more support in an election, they allocate more resources
(public expenditure and effort) to the more visible goods, since these goods demonstrate
their capability and provide a better image, given a binding fiscal budget constraint. In
this sense, the yardstick competition turns into a competition for a better image, and FD
can intensify this dress-up contest. Our model is related to the tax competition model
(see for example Janeba and Peters (1999), Cai and Treisman (2005), and Zissimos and
Wooders (2008)), but our conclusion is rather different. In the tax-competition litera-
ture, the mobility of capital motivates governments to promote public services. Using a
similar framework, we show that the mobility of information may not always be positive,
because it can distort the structure of public expenditure and lead to a welfare loss.
Second, we provide strong empirical evidence for public-expenditure distortion in
visible and invisible goods, and we also find that this distortion caused by FD can result
in a social welfare loss. To the best of our knowledge, although the visibility effect has
been theoretically established, no research has empirically verified this effect, possibly
because of the difficulty of finding good empirical proxies. In this paper, we investigate
the FD effect on the regional poverty rate, an important aspect of social welfare. We
propose to use cash assistance to the poor as a proxy for the more visible project, and
vendor payments as a proxy for the less visible project. Using U.S. state level data
from 1992 to 2008, we find that FD causes a public expenditure flow from the more
visible to the less visible project. This result provides evidence for the visibility effect,
and also confirms our theoretical findings that FD can cause dress-up contests between
local governments. To further investigate the role of yardstick competition, we propose
two yardstick competition measures based on the comparability of jurisdictions and the
competitiveness of local governments. We estimate a difference-in-difference model and
find that a stronger yardstick competition leads to a stronger FD effect on the structure
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of public expenditure. This is another evidence of dress-up contests. To capture how this
distortion of public expenditure affects poverty, we use a functional coefficient approach,
and we estimate a pooled panel and a panel with a fixed effect. This approach allows us to
capture the possible nonlinear interaction between the cash-vendor-payment (CV) ratio,
welfare expenditure, and poverty. We find that the distortion of public expenditure,
measured by the CV ratio, can greatly weaken the effect of welfare expenditure on
poverty reduction, and this influence appears to be nonlinear. Considering the possible
endogeneity of welfare expenditure, we propose using public expenditure on health and
hospitals as an instrumental variable of welfare expenditure. Our analysis shows that
this instrument is valid theoretically and statistically. We thus empirically verify our
theoretical findings, and provide empirical evidence for a dark side to FD.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we formally
model the causes and effects of dress-up contests in the presence of FD. Section 5.3
provides empirical evidence for dress-up contests, and Sections 5.4 and 5.5 analyse the
FD effect on social welfare. Section 5.6 summarises and concludes.
5.2. The basic model
The basic model aims to illustrate how yardstick competition (dress-up contests), which
is introduced by FD, can affect politicians’ resource allocation to two types of public
goods, more visible and less visible goods. In practice, yardstick competition can arise in
two cases. First, two local politicians from the different (neighbouring) cities/towns are
ambitious for one position in the higher level government. Second, each local incumbent
politician competes with rivals to win his local election. If the rivals are cheap talkers,
then the competition pressure comes from the neighbouring jurisdictions, and it is the
performance of neighbouring politicians that help voters evaluate the capability of the
local incumbent. In both cases voters compare these two incumbents from the neigh-
bouring jurisdictions. The two cases are equivalent in modeling, and thus we only discuss
the first case for simplicity. Since voters can only infer politicians’ capability from public
services, politicians aim to establish a better image to win votes. However, an overem-
phasis on image building can cause an efficiency loss in welfare expenditure, and further
hurt social welfare. In this section, we first derive the equilibrium of a one-shot game,
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and then analyse the comparative statics, i.e. the impact of FD on this equilibrium.
5.2.1. Politicians
We follow Cai and Treisman (2005) and assume that politicians are partially self-interested,
caring both voters’ welfare and private interest. To model such partially self-interested
politicians, we first discuss an ideal social planner whose aim is to appropriately dis-
tribute public resources (expenditure on public goods) to maximize the utility of the









In the utility function, zj is the observed outcome of the public good j, ej is the public
expenditure on public good j with the budget constraint I, and CP (·) is the social cost of
all public expenditure with C ′P (e) > 0 and C
′′
P (e) > 0. The social planner cares all public
goods with different weights υj. This is an ideal case. In practice, however, a politician
cares not only the social utility (benevolent), but also his own utility (self-interested),
i.e. wining the election. Assume that a politician put weight γ on the social utility, and
(1− γ) on his own utility, and he maximizes his expected payoff function
max
e1i,...,eJi





where R is the return from winning the election, with R = 0 indicating failure. ηi is the
probability of winning the local election for the politician i. To win the future election,
each politician needs to provides evidence of his capability (such as public services) at
the cost C to convince voters. Note that C also depends on the public expenditure on J
public services, but C is different from Cp, representing the extra cost for the politician
to provide public goods besides social cost, e.g. management expenses, time, et al. We
assume that the first- and second-order derivatives of the cost function satisfy C(e)′ > 0




We assume that there are two types of voters: well-informed voters (proportion k) and
ill-informed voters (proportion 1− k). Well-informed voters have their own ideology, i.e.
their political persuasions and preference on governmental behavior (for example, more
emphasis on defense or economic construction), and they make voting decisions based
on the (inferred) capability of politicians and their ideology. If a politician’s political
persuasion is far away from a voter’s ideology, then the voter is less likely to vote for
this politician. Let s be the measure of a voter’s ideology which uniquely identifies every





i ∈ {A,B} , (5.3)
where Φi is the inferred capability of politician i, Ds,i is the difference between the voter’s
ideology and politician i’s political persuasions. More particularly, voter s chooses to
support politician A if πs,A > πs,B and vice versa. If we assume, without loss of generality,
that politician A is the left wing, and B is the right, then Ds,A = s, and Ds,B = 1 − s.
Given the inferred capabilities of the two politicians (which we shall discuss in details
in the next subsection), we can compute the position of the marginal voter ŝ that is






This threshold value ŝ also determines the share of well-informed voters supporting A
and B. A simple calculation shows that well-informed voters with s < ŝ will support A,
while those with s > ŝ will support B, i.e.
SA = ŝ =
ΦA
ΦA + ΦB




The ill-informed voters do not have ideology, and they make decisions randomly. We
assume that politicians A and B equally share the votes of ill-informed voters. Then the
probability of politician i to win election can be written as
ηi = kSi +
(1− k)
2
i ∈ {A,B} , (5.6)
and we always have ηA + ηB = 1.
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5.2.3. Assessing politicians’ capability
To model the dress-up contest, we consider two types of public goods: more visible goods
a and less visible goods b. According to Mani and Mukand (2007), public goods are less
visible if it is hard to assess governmental competence based on their observed outcome.
Politicians need to allocate their limited resources to these two types of goods, and voters
can then infer their capability. Following Mani and Mukand (2007), we assume that the
production function of each good is
zj,i = τi + ej,i + ǫj,i j ∈ {a, b}, i ∈ {A,B}, (5.7)
where zj,i is the observed outcome of the public good j provided by politician i, τi is





captures the exogenous stochastic factors. Public good a being more visible
than b implies that there is more noise in the outcome of b than in that of a, i.e. σ2a, i <
σ2b, i. Mani and Mukand (2007) provided two reasons for visibility differences. First, the
outcome of some goods is intrinsically harder to directly observe or measure (e.g. those
with short-term results are typically more visible than those that are long term). Second,
some public goods are more ‘complex’ in the sense that their outcome is affected by a
variety of factors other than governmental competence. For example, the quantity and
quality of education is not determined only by governmental input, but also by teachers,
parents, and peers. For simplicity and without loss of generality, politicians are assumed
to have the same values of τ and ǫj .
Voters can observe the outcome of the public good z as well as the expenditure e.
The politician’s capability τ is unobserved, but voters have common knowledge of its
prior distribution, τi ∼ N (τ , σ2τ ) for i ∈ {A,B}. Voters (with rational expectations) can
use the observed outcome zi := {za,i, zb,i} and the public expenditure e∗i := {e∗a,i, e∗b,i} to
update their priors of the politicians’ capability, i.e. from τ to (zj,i− e∗j,i) with associated
variance σ2j,i. According to Mani and Mukand (2007), the mean posterior assessment of
the politician’s capability can be obtained via
Φi = E (τi | zi, e∗i ) =
[








hτ + ha + hb
]
,
where hτ = 1/σ
2
τ and hj = 1/σ
2





Given the preference of voters, politician choose their strategies on ea, i and eb, i in a one-
shot game simultaneously. We first look at the strategy of politician A. The optimization
problem (5.2) gives the first order condition
γυ − γC ′P,A (ea, A) + (1− γ) · Rk ·
(
ha




2 − C ′A (ea, A)− λ = 0
where λ is a Lagrangian multiplier. Since we have assumed the budget constraint is bind-
ing, λ must not be equal to zero, and the optimal expenditure e⋆a, A = argmax {E (UA)}.
The case for politician B is symmetric.
5.2.5. Comparative statics
Based on the analysis above, we can examine how FD affects the politicians’ behaviour,
i.e. their public expenditure on the two types of goods, ea,i and eb,i. FD can be regarded
as a trigger of yardstick competition, which strengthens the information externality, and
gives the voters more knowledge of the politicians’ capabilities. This thus increases
the proportion of well-informed voters, i.e. k, because information externality facilitates
voters to detect and compare the public services, and further increases the comparability
between the politicians in the neighboring jurisdictions. Therefore, we analyse the effect
of FD by investigating how an increase in k affects the equilibrium.
We study the behavior of politician A. Define FA := ∂Ê(UA)
∗/∂ea,A, and we have
FA = γυ − γC ′P,A (ea, A) + (1− γ)Rk ·
(
ha




2 − C ′A (ea, A)− λ.
Note that we always have
∂FA
∂k
= (1− γ)R ·
(
ha








= −γC ′′P,A (ea, A)− 2 (1− γ) ·Rk ·
(
ha




3 −C ′′A (ea, A) < 0.
















Chapter 5: Dress-up contests: A dark side of fiscal decentralisation
This shows that as k increases, politician A spends more on more visible public goods.
Given the binding budget constraint, the expenditure on less visible goods thus shrinks.
The analysis of politician B is similar, and we also have ∂ea,B/∂k > 0.
To summarise, our model shows that when k increases (more well-informed voters),
politicians tend to focus more on establishing a good image. Given a binding fiscal
budget constraint, more visible goods are more efficient at demonstrating capability and
establishing a good image. This explains why expenditure on more visible goods increases
under FD. However, an overemphasis on visible goods can lead to a structural bias in the
public expenditure, and thus hurt social welfare. This implies that politicians’ focus on
their image may have a negative effect on social welfare. We investigate these theoretical
findings empirically in the following sections.
5.3. Evidence for a dress-up contest
Our empirical analysis has two goals. The first is to provide evidence for the association
between FD and dress-up contests. Second, we ask how dress-up contests affect poverty,
an important aspect of social welfare. We address the first issue in this section, and the
second in the following two sections. We use U.S. state level data, and our sample covers
48 states excluding Alaska and Hawaii with the time span from 1992 to 2008.
A key issue is how to determine the more visible and less visible public goods. It is
difficult to find a strictly visible public good in the real world because the outcome of
most such goods is determined by a number of factors beyond the government’s control
and is difficult to observe or measure. We focus on poverty, and we consider cash as-
sistance to be relatively visible and vendor payments to be less visible. Cash assistance
directly increases citizens’ disposable income and reduces poverty. Hence, its outcome,
i.e. poverty reduction, can be observed in the short term, and it primarily depends on the
government’s expenditure on this service. In contrast, vendor payments (welfare expen-
diture excluding cash assistance) are made to private purveyors for medical care, burials,
and other commodities. The outcome of these payments depends on a large number of
factors beyond the government’s control, such as the performance of other institutes, and
it may not be obvious in the short term. To appreciate these two measures, we need to
distinguish between two concepts: visibility and visuality. Public services are visible if
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their outcomes are affected by less noisy factors, while they are visual if their outcomes
are easily observed by voters. Some of the items of vendor payment can be visual, such
as activities of soup kitchen. However, they are still less visible than cash because the
outcome of these payment depends on the performance of intermediate institute, i.e.
soup kitchen. Therefore, it is reasonable to regard cash assistance as more visible and
vendor payments as less visible.
We provide evidence to show the existence of a dress-up contest. Since it is difficult
to exactly identify all the transmission channels, we use evidence from different sources
to rule out possible alternative explanations.
5.3.1. FD effect on public-expenditure structure
We first consider a direct test for the causal effect of FD on dress-up contests. To
outline our empirical strategy, we introduce some preliminary notation. Assume that
state-level politicians spend 1/vS of the state expenditure on visible projects, while local-
level politicians spend 1/vL of the local expenditure on such projects. Since yardstick
competition is more fierce in local elections than in state elections, we have vS > vL ≥ 1.
If we let Γ be the total (state + local) public expenditure, and let D be the degree of
FD, then the total expenditure on the more visible project (cash assistance) and that on




















The ratio of Cash to Vendor (hereafter the CV ratio) is
RCV =
vL +D(vS − vL)
vL(vS − 1)− D(vS − vL)
.





[(vS − 1)vL −D(vS − vL)]2
> 0. (5.9)
Therefore, as the degree of FD increases, the total expenditure on cash and the CV ratio
both increase. Inequality (5.9) thus allows us to empirically test the direct association
between FD and dress-up contests.
To test this association, we consider the reduced-form model
RCVit = αi + κ0 + κ1Dit + κ2TWEit + εit, (5.10)
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where the subscript it denotes observation of the ith state (i = 1, . . . , N) at year t
(t = 1, . . . , T ), and αi is the individual-specific effect. D represents the degree of FD,





where the local expenditure includes the expenditure of the county, city, and town govern-
ments, and the total expenditure is the expenditure of the state and local governments.
TWE is the total (state + local) welfare expenditure. The fixed-effect estimation results5
are given in column (1) of Table 5.1. It shows that a larger degree of FD is associated
with a larger CV ratio, and the correlation is strong and robust. In columns (2) and (3),
we replace the contemporary FD D by its first- and second-order lagged values DL1 and
DL2, respectively, to capture the causal effect, since an FD policy may take effect after a
period of time. We see that using lagged values gives a more positive and more significant
estimate, confirming the causal relationship between FD and the CV ratio.
Table 5.1: FD effect on CV ratio









TWE −0.2464 −0.2539 −0.2270 −0.2760
(−9.78) (−10.26) (−10.06) (−5.68)
CONST 0.2430 0.2484 0.2233 0.2532
(7.83) (8.40) (8.58) (6.86)
As a robustness check, we recompute the FD ratio using the expenditure from only
the city and town governments (excluding the county-level governments), and we denote
this ratio DCT . Since yardstick competition is supposed to be more intense at the city
and town level, we expect to observe a stronger association between dress-up contests and
FD, i.e. a more significant and positive estimated coefficient κ1. The results in column (4)
indeed indicate a more significant effect, showing the robustness of this finding.
5A preliminary analysis suggests the fixed-effect model is more appropriate than the random-effect
model.
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5.3.2. The role of yardstick competition
Yardstick competition plays a crucial role in the theoretical model, so we introduce it into
our empirical analysis. Since FD distorts the structure of public expenditure through the
channel of yardstick competition, we expect that the stronger the yardstick competition,
the stronger the distortion. More formally, if the local-level yardstick competition is






[(vS − 1)vL −D(vS − vL)]2
< 0.
This implies that given the same degree of FD, if the local-level yardstick competition
is stronger in a particular state, then the politicians in that state have more incentive
to invest in visible projects. In other words, the degree of yardstick competition can
affect the impact of FD on the structure of public expenditure. This mechanism can
be empirically captured by an interaction term between yardstick competition and FD.
Thus, we consider the model
RCVit = αi + κ0 + κ1Dit + κ2COMPit + κ3Dit × COMPit + κ4TWEit + εit, (5.11)
where COMP is a measure of the yardstick competition. Estimating (5.11) allows us to
identify the mechanism described in Section 5.2, at least to some extent.
Yardstick competition is a difficult concept to measure, and to the best of our knowl-
edge there is no satisfactory measure in the literature. We propose two measures based on
the comparability of jurisdictions and the competitiveness of local governments. First,
we consider the comparability of jurisdictions. This is motivated by the argument of
Bodenstein and Ursprung (2005) that yardstick competition ‘emerges when the perfor-
mance of governments in various jurisdictions becomes sufficiently comparable so that
the voters can alleviate the agency problem by making meaningful comparisons between
jurisdictions’; see also Besley and Case (1995). In the U.S., most congressional districts
consist of several local governments that have similar political and economic situations,
such as similar political interests and voters’ preferences. Hence, we expect that the yard-
stick competition between local governments within a congressional district is stronger
than that outside the district. This implies that the congressional district demarcates
the political boundaries of the yardstick competition. If a given district contains more
local governments, then the yardstick competition in this district is more intense because
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each local government has more comparable rivals. Given this motivation, we propose
to measure the yardstick competition by
COMPr :=
Number of local governments
Number of congressional districts
.
This ratio is unaffected if we control for a state’s land size or population since we divide
both the numerator and denominator by the land size or population.
Next, we consider measuring the yardstick competition by the competitiveness of the
local elections, which is computed based on the percentage of votes won by the leading
party. We denote this measure as COMPc. The average level of competitiveness is a
reasonable measure of the yardstick competition within the state. The competitiveness
is higher if the leading party wins a smaller share of the votes, suggesting that the
competing parties are well matched or none of the candidates has strong support. In
both cases, the yardstick competition can be intense. Due to the lack of county-level data,
we use congressional-district data. In the two-party system of the U.S., congressional
elections are expected to be highly correlated with local (county, city, or town) elections,
and thus the average competitiveness of these elections can be a proxy for the yardstick
competition at the local level.
To see how the FD effect varies at different levels of competitiveness, we first rank
all the states according to their average competitiveness (averaged over time). Then, we
estimate the FD effect using two samples, made up of the most competitive and the least
competitive states. Columns (1)–(4) of Table 5.2 present the results. It is clear that the
FD effect on the CV ratio is much stronger and more significant in the more competitive
states. Next, we examine the interaction effect of competitiveness more formally by
estimating the panel data model (5.11). The results are given in columns (5)–(8) of
Table 5.2. We see that the interaction terms are strongly positive when using COMPr
and strongly negative when using COMPc in the models with contemporary and lagged
FD. This again confirms that a stronger yardstick competition leads to a stronger FD
effect on the CV ratio. The significance of the level terms D and COMP depends
on the measurement of the yardstick competition. COMP is significant but D is not
when we measure the competition by COMPr; and D is significant but COMP is not
when we measure the competition by COMPc. In the difference-in-difference model, the
coefficients of the level terms capture only an ‘initial’ effect. The different significance
levels suggest that COMPr and COMPc measure the yardstick competition from different
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perspectives. Since the size of the interaction term in columns (5) and (6) is much larger
than that in columns (7) and (8), and is also larger than the size of its level terms, we
find that the results from the two measures are generally consistent: a larger degree of
FD and more intense yardstick competition are associated with a higher CV ratio.
Table 5.2: Interaction between FD, yardstick competition, and CV ratio
15 most competitive 15 least competitive Entire sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
D 0.7432 0.5789 −0.0900 0.4929 0.0599 0.8393
(4.91) (2.52) (−0.40) (1.55) (0.39) (2.92)
DL1 0.1178 0.9182
(0.79) (3.60)
TWE −0.2923 −0.2769 −0.2804 −0.2195 −0.2636 −0.2668 −0.2457 −0.2536
(−8.00) (−4.94) (−8.76) (−6.50) (−11.90) (−12.39) (−10.24) (−10.64)
COMPr
√ √ −2.4494 −2.7143
(−3.56) (−4.01)
COMPc






DL1 × COMPr 6.3943
(4.05)
DL1 × COMPc −0.0081
(−3.05)
CONST 0.2590 0.2591 0.3086 0.2328 0.3266 0.3335 0.2661 0.2722
(8.07) (3.68) (8.62) (8.74) (11.50) (12.54) (5.93) (5.90)
Note: Columns (1) and (2) use the 15 most competitive states, based on COMPr and COMPc, re-
spectively; columns (3) and (4) use the 15 least competitive states, based on COMPr and COMPc,
respectively; columns (5) and (6) use the entire sample of 48 states.
To summarise, the above analysis shows that a high degree of FD is associated with
an expenditure flow from the more visible product (cash assistance) to the less visible
product (vendor payments), and the association is even stronger in regions with more
intense yardstick competition. This is because to achieve a better image and win more
votes, politicians tend to allocate more resources to the more visible project. This dress-
up contest is intensified by FD through the channel of yardstick competition. These
empirical results thus provide support for our theoretical findings.
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5.4. FD effect on poverty
We have seen, from both theoretical and empirical perspectives, that fiscal FD can cause
a dress-up contest which forces governments to allocate more expenditure to the more
visible public goods. In the following two sections, we investigate how this distortion of
public expenditure influences social welfare. We focus on the effect of FD on the poverty
rate, an important aspect of social welfare, and empirically identify the transmission
mechanisms. For this purpose, we introduce three additional variables: poverty (p),
unemployment rate (UNEM), and Gini index (GINI). Poverty is defined by the share of
people with an income lower than the standard income, and this standard differs across
states. A more detailed description of the variables and their sources is given in the
Appendix.
Figure 5.1: Transmission channels from FD to poverty










We focus on three channels from FD to poverty, which are summarised in Figure 5.1.
First, according to the two-politician model in Section 5.2, FD can affect poverty through
the dress-up contest, i.e. an expenditure flow from less visible goods to more visible
goods (effects A and B). Second, FD can indirectly affect poverty by affecting the welfare
expenditure (effects C and D). On the one hand, FD may increase the welfare expenditure
due to higher administrative costs; on the other hand, it is likely that welfare expenditure
shrinks after FD because the mobility of the poor motivates governments to spend less
on welfare to reduce the fiscal burden. It is not clear which effect dominates, and we
investigate this in our empirical study. Finally, in addition to the indirect effects, FD
can have an impact on poverty through channels other than welfare expenditure and
dress-up contests. We consider other connections between FD and poverty as effect E.
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We observe that the CV ratio influences poverty not directly but indirectly, by changing
the structure of welfare expenditure. Hence, the arrow line of effect B does not point
at poverty but at effect D. We use a dashed line for channel D since there is potential
reverse causality between welfare expenditure and poverty, which we will investigate
using instrumental variables.
5.4.1. Standard panel data
To provide empirical evidence for the transmission channels described in Figure 5.1, we
first identify each effect A–E separately. First, we examine the transmission channel
from FD to welfare expenditure, and then to poverty, namely effects C and D. To show
the mediation of the welfare expenditure, we estimate the following models:
TWEit = αi + θ0 + θ1Dit + eit, (5.12)
pit = αi + β0 + β1Dit + β2TWEit + β3UNEMit + β4GINIit + ǫit. (5.13)
Model (5.12) captures the transmission effect C, while (5.13) captures the direct effect
of FD on poverty (effect E) and the indirect effect through welfare expenditure (effect
D).
Table 5.3: Results for separate transmission channels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
TWE TWE p p p p p
D −1.1031 7.4507 5.4731 4.7246 3.3062 4.6255
(−3.58) (4.54) (3.49) (2.29) (1.54) (1.82)
DL1 −1.0418
(−3.56)
TWE −1.7927 −2.2731 −0.4419 −2.3902







CONST 0.7922 0.7796 12.037 13.457 10.960 12.142 10.518
(28.15) (27.82) (80.16) (30.95) (8.46) (22.83) (8.00)
Columns (1)–(5) of Table 5.3 present the standard fixed-effect estimation results based
on Equations (5.12) and (5.13). Column (1) shows that FD has a strongly negative effect
on welfare expenditure. Column (2) replaces the contemporary value of FD by its first-
order lagged value DL1, and shows a similar result, confirming that a high degree of FD
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leads to less welfare expenditure. This suggests that the negative effect of FD on welfare
expenditure dominates in our case. In particular, since the poor are mobile, an increase
of welfare expenditure in one jurisdiction attracts the poor to this region, which adds
to the burden of this jurisdiction but reduces the burden of others. Therefore, if most
jurisdictions are free riders, then FD leads to a coordination failure and the inefficient
provision of public goods. Column (3) shows a significant and positive overall effect of FD
on poverty, challenging the conventional viewpoint that it has a positive impact on social
welfare. This effect is largely reduced (in size and significance) when we include welfare
expenditure (column (4)), but remains strong, and the coefficient of welfare expenditure
is significantly negative. This suggests that part of the FD effect on poverty is explained
by the intermediate transmission through welfare expenditure, and it provides evidence
for strong effects C and D. These effects are robust when we include the Gini coefficient
and unemployment (column (5)).
To examine effect B, we first add RCV as an explanatory variable in the poverty
regression. Columns (6) and (7) show that the FD effect remains strong and positive
after we control for welfare expenditure and the CV ratio, and this suggests the existence
of effect E. The strongly positive and robust effect of FD again confirms the negative
effect of FD on poverty reduction. The CV ratio is positively related to poverty, but this
effect becomes insignificant when we control for unemployment and the Gini index. It
shows that the CV ratio can be positively related to poverty, but the delicate coefficient
suggests that the standard panel data model may not fully capture the effect of the CV
ratio on poverty. Also, we see that including RCV can affect the estimated coefficient of
WE, which suggests possible interactions between RCV and WE. In fact, the CV ratio
influences poverty by interacting with the effect of welfare expenditure. An excessively
large (or small) CV ratio reduces the effect of welfare expenditure on poverty reduction,
while an appropriate value of the ratio can maximise the effect of welfare expenditure.
Therefore, effect B cannot be fully captured by the standard fixed-effect model with RCV
as a control variable, and more appropriate methods are required.
5.4.2. Endogeneity of welfare expenditure
A potential issue is the endogeneity of welfare expenditure. The endogeneity is due to
possible reverse causality between welfare expenditure and poverty; in particular, welfare
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expenditure can reduce poverty, while regions with a higher poverty rate are likely to
have more welfare expenditure. To reduce the potential bias caused by reverse causal-
ity, we consider instrumental-variable estimation. We propose to use public expenditure
on health and/or hospitals as the instrumental variable of welfare expenditure. Ex-
penditure on health and hospitals is highly correlated with welfare expenditure because
factors such as citizens’ interest in government services, politicians’ attention to citizens’
wellbeing, and the power of the public-sector unions can influence the expenditure on
welfare, health, and hospitals. Moreover, this instrument does not depend on poverty
because government hardly increase or reduce health expenditure for poverty reason.
Also, there is no clear transmission channels from public health expenditure on poverty
other than welfare expenditure. This is because only a proportion of public expenditure
on health and hospital may be distributed to individual health care, and only this part
of expenditure is possibly related with poverty. Even if part of public expenditure on
health and hospital is related with poverty, it is still unclear how much assistance to
individual health expenditure can alleviate poverty.Therefore, health and hospital ex-
penditure satisfies the requirements of relevance and exogeneity, so it is an appropriate
instrumental variable. This instrument is in the similar spirit of Levitt (2002) who used
expenditure on fire fighting as an instrument of expenditure on police when investigating
the determinants of crime.
Table 5.4: Results of poverty regression: IV estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Instrument HE HO HH HH HEO HEO
D 3.5819 5.1961 4.4651 4.6046 4.0719 4.5837
(1.90) (2.56) (2.44) (2.44) (2.50) (2.54)
TWE −3.5619 −1.7413 −2.5657 −3.2093 −2.9985 −3.5670
(−2.87) (−1.14) (−2.25) (−1.73) (−3.05) (−2.06)
GINI 0.9078 −0.6449 0.0582 0.7794 0.4733 0.7590
(0.35) (−0.24) (0.02) (0.31) (0.18) (0.30)
UNEM 0.5360 0.5585 0.5483 0.5943 0.5424 0.6001
(8.75) (9.01) (9.03) (7.79) (9.12) (7.64)
RCV −0.9291 −1.4686
(−0.33) (−0.55)
First-stage F -stat. 122.13 75.64 146.95 76.61 80.98 38.27
p-value of first-stage F -test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
p-value of Hansen’s J-test 0.24 0.24
Note: The dependent variable in all models is poverty. Columns (1)–(4) are 2SLS, and columns (5)
and (6) are GMM. Using 2SLS to estimate columns (5) and (6) leads to consistent results.
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We consider four variations of the instrument: expenditure on health (HE), expen-
diture on hospitals (HO), expenditure on health and hospitals (HH), and expenditure
on health together with expenditure on hospitals (HEO). In the first three cases, the
model is exactly identified, and we estimate it using two-stage least squares (2SLS).
In the last case, we estimate the overidentified model using the generalised method of
moments (GMM). The results are presented in Table 5.4. We see that using the instru-
mental variable does not change our results. In particular, the estimated coefficient of
welfare expenditure using 2SLS/GMM remains significantly negative, and it is slightly
larger (in absolute value) than the standard fixed-effect coefficient estimate, except in
column (2). The estimates of the other covariates are generally unaffected when we
use 2SLS. The first-stage F statistic and its p-value show that the instruments are in
general highly correlated with the endogenous variable. However, the single-instrument
HO is relatively weak compared with HE, and this explains the small absolute value of
the welfare-expenditure coefficient in column (2). In columns (5) and (6), the rejection
of Hansen’s J test suggests that the overidentified instruments satisfy the orthogonal
conditions, and thus are valid instruments.
To conclude, the results from a separate estimation of each channel show that ef-
fects A–E indeed exist. FD can have an impact on poverty by reducing welfare expen-
diture and, more interestingly, through the CV ratio. However, we also note that the
interaction between poverty and the CV ratio (effect B) cannot be fully captured by the
standard panel data model, and more thorough studies will be required.
5.5. Joint estimation using functional coefficient model
The above analysis specifies each channel separately, and shows that each effect is strong
and significant. However, these channels may not be jointly strong and their relative
importance is not yet clear. For example, it is possible that the transmission channel
through the CV ratio (effects A and B) is individually significant, but plays a minor role
when we control the channel through the welfare expenditure. Also, the standard fixed-
effect model considered in the previous section cannot capture the interaction between
the CV ratio, welfare expenditure, and poverty. A frequently used method to capture
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where xit = (GINIit,UNEMit). We argue that this approach does not work here, for
two reasons. First, since RCV is influenced by D, the interaction term TWE × RCV
can be highly correlated with the level terms even if all the variables are centred to
remove multicollinearity, and therefore the estimated coefficient of the interaction term
can be inefficient. Second, the interaction term provides only a positive or negative (lin-
ear) interaction effect, and this effect is the same for all CV ratio levels. However, it is
possible that the welfare-expenditure effect on poverty depends nonlinearly on the CV
ratio; in particular, both extremely large and small values of the CV ratio reflect the
distortion of welfare expenditure, and this distortion can weaken its effect on poverty re-
duction. Therefore, the welfare-expenditure effect is expected to be a nonlinear function
of the CV ratio (roughly U-shaped). This nonlinear relationship cannot be captured by
Equation (5.14). Indeed, estimates of Equation (5.14) show that β̂5 is not significant.
5.5.1. Standard functional coefficient model
To investigate the relative importance of each channel and capture the possibly nonlinear
relationship between the CV ratio and poverty, we consider the functional coefficient
model in which the slope coefficients are allowed to vary over a common variable. We
first consider a standard functional coefficient model,
pit = δ0 + δ1Dit + δ2TWEit + δ3GINIit + δ4UNEMit + ηit, (5.15)
where the slope coefficient δk (k = 0, 1, . . . , 4) is a continuous function of the CV ratio.
The variables D, TWE, GINI, and UNEM in Equation (5.15) are the same as in Equa-
tion (5.13), except that DINC is not included to avoid possible multicollinearity between
TWE and DINC. Our robustness check suggests that including DINC does not change
the shape of the curves, but just widens the confidence bands. One advantage of a func-
tional coefficient model is that it allows regressors to be correlated with the smoothing
variable RCV, and thus avoids the multicollinearity problem in (5.14). Moreover, it pro-
vides information on how the effect of welfare expenditure varies (possibly nonlinearly)
for different values of the CV ratio. The model also allows us to rule out other possible
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transmission channels from the CV ratio to poverty, at least to some extent, if the other
functional coefficients (δ1, δ3, and δ4) do not vary over RCV or show no clear trends.
For the moment, we consider a standard functional model without an individual-specific
effect αi (pool estimation), and the estimated coefficients are consistent if αi is assumed
to be uncorrelated with the regressors. In the next subsection we will allow correlation
between αi and the regressors and estimate a fixed-effect functional coefficient model.
The parameters in this model are estimated by local linear estimation (Fan and
Gijbels (1996); see also Cai et al. (2000)). Thus we specify
δk = δCk + δSk(RCV− u0) (k = 0, 1, . . . , 4) (5.16)
where min(RCV) ≤ u0 ≤ max(RCV). The parameters (δCk, δSk) are estimated by min-











{δCk + δSk(RCVit − u0)}xitk
)2
Kh(RCVit − u0),
where xitk is the kth regressor, and Kh(·) := h−1K(·/h) with bandwidth h and kernel
function K(·). Various data-driven methods could be used to select the bandwidth, e.g.
cross-validation (Fan and Gijbels, 1996). We choose the bandwidth by minimising the
averaged mean square error, following Cai et al. (2000).
Figure 5.2 shows the slope parameters as a function of the CV ratio. The solid line
plots the coefficient estimate, and the dashed lines are±2× the bootstrap standard errors
(calculated over 200 replications). We see a rough U-shape of the welfare-expenditure
effect on poverty (upper-left subfigure). The effect is significantly negative when the
proporition of the cash assistance is relatively small, and it becomes stronger (more
negative) as the ratio increases to around 0.2. However, when the ratio is more than
0.3, increasing the cash proportion weakens the welfare-expenditure effect on poverty
reduction, with wide confidence bands. The effect even becomes weakly positive when
the ratio is particularly high. The nonlinear behaviour shows that a deviation of the CV
ratio from its optimal value, and in particular an increase in its value, can weaken the
poverty-reduction effect of welfare expenditure. This provides evidence for the efficiency
loss caused by an overemphasis on visible products.
The FD effect on poverty (upper-right subfigure) is significantly positive for values of
the CV ratio from around 0.1 to 0.4, and less significant for larger values. The estimated
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Figure 5.2: Marginal effect of control variables on poverty as function of CV ratio (stan-
dard functional coefficient model)







































































































Chapter 5: Dress-up contests: A dark side of fiscal decentralisation
functional coefficients of the welfare expenditure and FD confirm the results from the
standard fixed-effect model that the indirect channel (effects C and D) is strong, other
channels also matter (effect E), but the evidence for the direct effects (A and B) is not
as clear. We also see that the curves of FD, unemployment, and the Gini index have no
particular shape, suggesting that the CV ratio does not influence poverty through these
channels.
5.5.2. Fixed-effect functional coefficient model
Standard functional coefficient estimation works if the individual-specific effect αi is in-
dependent of the control variables. However, it is possible that an unobserved individual
effect αi is correlated with the control variables, for example, the historical and cultural
differences between states (an unobserved individual effect) may affect the government
behaviour, and thus impact the degree of FD. To allow for possible correlation between
the individual-specific effect and the regressors, we estimate a fixed-effect functional
coefficient model:
pit = αi + δ0 + δ1Dit + δ2TWEit + δ3GINIit + δ4UNEMit + ηit, (5.17)
where αi can be correlated with the regressors in any (unknown) pattern. In a func-
tional coefficient model, the fixed effect cannot be removed by a preliminary step of
first-difference or within-transformation of the dependent and independent variables, be-
cause the slope coefficients δk = δk(RCVit) are no longer constant for all the observations.
The transformation based on equations also does not work, because it involves an ad-
ditive function that impedes kernel-based estimation, and also because it produces an
inconsistent estimated coefficient of the time-invariant term (see Sun et al. (2009) for
the details). Therefore, we follow Sun et al. (2009) and remove the fixed effects by de-
ducting a smoothed version of the cross-time average from each individual unit. This
approach first analytically finds the fixed-effect vector via a weighted least square dummy
variable model, and then estimates the functional parameters nonparametrically using a
concentrate weighted least square method. To calculate the bootstrap standard error in
the panel data model, we follow Kapetanios (2008) and construct bootstrap samples by
resampling whole cross-sectional units with replacement (cross-sectional resampling).
Figure 5.3 presents the fixed-effect functional coefficient estimates for each control
variable. In general the shape of the curves is similar to those in the standard func-
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Figure 5.3: Marginal effect of control variables on poverty as a function of CV ratio:
Fixed-effect estimation







































































































Chapter 5: Dress-up contests: A dark side of fiscal decentralisation
tional coefficient model. In particular, the trends of the welfare-expenditure effect are
consistent: welfare expenditure has a significantly negative effect on poverty when the
CV ratio is low, but a weakly positive effect when the ratio is high (the U-shaped curve).
Also, this effect becomes less significant as the ratio increases. The estimated coefficients
of FD are below the zero line; they are much lower than those in the standard panel data
model, even though we observe only the upper bound of the confidence interval. Thus,
FD has little impact on the poverty rate if we control for the size (effects C and D) and
the structure (effects A and B) of welfare expenditure. The results for unemployment
and the Gini index show no particular trends.
In contrast to the standard estimation, the fixed-effect estimation results provide
evidence for both the direct channels (effects A and B) and indirect channels (effects
C and D), while the other channels (effect E) become relatively weak. In general, the
harmful effect of FD can be observed in the functional coefficient analysis when we take
the fixed effect into consideration.
5.5.3. Robustness check
We investigate the robustness of our results in various ways. First, we focus on the
coefficient of TWE and consider different subsets of auxiliary variables {D, UNEM,
GINI}. The results from both the standard and fixed-effect models show that including
different auxiliary variables does not affect the curves of the welfare-expenditure effect.
Second, we consider using an alternative data set, namely the local governments’
expenditure on cash and vendor payments. To ensure that the ratio is well-defined, we
assign zero to those observations with no such assistance or payments.6 We estimate the
functional coefficient model using the local government expenditure. The left panel of
Figure 5.4 shows that the welfare-expenditure effect on poverty is negative when RCV is
small but weakly positive when RCV is large. This result is consistent with our previous
findings. The larger confidence bands for small values of RCV are partly because we
assign zero to those observations with no assistance or payments, which reduces the
accuracy.
Finally, we consider the possible effect of lagged variables. This captures the causal
effect, and using the lagged value can also reduce the endogeneity to some extent. We
6Setting these observations to zero cannot distinguish the case with no cash and vendor payments
from the case with vendor payments but no cash assistance.
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consider the following model:
pit = αi + δ0 + δ1Di,t−1 + δ2TWEi,t−1 + δ3GINIit + δ4UNEMit + ηit, (5.18)
where δk is a function of RCVi,t−1. In this model, we take a first-order lag of the control
variables D and TWE together with the smoothing covariate RCV, because they are
related to the fiscal policies. We estimate (5.18) using both standard and fixed-effect
models, and the right panel of Figure 5.4 shows that our main results are not affected.
Figure 5.4: Functional coefficient estimates of welfare-expenditure effect: Robustness
check
(a) Estimates using local data (b) Estimates using lagged variables
















































This paper models and empirically identifies the dress-up contest introduced by FD
and its harmful effect on social welfare. Because of asymmetric information, voters
cannot observe politicians’ capabilities, but they make assessments based on the outcome
of public projects. Therefore politicians, under election pressures, are motivated to
allocate more resources to more visible projects to improve their image. We show that
the yardstick competition triggered by FD can turn into a competition for a better
image, i.e. a dress-up contest, and this contest further causes a structural bias in public
expenditure (more expenditure on visible projects) and reduces the efficiency of public
expenditure.
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Our empirical analysis first examined each transmission channel separately using the
standard panel data model, and found that each effect is individually strong. On the
one hand, FD significantly reduces the welfare expenditure, and thus further increases
poverty. On the other hand, it encourages governments to spend more on visible projects,
leading to a higher CV ratio in welfare expenditure. To capture the possible nonlinear
interaction between CV ratio, welfare expenditure, and poverty, and also to examine the
relative importance of each channel, we estimated the effects jointly using the functional
coefficient panel data model. It showed that the transmission effects through welfare
expenditure and the CV ratio are both nontrivial. An excessively large CV ratio weakens
the poverty-reduction effect of welfare expenditure because of the efficiency loss. Separate
estimation and joint estimation together provide supporting evidence for the positive
effect of FD on poverty, and our results are robust to different model specifications.
Therefore, our empirical analysis suggests that FD in general has a dark side that can
lead to a higher level of poverty through a dress-up contest.
Our main results have important policy implications. Policymakers, who consider
FD to be an efficient policy tool, should also be aware of its dark side. Two methods can
help to avoid dress-up contests and their negative effects on social welfare in the course of
FD. First, there should be a minimum level of public expenditure on less visible projects,
so that the structure of public spending does not become too distorted. Second, an
evaluation system could be introduced to increase the visibility of public projects, such
as the CPA (comprehensive performance assessment) system used in the UK since 2002.
Such an assessment system would allow voters to better evaluate politicians’ capabilities.
Further research is needed in several areas. First, we plan to use an alternative mea-
sure of yardstick competition to provide further evidence for dress-up contests. Second,
there are missing values in the current data set, and a better data set is thus required.






p Regional poverty rate. The share of people with an income lower than the regional
standard (varying over regions), from 1992 to 2008. Source: Statistical Abstract.
D Fiscal decentralisation. Defined as
D =
local expenditure
local expenditure + state expenditure
,
where state expenditure refers to the expenditure by the state government, and
local expenditure is the expenditure by all local governments. Source: Statistical
Abstract.
UNEM Unemployment rate, from 1992 to 2008. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
COMPr Yardstick competition based on the comparability of jurisdictions, the ratio of the
number of local governments over the number of congressional districts.
COMPc Yardstick competition based on the competitiveness of local governments, the per-
centage of votes won by the leading party, from 1992 to 2008.
TWE Welfare expenditure. Total public welfare per thousand persons measured in thou-
sands of dollars, from 1992 to 2008 excluding 2000, 2002, and 2006. Source: Sta-
tistical Abstract.
RCV The ratio of cash assistance to vendor payments. In this ratio, cash assistance is
paid directly to needy persons under the categorical programs (Old Age Assistance,
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)) and any other welfare pro-
grams. Vendor payments are made directly to private purveyors for medical care,
burials, and other commodities and services provided under welfare programs; and
for the provision and operation by the government of welfare institutions. Source:
Statistical Abstract.







This document provides some supplementary material and additional results relating to
Magnus and Wang (2013). It contains the within-group correlation of five groups in
which we re-sign a variable, the BACE results (Sala-i-Martin et al., 2004) which we use
to compare our results with, and the full results using data-dependent prior probabilities.
It provides the procedure and detailed results of sensitivity analysis with respect to the
prior π and to the grouping. It also contains a growth empirics study using another data
set to test the robustness of the endogenous growth model.
6.2. Scaling
We present five groups in which we re-sign a variable in Table 6.1, so that variables
within one group are positively correlated.
Note that the original variables in each group are highly and negatively correlated.
Therefore, averaging estimates without scaling cancels the effect of these variables.
6.3. Results of BACE and HWALS-F1
The original results of BACE in Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) are posterior mean and
standard deviation estimates, conditional on inclusion along with posterior conditional
probabilities. Since model uncertainty is not fully taken into account in the posterior
standard deviations conditional on inclusion, the precision of the estimates is misleading
as explained in Magnus et al. (2010). To ‘fairly’ compare the estimates produced by
BACE with those of WALS and HWALS, we compute the unconditional (‘true’) moments
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Table 6.1: Within-group correlations
g Group v Variable Correlation
(1) Demographic characteristics 1∗ Fraction population over 65
2 Fraction population under 15 −0.91
(2) Economy system 3 Capitalism −0.58
4∗ Socialist dummy
(5) Health 19 Life expectancy in 1960 −0.73
20∗ Malaria prevalence in 1960s
(8) Democracy 25 Political rights −0.83
26∗ Civil liberties
(11) Tropics effect 31 Fraction of tropical area −0.89
32 Tropical climate zone −0.60
33∗ Absolute latitude
* Adjusted variable.
of BACE, based on Equations (8) and (14) in Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004).
The unconditional posterior mean can be computed by multiplying the conditional











× (posterior inclusion prob)− β2
uncond
.
Both the conditional and the unconditional estimates of BACE are given in Table 6.2,
where the variables are ordered in the same way as in Magnus and Wang (2013).
Results of HWALS-F1 are also provided in Table 6.2 as a direct comparison between
HWALS and BMA because all explanatory variables are allowed to be either included
or excluded.
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Table 6.2: BACE results and HWALS-F1
Variable BACE results HWALS-F1
Conditional Unconditional
posterior estimates posterior estimates
Education −0.0013 (0.0038)
5 Primary schooling 0.0269 (0.0080) 0.0214 (0.0130)
6 Secondary schooling
7 Higher education −0.0697 (0.0418) −0.0043 (0.0196)
8 Public edu. spending 0.1295 (0.1728) 0.0027 (0.0312)
9 Primary school yrs
10 Secondary school yrs
11 Higher education yrs
12 Ave. school yrs
13 Ave. school yrs × logGDP
Health 0.0045 (0.0044)
19 Life expectancy 0.0008 (0.0004) 0.0002 (0.0004)
20 Malaria prevalence −0.0157 (0.0062) −0.0040 (0.0075)
Initial state −0.0030 (0.0046)
23 GDP in 1960 (log) −0.0085 (0.0029) −0.0058 (0.0046)
24 Size of economy −0.0005 (0.0014) −0.0000 (0.0002)
Tropics effect −0.0029 (0.0032)
31 Frac. of tropical area −0.0148 (0.0042) −0.0083 (0.0080)
32 Tropical climate zone −0.0021 (0.0066) 0.0000 (0.0009)
33 Absolute latitude 0.0001 (0.0002) 0.0000 (0.0000)
Ethnicity and language
36 Ethnolinguistic frac. −0.0113 (0.0058) −0.0012 (0.0039) −0.0024 (0.0025)
37 English-speaking pop. −0.0037 (0.0071) −0.0001 (0.0011)
38 Frac. foreign language 0.0070 (0.0040) 0.0006 (0.0022)
Religion
39 Fraction Confucian 0.0544 (0.0224) 0.0112 (0.0242)
40 Fraction Muslim 0.0126 (0.0063) 0.0014 (0.0045)
41 Fraction Buddhist 0.0217 (0.0107) 0.0023 (0.0076)
42 Fraction Protestant −0.0119 (0.0093) −0.0005 (0.0032)
43 Fraction Hindu 0.0176 (0.0126) 0.0008 (0.0045)
44 Fraction Catholic −0.0084 (0.0085) −0.0003 (0.0022)
45 Fraction Orthodox 0.0057 (0.0136) 0.0001 (0.0018)
46 Religious intensity −0.0047 (0.0072) −0.0001 (0.0012) −0.0009 (0.0017)
Price distortion
70 Investment price −0.0001 (0.0000) −0.0001 (0.0000) −0.0029 (0.0015)
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Table 6.2: Continued
Variable BACE results HWALS-F1
Conditional Unconditional
posterior estimates posterior estimates
Demographic characteristics 0.0026 (0.0047)
1 Frac. pop. over 65 0.0194 (0.1195) 0.0004 (0.0180)
2 Frac. pop. under 15 0.0450 (0.0411) 0.0018 (0.0122)
Economy system −0.0010 (0.0016)
3 Capitalism −0.0002 (0.0011) 0.0000 (0.0001)
4 Socialist dummy 0.0040 (0.0050) 0.0001 (0.0009)
Government intervention −0.0004 (0.0021)
14 Public investment share −0.0615 (0.0430) −0.0030 (0.0162)
15 Public consumption share (excl. education and defense)
16 Gov. consumption share −0.0442 (0.0254) −0.0046 (0.0158)
17 Gov. share of GDP −0.0349 (0.0294) −0.0022 (0.0112)
18 Nominal gov. GDP share −0.0336 (0.0274) −0.0012 (0.0081)
Inflation 0.0005 (0.0022)
21 Average inflation −0.0001 (0.0001) −0.0000 (0.0000)
22 Square of inflation 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000)
Democracy 0.0025 (0.0027)
25 Political rights −0.0018 (0.0102) −0.0001 (0.0005)
26 Civil liberties −0.0072 (0.0071) −0.0002 (0.0017)
Scale effect 0.0028 (0.0027)
27 Land area 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000)
28 Population 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000)
Trade policy indices 0.0010 (0.0025)
29 Outward orientation −0.0033 (0.0027) −0.0001 (0.0007)
30 Years open 0.0122 (0.0063) 0.0015 (0.0045)
War −0.0001 (0.0017)
34 Frac. spent in war −0.0014 (0.0092) −0.0000 (0.0012)
35 War participation −0.0007 (0.0030) −0.0000 (0.0004)
Trade statistics
47 Openness measure 0.0089 (0.0052) 0.0007 (0.0028) 0.0007 (0.0029)
48 Primary exports −0.0113 (0.0075) −0.0006 (0.0031)
Terms of trade
49 Terms of trade ranking −0.0037 (0.0096) −0.0001 (0.0013) 0.0004 (0.0027)
50 Terms of trade growth 0.0326 (0.0467) 0.0007 (0.0082) 0.0036 (0.0024)
Regional effect
51 East Asian dummy 0.0218 (0.0061) 0.0179 (0.0100) 0.0062 (0.0028)
52 African dummy −0.0147 (0.0069) −0.0023 (0.0060) −0.0033 (0.0035)
53 European dummy −0.0023 (0.0105) −0.0001 (0.0019) 0.0016 (0.0045)
54 Latin-American dummy −0.0128 (0.0058) −0.0019 (0.0051) −0.0012 (0.0045)
55 Colony dummy −0.0050 (0.0047) −0.0001 (0.0012) −0.0040 (0.0035)
56 British colony 0.0037 (0.0036) 0.0001 (0.0008) 0.0028 (0.0027)
57 Spanish colony −0.0107 (0.0050) −0.0013 (0.0039) 0.0015 (0.0033)
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Table 6.2: Continued
Natural resource
58 Hydrocarbon deposits 0.0003 (0.0004) 0.0000 (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0019)
59 Frac. GDP in mining 0.0388 (0.0193) 0.0048 (0.0145) −0.0014 (0.0019)
60 Oil country dummy 0.0048 (0.0071) 0.0001 (0.0012) −0.0018 (0.0023)
Population
61 Population density coastal 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0010 (0.0029)
62 Interior density 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) −0.0011 (0.0017)
63 Fraction pop. in tropics −0.0107 (0.0068) −0.0006 (0.0030) 0.0014 (0.0032)
64 Population density 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) −0.0016 (0.0021)
65 Population growth rate 0.0208 (0.3078) 0.0004 (0.0425) 0.0013 (0.0053)
66 Fertility −0.0075 (0.0101) −0.0002 (0.0022) −0.0031 (0.0061)
Geography (excl. tropics effect)
67 Frac. land area near water −0.0026 (0.0059) 0.0000 (0.0009) 0.0018 (0.0032)
68 Landlocked country dummy −0.0021 (0.0042) 0.0000 (0.0007) 0.0003 (0.0018)
69 Air distance to big cities 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0010 (0.0025)
Real exchange rate
71 Real exchange rate dist. −0.0001 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) −0.0024 (0.0020)
Defense
72 Defense spending share 0.0453 (0.0768) 0.0010 (0.0129) −0.0003 (0.0017)
Political instability
73 Revolutions and coups −0.0071 (0.0061) −0.0002 (0.0016) −0.0005 (0.0019)
Independence
74 Timing of independence 0.0011 (0.0021) 0.0000 (0.0003) 0.0006 (0.0025)
6.4. Complete results of data-dependent prior
In Section 2.3 of the paper we discussed two updating algorithms based on data-dependent
priors: one-step updating and two-step updating. This section provides complete results
of HWALS-F8 using two updating methods.
In Table 6.4 and 6.5 we present the updated priors and the new HWALS-F8 estimates
for all groups. The robustness of the updated probabilities and resulting estimates con-
firms that model specification only has a marginal effect in the updating procedure.
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Table 6.4: HWALS estimates using data-dependent priors: focus variables
One-step updating Two-step updating
Variable HWALS-F8 updated π HWALS-F8 updated π
Education 0.0051 (0.0034) 0.0050 (0.0034)
5 Primary schooling 0.9784 0.9784
6 Secondary schooling 0.0033 0.0033
7 Higher education 0.0024 0.0024
8 Public edu. spending 0.0027 0.0027
9 Primary school yrs 0.0025 0.0025
10 Secondary school yrs 0.0031 0.0031
11 Higher education yrs 0.0019 0.0019
12 Ave. school yrs 0.0024 0.0024
13 Ave. school yrs × logGDP 0.0033 0.0033
Health 0.0062 (0.0059) 0.0065 (0.0060)
19 Life expectancy 0.8142 0.8142
20 Malaria prevalence 0.1858 0.1858
Initial state −0.0084 (0.0057) −0.0082 (0.0059)
23 GDP in 1960 (log) 0.6923 0.6923
24 Size of economy 0.3077 0.3077
Tropics effect −0.0041 (0.0034) −0.0040 (0.0034)
31 Frac. of tropical area 0.5488 0.5488
32 Tropical climate zone 0.1489 0.1489
33 Absolute latitude 0.3023 0.3023
Ethnicity and language
36 Ethnolinguistic frac. −0.0022 (0.0026) – −0.0023 (0.0028) –
37 English-speaking pop. – –
38 Frac. foreign language – –
Religion
39 Fraction Confucian – –
40 Fraction Muslim – –
41 Fraction Buddhist – –
42 Fraction Protestant – –
43 Fraction Hindu – –
44 Fraction Catholic – –
45 Fraction Orthodox – –
46 Religious intensity −0.0022 (0.0018) – −0.0022 (0.0018) –
Price distortion
70 Investment price −0.0046 (0.0015) – −0.0045 (0.0016) –
134
Complete results of data-dependent prior
Table 6.5: HWALS estimates using data-dependent priors: auxiliary variables
One-step updating Two-step updating
Variable HWALS-F8 updated π HWALS-F8 updated π
Demographic characteristics 0.0026 (0.0044) 0.0019 (0.0041)
1 Frac. pop. over 65 0.7202 0.3282
2 Frac. pop. under 15 0.2798 0.6718
Economy system −0.0007 (0.0015) −0.0007 (0.0014)
3 Capitalism 0.5227 0.5516
4 Socialist dummy 0.4773 0.4484
Government intervention 0.0005 (0.0020) 0.0004 (0.0020)
14 Public investment share 0.1555 0.1647
15 Public consumption share 0.1710 0.0220
(excl. education and defense)
16 Gov. consumption share 0.4317 0.5210
17 Gov. share of GDP 0.0827 0.0440
18 Nominal gov. GDP share 0.1590 0.2484
Inflation 0.0004 (0.0019) 0.0007 (0.0018)
21 Average inflation 0.5005 0.5372
22 Square of inflation 0.4995 0.4628
Democracy 0.0015 (0.0024) 0.0017 (0.0024)
25 Political rights 0.3017 0.2217
26 Civil liberties 0.6983 0.7783
Scale effect 0.0018 (0.0024) 0.0012 (0.0019)
27 Land area 0.5293 0.1411
28 Population 0.4707 0.8589
Trade policy indices 0.0009 (0.0026) 0.0011 (0.0027)
29 Outward orientation 0.0002 0.0005
30 Years open 0.9998 0.9995
War −0.0003 (0.0015) −0.0005 (0.0015)
34 Frac. spent in war 0.5932 0.6160
35 War participation 0.4068 0.3840
Trade statistics
47 Openness measure −0.0003 (0.0025) – −1.50e-5(0.0025) –
48 Primary exports – –
Terms of trade
49 Terms of trade ranking 0.0002 (0.0024) – −0.0003 (0.0023) –
50 Terms of trade growth 0.0021 (0.0022) – 0.0019 (0.0022) –
Regional effect
51 East Asian dummy 0.0046 (0.0025) – 0.0046 (0.0025) –
52 African dummy −0.0020 (0.0032) – −0.0018 (0.0032) –
53 European dummy 0.0009 (0.0040) – 0.0014 (0.0040) –
54 Latin-American dummy −0.0002 (0.0042) – 0.0004 (0.0042) –
55 Colony dummy −0.0040 (0.0031) – −0.0036 (0.0030) –
56 British colony 0.0022 (0.0026) – 0.0021 (0.0025) –
57 Spanish colony 0.0007 (0.0031) – 0.0002 (0.0029) –
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Table 6.5: Continued
One-step updating Two-step updating
Variable HWALS-F8 updated π HWALS-F8 updated π
Natural resource
58 Hydrocarbon deposits 0.0005 (0.0017) – 0.0005 (0.0017) –
59 Frac. GDP in mining −0.0012 (0.0017) – −0.0012 (0.0017) –
60 Oil country dummy −0.0004 (0.0021) – −0.0003 (0.0020) –
Population
61 Population density coastal 0.0026 (0.0025) – 0.0024 (0.0026) –
62 Interior density −0.0008 (0.0015) – −0.0007 (0.0015) –
63 Fraction pop. in tropics 0.0009 (0.0028) – 0.0007 (0.0028) –
64 Population density −0.0009 (0.0018) – −0.0007 (0.0017) –
65 Population growth rate 0.0003 (0.0047) – 0.0012 (0.0047) –
66 Fertility −0.0006 (0.0052) – −0.0004 (0.0052) –
Geography (excl. tropics effect)
67 Frac. land area near water 0.0001 (0.0030) – −0.0004 (0.0027) –
68 Landlocked country dummy −0.0003 (0.0016) – −0.0005 (0.0016) –
69 Air distance to big cities −0.0001 (0.0023) – −0.0003 (0.0022) –
Real exchange rate
71 Real exchange rate dist. −0.0019 (0.0019) – −0.0019 (0.0019) –
Defense
72 Defense spending share −0.0007 (0.0016) – −0.0008 (0.0016) –
Political instability
73 Revolutions and coups −0.0003 (0.0017) – −0.0005 (0.0017) –
Independence
74 Timing of independence 0.0010 (0.0023) – 0.0010 (0.0022) –
6.5. Sensitivity with respect to the prior π
In Section 3.3 of the paper we distinguished between four levels of belief regarding the
specification of the prior probabilities π. In Section 5 of the paper we present the
empirical results based on the first two levels (default equal priors and data-dependent
priors). In this section we investigate the effects of the belief of π on the estimates and
standard deviations. In other words, we ask how sensitive the empirical results and the
conclusions are with respect to π. We discuss the two levels in turn: equal priors and
ordered priors. The analysis of equal priors corresponds to the first case where researchers
have no information, and we study how the change in the prior of one variable affects the
results, keeping priors of other variables equal; The other case of order priors corresponds
to the third and fourth cases where researchers have unequal information and are able
to order the variables in one group. The way of assigning priors and the effect of priors
are very different from Ley and Steel (2009) or Eicher et al. (2011) who found sensitive
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results with respect to priors, because the priors in our case are assigned to the variables
in one group, unlike the priors of the models or parameters. Therefore, we expect the
effect of priors on our results is also different from the findings in Ley and Steel (2009)
and Eicher et al. (2011).
6.5.1. Equal priors
Suppose that in one group, say group l, the ml variables do not all have the same prior
probability 1/ml, but that one of the variables, say variable j, has a different probability




(i = 1, . . . , j − 1, j + 1, . . . , ml). (6.1)
This assumption can be made for any of the type I groups. For our sensitivity exper-
iment we choose one focus variable ‘education’ and one auxiliary variable ‘democracy’.
We choose education, because this group contains nine variables with relatively large
deviations, and the effect of education on economic growth depends on which variable
is used; see Table 3 of the paper. Democracy is of interest because it has strong policy
implications (Barro, 1999) and its effect on economic growth is controversial. Within
education we choose the variable ‘primary schooling’ as the one whose prior probability
is different, because its role in explaining economic growth appears to differ from other
education variables; within democracy we choose the variable ‘political rights’.
In Figure 6.1 we report the sensitivity of four groups: education, democracy, health,
and initial state. These groups are chosen because they are proximate determinants
that are typically regarded as the most important growth theories. Also, by including
education and democracy, we can investigate the direct effect (effect on the group itself)
and the indirect effect (effect on other groups) of changing the prior probability. In the
figure, the prior probability of primary schooling (top panel) and political rights (bottom
panel) varies between 0 and 1. Note that the estimated means of all variables are linear
with the varying prior probability, because πil in Equation (6.1) is a linear function of π
j
l .
Changing the prior probability of primary schooling has a serious direct effect on the
estimated mean and standard deviation of education. The estimated mean of education
is negative when the prior probability of primary schooling is less than 0.2, but becomes
positive when it is larger than 0.4. This is due to the fact that primary schooling has a
strong positive effect on growth while the effect of other education variables is weak.
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Figure 6.1: Sensitivity with respect to π: unequal priors
Unequal prior in group ‘education’

















































Unequal prior in group ‘democracy’















































The estimated standard deviation of education is a concave function of the prior
probability. It is obvious that when primary schooling has weight 1, we obtain the
minimal standard deviation because there is no variation between variables. It is less
obvious that when primary schooling has a small weight, we also obtain small standard
deviations. The reason lies in the fact that primary schooling differs much from other
education variables, so that a small weight leads to a small cross term bb′ in Equation (12)
of the paper.
The estimates in the other three groups (indirect effect) are less sensitive than those of
education. The estimated means never change sign. Among the three groups, health ap-
pears to be the most sensitive to the change in prior. The estimated standard deviations
of the three groups are all insensitive to the change in prior.
In the bottom panel we change the prior on political rights in the group democracy.
The effects are very small. Even the estimate of democracy itself (the direct effect) is
not sensitive.
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6.5.2. Ordered priors
Next suppose that we can order the priors in group l so that the priors of the variables
x1l , . . . , x
ml
l are known to satisfy π
1
l > · · · > πmll . In particular, assume that πi+1l = rπil
for some 0 < r < 1. Then,
πil =
(1− r)ri−1
1− rml (i = 1, . . . , ml). (6.2)
The smaller is r the more weight is placed on the important variables. Equation (6.2)
allows the prior probability of the most important measurement, π1l , to change over the
interval (1/ml, 1).
Figure 6.2: Sensitivity with respect to π: ordered priors
Ordered priors in group ‘education’
















































Ordered priors in group ‘democracy’















































Figure 6.2 presents some representative examples when the priors are ordered. To
perform this experiment we set r = 1/2 and we need a predetermined ordering of the
variables. In the group education we select primary schooling as the most important
variable and we order the other variables randomly. Unlike the previous case, neither the
estimated mean nor the standard deviation is a linear function of the prior probability.
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Still, the main results are essentially the same as before. In particular, as the prior
probability of primary schooling increases, the estimated mean of education changes from
negative to positive, and the estimated standard deviation of education is a concave
function. The health effect is weakened as the prior probability of primary schooling
increases, while initial state and democracy are insensitive to the probability change.
In the group democracy we select political rights as the most important variable. In
this group there are only two variables, so that π1 = 1/(1 + r) and π2 = r/(1 + r).
Changing the probability hardly changes the estimated means and standard deviations
for any of the groups.
We repeated these experiments for all other type I groups, both for the unequal
prior case and for the ordered priors case. Based on these experiments we draw three
conclusions regarding the sensitivity with respect to the prior probability. First, the
effects of proximate determinants on economic growth is robust to the choice of prior
probability, except for the group education. Second, the indirect effects of the prior
probability are very small, while the direct effect varies across groups. The direct effect
is large for those groups whose variables vary greatly, such as education. But it is small
for those groups whose variables are highly correlated, such as health, inflation, and scale
effect. Third, the standard deviations are quite robust.
6.6. Sensitivity with respect to grouping
It is not always easy to decide which variable belongs in which group. In this section we
investigate the sensitivity of estimates and standard deviations with respect to grouping.
We consider six scenarios. First, we consider separating GDP per capita in 1960 and the
initial size of the economy. This is motivated by the neoclassical growth model where
initial GDP per capita has a structural role and thus should always be included. This
is scenario S1. Second, we question whether the variable ‘public spending on education’
belongs in the group ‘education’. This variable has a low correlation with other education
variables, so perhaps it should be placed in a separate group (scenario S2). Third,
one might make a case for placing this variable in the group ‘government intervention’
(scenario S3). Besides separating public education spending, one could also consider
the possibility that enrollment rates and attainment levels (school years) have a different
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effect on growth, because the former is a flow measure while the latter captures the stock
of human capital. Thus, in scenario S4, we separate enrollment rates (variables 5–7 and
8), school years (variables 9–13), and public education spending. In scenario S5, we
allow that lower level (primary and secondary) and higher education may have different
effects because the first is related with basic literacy necessary for simpler activities while
the latter provides advanced capability useful in some innovative industry. Finally, we
consider separating latitude from tropic effect group since it could also measure proximity
to major economic hubs (scenario S6).
Table 6.6 presents the results of focus variables under alternative groupings. We
see that S1 leads to a much larger estimated coefficient (b = −0.0098) of the initial
level of income and a smaller variance (V = 0.0053), making initial income as one
of the most important determinants explaining cross-country growth differences. This
also provides strong evidence of convergence. The new grouping also has an impact on
other focus variables, but this impact is not large. For example, education effect on
steady-state growth is still weakly negative, while the effects of health, ethnolinguistic
fractionalization, and religion are strengthened to different extents. Results of other focus
variables and auxiliary variables are marginally affected except that estimated coefficients
of democracy and scale effects reduced by around 28% and 32%, respectively, and that of
trade statistic is doubled (standard deviation unchanged). Separating public education
spending makes education group slightly more negative but with larger variance given by
column S2, while assigning public education spending in ‘government intervention’ group
(column S3) has a weaker effect on education than S2. Column S4 shows that the effects
of both the flow measure and the stock measure of education are weak. Distinguishing
different levels of education (S5) suggests that primary and secondary education has a
very weak effect on growth, while the effect higher education is even negative. These
results confirm large variation of education variables as well as their distinct effects
on growth. In general we see most education variables are weakly related with growth
except for primary schooling. Finally, we see from column S6 that it does not make much



























Table 6.6: Sensitivity analysis on grouping: focus variables
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6
Education −0.0002 (0.0043) −0.0021 (0.0050) −0.0017 (0.0048) −0.0015 (0.0048)
Edu.stock −0.0020 (0.0066)
Edu.flow −0.0011 (0.0042)
Lower edu. 0.0000 (0.0049)
Higher edu. −0.0044 (0.0032)
Health 0.0088 (0.0064) 0.0077 (0.0060) 0.0074 (0.0058) 0.0077 (0.0060) 0.0082 (0.0062) 0.0071 (0.0058)
Initial state −0.0098 (0.0053) −0.0046 (0.0065) −0.0045 (0.0064) −0.0043 (0.0062) −0.0042 (0.0063) −0.0048 (0.0064)
Tropics effect −0.0030 (0.0033) −0.0029 (0.0034) −0.0031 (0.0034) −0.0032 (0.0034) −0.0031 (0.0034) −0.0028 (0.0041)
Ethnicity and lang. −0.0035 (0.0028) −0.0028 (0.0028) −0.0030 (0.0028) −0.0024 (0.0028) −0.0024 (0.0028) −0.0030 (0.0028)
Religion −0.0017 (0.0019) −0.0017 (0.0019) −0.0015 (0.0019) −0.0018 (0.0019) −0.0017 (0.0020) −0.0016 (0.0020)
Price distortion −0.0041 (0.0017) −0.0042 (0.0017) −0.0041 (0.0017) −0.0044 (0.0017) −0.0045 (0.0017) −0.0040 (0.0018)
Notes: Public education spending is treated as auxiliary in S2–S5, and other education-related groups are focus.
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We also look at the average relative change between the HWALS-F8 estimates and
standard deviations from the new grouping and the original grouping. If we consider
all variables, then some changes in grouping have a relatively significant effect on the
estimates, but the standard deviations are not much affected. This applies in particular
to the case where public spending in education is separated from group ‘education’, and
we find 30% change in estimates and 0.01% change in standard deviations. Grouping
public spending into government intervention affects the results only marginally, with
6% change in estimates and 0.6% standard deviation change. Distinguishing between
lower level and higher education (S4) and flow and stock (S5) lead to moderate changes
in both estimates and standard deviations, and separating absolute latitude also has
a weak effect. The average relative change is much less if we only compare the focus
groups.
6.7. Growth models: Alternative data set
This section applies hierarchical model averaging to a small set of growth data. There
are three reasons for doing this. First, we test the robustness of the endogenous growth
model with the distinction between focus and auxiliary regressors. Second, we compare
our results with Magnus et al.’s (2010) Model 2 that uses a similar data set. Finally, the
small data set allows us to study all combinations of measurements, so that we can have
more information on the distribution of our estimates, not just the first two moments.
This data set introduces two variables that are not listed in Tables 1 and 2 of our
main paper, namely
75 Equipment investment
76 Rule of law index,
both taken from Sala-i-Martin (1997). We follow a similar specification as in Model 2 of
Magnus et al. (2010), in which nine focus variables (labeled ‘F’ in Table 6.7) and three
auxiliary regressors were considered. The auxiliary variables are: political rights (25),
fraction GDP in mining (59), and population growth rate (65).
We note two deviations from the specification in Magnus et al. (2010). First, we take
into account different alternative measurements of four type I groups, namely education,
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health, democracy, and tropics effect. Second, since malaria prevalence belongs to the
group ‘health’, it is not estimated as a separate auxiliary variable as in Magnus et al.
(2010).
Table 6.7: Results for small data set
Group/Variable WALS HWALS
Constant (F) 0.0211 (0.0013) 0.0211 (0.0014)
Type I groups/variables
Education (F) −0.0009 (0.0038)
5 Primary schooling (F) 0.0039 (0.0026)
Health (F) 0.0060 (0.0045)
19 Life expectancy (F) 0.0065 (0.0041)
20 Malaria prevalence 0.0022 (0.0018)
Initial state (F) −0.0062 (0.0068)
23 GDP in 1960 (log) (F) −0.0149 (0.0030)
Democracy 0.0008 (0.0027)
25 Political rights −0.0014 (0.0018)
Tropics effect (F) 0.0005 (0.0024)
31 Frac. of tropical area (F) −0.0017 (0.0019)
Type II variables
36 Ethnolinguistic frac. (F) −0.0020 (0.0018) −0.0026 (0.0022)
39 Frac. Confucian (F) 0.0049 (0.0015) 0.0060 (0.0019)
59 Frac. GDP in mining −0.0003 (0.0013) −0.0006 (0.0015)
65 Population growth rate 0.0015 (0.0021) 0.0013 (0.0025)
75 Equipment investment (F) 0.0041 (0.0020) 0.0053 (0.0024)
76 Rule of law index (F) 0.0074 (0.0024) 0.0073 (0.0031)
The estimates based on the small data set are given in Table 6.7. The WALS results
in the table are different in magnitude from Magnus et al. (2010) (with the same signs)
due to the scaling of the regressors and also the different number of observations (We
have 6 countries less than Magnus et al. (2010) since we include additional alternative
measurements.) For type I groups, the WALS estimates correspond to variables while
the estimates in HWALS correspond to groups.
We first compare the signs, and then the precisions as in the large data set. Three
groups have different signs: education, tropics effect, and democracy. The counterin-
tuitive sign of education produced by HWALS is mainly due to large variation of nine
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measurements as discussed in our main paper. For the group tropics effect, HWALS
produces a positive estimate but very insignificant. The standard deviation is more than
four times the mean, so that the sign of the mean estimate is very uncertain. The large
standard deviation is mainly caused by the fact that the variables ‘tropic climate zone’
and ‘absolute latitude’ are insignificant and not robust. If we fix this group to ‘fraction
of tropical area’ and re-estimate using HWALS, ceteris paribus, we obtain a strongly
negative tropics effect. As for the group democracy, HWALS reports a negative effect,
but insignificant as well. This is in line with most studies on the association between
growth and democracy, as discussed in more detail in our paper.
Next, we comment on the precision of the estimates. Unlike in the large data set,
estimates from HWALS, in this case, have larger standard deviations than estimates
from WALS. This is because HWALS standard deviation explicitly takes into account
additional uncertainty on the choice of measurement that is not considered in WALS.
It is also because there are not many type I groups in this small data set, and thus
not many highly correlated variables are included in the WALS regressions. Therefore,
multicollinearity is not a serious problem here. To gain further insight on how the esti-
Table 6.8: Quantiles of estimated mean
Quantile 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
Constant (F) 0.0211 0.0211 0.0211 0.0211 0.0211
Education (F) −0.0044 −0.0022 −0.0012 0.0005 0.0033
Health (F) 0.0029 0.0037 0.0054 0.0066 0.0118
Initial state (F) −0.0138 −0.0119 −0.0054 −0.0001 0.0004
Democracy −0.0016 −0.0002 0.0007 0.0017 0.0036
Tropics effect (F) −0.0013 −0.0003 0.0009 0.0015 0.0019
Ethnolinguistic frac. (F) −0.0038 −0.0033 −0.0026 −0.0020 −0.0013
Frac. Confucian (F) 0.0048 0.0052 0.0058 0.0068 0.0073
Frac. GDP in mining −0.0010 −0.0008 −0.0005 −0.0004 −0.0001
Population growth rate −0.0001 0.0009 0.0015 0.0018 0.0024
Equipment investment (F) 0.0039 0.0051 0.0055 0.0058 0.0063
Rule of law index (F) 0.0052 0.0065 0.0073 0.0079 0.0096
mated mean and standard deviation vary across different combinations of measurements,
we present the quantiles of the mean and standard deviation estimates in Tables 6.8
and 6.9. The quantiles are obtained based on 216 (= 2×9×2×3×2) possible choices of
measurements. The quantiles are calculated without weighting, and therefore invariant
145
Chapter 6: Supplementary document to Chapter 2
Table 6.9: Quantiles of estimated standard deviation
Quantile 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
Constant (F) 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0015 0.0015
Education (F) 0.0018 0.0020 0.0020 0.0028 0.0031
Health (F) 0.0021 0.0022 0.0022 0.0033 0.0036
Initial state (F) 0.0021 0.0022 0.0022 0.0032 0.0034
Democracy 0.0017 0.0018 0.0018 0.0020 0.0021
Tropics effect (F) 0.0015 0.0017 0.0017 0.0023 0.0025
Ethnolinguistic frac. (F) 0.0018 0.0020 0.0020 0.0021 0.0021
Frac. Confucian (F) 0.0015 0.0016 0.0016 0.0016 0.0017
Frac. GDP in mining 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0016 0.0016
Population growth rate 0.0020 0.0022 0.0022 0.0024 0.0026
Equipment investment (F) 0.0020 0.0021 0.0021 0.0023 0.0024
Rule of law index (F) 0.0024 0.0025 0.0025 0.0029 0.0029
to the prior probability. Quantiles provide more information on the distribution of the
estimates, from which we can see which groups (variables) are robust with respect to
the choice of measurements and which are not. We emphasize that it makes no sense to
associate the estimated mean and standard deviation at the same quantile level because
they are obtained from different measurement combinations.
We first look at the quantiles of the estimated means in Table 6.8. For type I groups,
health is the most robust group with positive mean estimates at all quantiles. Although
initial state, democracy, and tropics effect are less robust, still about 70% of their es-
timated means are consistently negative. Education has the largest variation in mean
estimates. About half of them are negative, while the other half are positive. The esti-
mated means of type II groups all have consistent signs except population growth rate.
Among them, the variables equipment investment, religion, and rule of law are highly
robust, while ethnolinguistic fraction, fraction GDP in mining, and population growth
rate are relatively less robust. Generally speaking, we observe that estimates of variables
(type II groups) vary much less than estimates of concepts (type I groups). This suggests
that changing the measurements of a group has a much smaller impact on other groups
(indirect effect) than on the group itself (direct effect). This observation is the basis of
our approximation strategy. Compared to the estimated means, the estimated standard
deviations reported in Table 6.9 have much smaller variations, showing that estimated
standard deviations are more robust to the choice of measurements than means.
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Ciccone, A. and M. Jarociński (2010). Determinants of economic growth: Will data tell?
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 2, 222–246.
Claessens, S. and L. Laeven (2003). Financial development, property rights, and growth.
Journal of Finance 58, 2401–2436.
Collier, P. and B. Goderis (2008). Commodity prices, growth, and the natural resource
curse: Reconciling a conundrum. MPRA Paper 17315, University Library of Munich,
Germany.
Danilov, D. (2005). Estimation of the mean of a univariate normal distribution when
the variance is not known. Econometrics Journal 8, 277–291.
Danilov, D. and J. R. Magnus (2004a). Forecast accuracy after pretesting with an
application to the stock market. Journal of Forecasting 23, 251–274.
Danilov, D. and J. R. Magnus (2004b). On the harm that ignoring pretesting can cause.
Journal of Econometrics 122, 27–46.
De Luca, G. and J. R. Magnus (2011). Bayesian model averaging and weighted average
least squares: Equivariance, stability, and numerical issues. The Stata Journal 11,
518–544.
Doppelhofer, G. and M. Weeks (2009). Jointness of growth determinants. Journal of
Applied Econometrics 24, 209–244.
Durlauf, S. N., P. A. Johnson, and J. R. W. Temple (2005). Growth econometrics. In
S. N. Durlauf (Ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, pp. 555–677. Amsterdam: North
Holland.
Durlauf, S. N., A. Kourtellos, and C. M. Tan (2008). Are any growth theories robust?
The Economic Journal 118, 329–346.
Durlauf, S. N., A. Kourtellos, and C. M. Tan (2012). Is God in the details? A reexami-




Eicher, T. S., C. Papageorgiou, and A. E. Raftery (2011). Default priors and predictive
performance in Bayesian model averaging, with application to growth determinants.
Journal of Applied Econometrics 26, 30–55.
Elliott, G. and A. Timmermann (2004). Optimal forecast combinations under general
loss functions and forecast error distributions. Journal of Econometrics 122, 47–79.
Fan, J. and I. Gijbels (1996). Local Polynomial Modelling and Its Applications. London,
UK: Chapman and Hall.
Fan, R., Y. Fang, and S. Y. Park (2012). Resource abundance and economic growth in
China. China Economic Review .
Fernandez, C., E. Ley, and M. F. J. Steel (2001). Model uncertainty in cross-country
growth regressions. Journal of Applied Econometrics 16, 563–576.
Froehlich, B. R. (1973). Some estimators for a random coefficient regression model.
Journal of the American Statistical Association 68, 329–335.
George, E. I. (2010). Dilution priors: Compensating for model space redundancy. In J. O.
Berger, T. T. Cai, and I. M. Johnstone (Eds.), Borrowing Strength: Theory Powering
Applications — A Festschrift for Lawrence D. Brown, pp. 158–165. Beachwood, Ohio,
USA: Institute of Mathematical Statistics.
Giles, J. A. and D. E. A. Giles (1993). Pre-test estimation and testing in econometrics:
Recent developments. Journal of Economic Surveys 7, 145–197.
Golub, G. H., M. Heath, and G. Wahba (1979). Generalized cross-validation as a method
for choosing a good ridge parameter. Technometrics 21, 215–223.
Granger, C. W. J. (2003). Time series concepts for conditional distributions. Oxford
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 65, 689–701.
Habakkuk, H. J. (1962). American and British Technology in the Nineteenth Century.
Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Hansen, B. E. (2007). Least squares model averaging. Econometrica 75, 1175–1189.
150
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Hansen, B. E. (2008). Least-squares forecast averaging. Journal of Econometrics 146,
342–350.
Hendry, D. F. and M. P. Clements (2004). Pooling of forecasts. Econometrics Journal 7,
1–31.
Hildreth, C. and J. P. Houck (1968). Some estimators for a linear model with random
coefficients. Journal of the American Statistical Association 63, 584–595.
Hjort, N. L. and G. Claeskens (2003). Frequentist model average estimators. Journal of
the American Statistical Association 98, 879–899.
Hoerl, A. E. and R. W. Kennard (1970). Ridge regression: Biased estimation for
nonorthogonal problems. Technometrics 12, 55–67.
Hoover, D. R., J. A. Rice, C. O. Wu, and L. Yang (1998). Nonparametric smoothing
estimates of time-varying coeffcient models with longitudinal data. Biometrika 85 (4),
809–822.
Huang, J., J. L. Horowitz, , and F. Wei (2010). Variable selection in nonparametric
additive models. The Annals of Statistics 38, 2282–2313.
Isham, J., M. Woolcock, L. Pritchett, and G. Busby (2005). The varieties of resource
experience: Natural resource export structures and the political economy of economic
growth. World Bank Economic Review 19, 141–174.
Jackson, T. and S. Karlsson (2004). Finding good predictors for inflation: A Bayesian
model averaging approach. Journal of Forecasting 23, 479–496.
Janeba, E. and W. Peters (1999). Tax evasion, tax competition and the gains from
nondiscrimination: The case of interest taxation in Europe. Economic Journal 109,
93–101.
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